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Ricardo's Mistake

by JakeS Sat Dec 12th, 2009 at 06:45:49 AM EST

Ricardo is one of those classical economists who is usually turned into a pagan idol - to be the subject either of worship or of purification rites, depending on one's political affiliation.

It will, I hope, be evident that this text is written with no such desire. Richardo was not a stupid man, nor, I believe, a uniquely wicked one. Those of his models that have passed into the modern (neo)classical synthesis were not stupid models, and they were not based on stupid assumptions. They have, however, suffered the unfortunate fate that most economic theory will eventually fall prey to: Events have overtaken several of the key assumptions underpinning them.

Theory

The best way to illustrate this will be with a little graph:

The image on the right illustrates the production possibility frontiers (PPF) of two countries, A and B, with equal population (for a thorough introduction to PPFs, see this diary by Migeru). Both countries produce microchips and ball bearings, but Country A is an industrial state, while Country B is a third-world country, as seen from the disparity in their production levels (recall that they have similar population).

Now imagine that we open up Ricardian free trade between these two countries. What happens?

The answer is "nothing at all." The PPFs of these countries have precisely the same shape, so there is no expansion in the aggregated PPF from Ricardian free trade.1

Practise

Suppose now that a well-meaning economist manages to convince Country A to enter into a bilateral trade agreement with Country B, modelled on the pattern of existing GATT/WTO treaties.

Promoted by afew


After one year, the picture looks like this:

Country A, as we see, is now poorer than it used to be (its PPF has been reduced). Country B is richer, granted, but the aggregated PPF has shrunk.

That was not supposed to happen.

The Mistake

So what went wrong here? Simple: The Ricardian analysis of trade is a (quasi)static analysis. It does not permit the production possibility frontiers to change - or at least it does not permit them to change due to trade.2

Now, why would the PPFs change due to trade? Simple: Modern "free trade" agreements permit free flow of capital - both in terms of financial assets and physical plant.

Microchips and ball bearings are both industries that require highly precise machine tools. A factory worker who is involved in the process of making ball bearings can not simply leave the factory and set up shop on his own, because he does not own any of the required machines (nevermind the intellectual property rights, long-term supply contracts and sundry other aspects of modern corporate management). So, if the capitalists who own the factory decide to shut it down and move the machines that permit production to another site, the worker is left with a more or less useless skill set, because he has no machines available with which to apply those skills.

But why would the capitalist decide to move it to a country where labour is less productive? This is also fairly simple, and can be summarised in two words: Rent seeking. Suppose, as in our example above, that the workers in Country B employ machines only 75 % as efficiently as the workers in Country A (due to lack of training, lack of proper infrastructure, etc.). But suppose that the workers in Country A are able to capture half of the value added in the industrial production, while the workers in Country B are only able to capture a quarter of the value added (due to differences in organisation, democratic accountability of the government, etc.).

The capitalist's return on his investment in Country A is then

[value added]x[fraction of value added captured by capitalist] = 100 % x 50 % = 50 %

His return on investment in Country B is

[value added]x[fraction of value added captured by capitalist] = 75 % x 75 % = 56.25 %.

In other words, from the point of view of the capitalist, the return on investment can be greater in the country with the lower productivity.

Discussion

This seems like a pretty silly mistake to make, in our modern world. So why did I say that I didn't consider Ricardo a stupid man?

Well, Ricardo didn't live in our modern world. In Ricardo's world, the assumption that a country's capacity to produce was unrelated to whether it traded or not was not a stupid assumption. At Ricardo's time, production was almost exclusively craftsmanship and agriculture. The means of production were the skills of the workman and the quality of the soil he tilled. On a sunny day he might have a steam engine. The miller had a wind or water mill and the smith had a smithy. But these are not terribly mobile constructs at the best of times, and Ricardo's world did not have massive rail nets or intercontinental container shipping. So the means of production didn't move around much.

Modern economists have no similarly persuasive defence. Nevertheless, they do have two main excuses that are usually employed in defence of this bastardised Ricardian theory.3

The first is that the workmen in Country A are engaged in rent seeking behaviour, by using the collective bargaining power derived from labour unions to capture a greater share of the value added than that to which they would be entitled by the operation of market forces. The liberalisation of trade then eliminates the ability of labour unions to engage in such rent seeking behaviour.

The second excuse is that the reason the workmen of Country A capture a larger share of the value added is that they have better prospects for gainful employment elsewhere. This, by raising the opportunity cost of being employed in the microchip industry, increases the minimal wage that their fellow workmen are willing to accept, and thus improves the bargaining power of each individual workman. Therefore, the workman in Country A loses less by the movement of production to Country B than the workman in Country B gains.

It is easily recognised that both of these excuses presuppose a liquid, competitive labour market populated by small, independent, rational actors with fungible skills and equal access to information.4 They are, in other words, utter and complete garbage.

- Jake

1I have tacitly assumed that the countries have the same relative demand for microchips and ball bearings. If they had different relative demand, Ricardian trade would expand their potential consumption.

2I owe a hat tip here to this excellent article which first started me down this line of thinking.

3Both by those who are caught up in the conventional wisdom and those who are being deliberately obtuse [8 of Spades].

4Proof is left as an exercise to the reader, as a discussion of the (neo)classical misconception of labour markets is beyond the scope of this diary.

Display:
The economy of Ricardo's day was far from a pre-industrial paradise, but that does not change the nature of your argument at all.  There were rather large steam-powered mills of all sorts, not only in textiles.  But the ability to manufacture the machinery for these mills was quite limited, and in that sense capital was not mobile.
by Zwackus on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 06:31:53 AM EST
I'd hardly call the agrarian pre-industrial world a "paradise" by any of the ordinarily employed definitions of that word.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 08:04:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In fifty years, it may look like on.  :-)
by Zwackus on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 04:54:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That would require a quite imaginative and historically unprecedented disaster, such as a nuclear war.

They did not have running water and central heating in the late 18th century. I can dispense with most of the wonders of modern civilisation if need be, as long as I am allowed to keep running water and central heating.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 08:22:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
may yet match the imagined effects of  a major nuclear exchange.
by wu ming on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 08:04:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Possible, but unlikely.

However, global warming may yet trigger a major nuclear exchange.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 08:08:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
??? I find this troubling.

As recently as 50 years ago, plenty of people in Europe and the U.S. didn't have central heating or running water (cold, let alone hot).

It is not that big of a deal to not have these things. Admittedly it is easier to turn a tap and have hot water come out, but is it really so important?

by asdf on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 11:09:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I take it you're not living in the northern boundary of the temperate climate zone? It gets real cold in the winter up here...

Before central heating, people would use oil furnaces in their basement to heat their house - but I made the tacit assumption that those were going to go away long before central heating would. And distributing firewood to every household in Scandinavia would be a major undertaking.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 11:17:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I live in Colorado Springs, where currently the outside temperature is 5 degrees F. I'm spoiled by my nice natural gas furnace and hot water system.

But my family lived in Steamboat Springs where it gets to 40 below zero (F and C) in the winter, and they only had coal stoves. Their domestic water supply was a pump in the kitchen, and a cistern. This was in the 1940s.

We lived in various European countries and Australia in the 1960s and 1970s in houses that did not have central heat. It's really a pretty recent innovation in rural areas...

by asdf on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 11:26:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Point taken.

But I'm assuming here that coal and oil stoves for private use will fall out of use before district heating in the event of a serious disruption of industrial society.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 11:36:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Sweden managed to use firewood during ww2. Wood was actually used for cars too.

There are quite a lot of great ww2 pictures with big outdoors piles of chopped wood in swedish cities, but google was not with me today in finding any. And yes, it was a major undertaking.

(Saw btw a neat little propaganda film from 1941 that emphasised the values of riding your bike. "You will be saving energy for where it is needed better, you will feel well and you will even look better!")

But if we are to rebuild for a low energy future I think insulating is the first step. We have houses in Sweden that are heated by leftover heat from home appliances and the inhabitants.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Dec 15th, 2009 at 06:11:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Running water is a pre-industrial technology.  Pressurized water from the tap might not be, but fresh water delivered to one's home, combined with adequate sewage, is something that's been done here and there since the dawn of civilization.

Central heating is overrated.  I haven't had central heating for the past five and a half years, living in a "modern" apartment in industrialized Japan, and I get along just fine.

But I'm just being silly and pedantic, here, and not meaningfully engaging with any of the primary issues in your diary.

by Zwackus on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 11:11:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But then, were there many towns ever with that kind of freshwater system without a powerful civilisation keeping the peace ? The Roman aquaducts quickly broke up after the fall of the empire...

Also, I'm in VietNam right now, and pressurised or drinkable tap water is not really existing. Most buildings have an individual water tank, and only bottles allow for drinkable water.

Un roi sans divertissement est un homme plein de misères

by linca (antonin POINT lucas AROBASE gmail.com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 05:20:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The romans had both, perhaps we could learn something from the decline and fall of the roman empire?  Any bunch of gibbons would say so.
by njh on Sun Dec 13th, 2009 at 06:29:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Ok, a serious question.

Textile mill technology was developed in the 18th century in England, then borrowed (or stolen) for introduction in the USA. The technology was as mobile as the person who understood it. Similarly, 19th century gold mines in California and Colorado were generally run by European engineers. 20th century mines in South America were frequently run by American engineers.

Today, Global Foundries is setting up a new chip fab using technology from the USA and Far East, and money from the Middle East.

What is the difference?

by asdf on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 11:38:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
People did not, as a rule, move around as much. Moreover, as soon as the mine or factory was set up, the factory did not tend to move around very much.

By contrast, today you can gut the factory, ship the machines halfway around the world and put them in a factory there. And your engineers will not take a month to get there, but a couple of days.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 12:15:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
We're also forgetting capital controls, the fact that financial capital was also aptly assumed to be tied to its home country and that free movement of capital has become pretty much complete (and, moreover, a part of "free 'trade'" agreements in the last 30 years or so).

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 04:47:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I think a persuasive argument can be made that British financial capital, at least, was not seriously constrained by those capital controls. Probably not French either.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 04:51:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I think a persuasive argument can be made that British financial capital, at least, was not seriously constrained by those capital controls.

In Ricardo's time there was no need. The opportunities were right there in Britain. Plus, until 1815 there was the minor annoyance of the Napoleonic Wars. This probably remained the case at least through mid century. Why send your money overseas if there are ample opportunities at home, where you can keep a close eye on it and influence the government through known and traditional means?

By 1880 there was a need by those who held the capital, and who had great influence over the government, to find profitable investment opportunities abroad lest they cause the price of labor in Britain to rise and the return on their existing investments to decline. So long as they could manipulate the government into providing basic security in a destination country, such as India or South Africa, on pretext of colonial rivalry or "national interest" they could manufacture rails and locomotives in the U.K. from existing plants, build and operate railroads, etc. in India and South Africa, thereby bringing vast hinterlands into the reach, through their control, of "the market."

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 05:49:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'd like to see more evidence of this. The railroads in Colorado were built (1880s) largely with English money.
by asdf on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 09:38:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That's 60 years after Ricardo, already in the middle of the Long Depression and after financial capitalism had already replaced the entrepreneurial capitalism of Smith/Ricardo, at least in capital-intensive sectors such as railways. What Veblen wrote in 1904 about railways and finance is not that different from what Minsky was writing in 1986, but both are a world apart from what Ricardo was writing about.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 10:23:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
U.S. laws and institutions were sufficiently similar to those of the U.K. that British investors were generally comfortable investing in high potential return projects in the USA, not to mention Canada.  But they were also very active, for instance, in Argentina and Chile as well.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 05:51:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I believe russian railroads were similarly built with french money.

(This was also during the the first period of globalization so Mig's comment applies similarly to it.)

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Dec 15th, 2009 at 06:15:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
asdf:
The technology was as mobile as the person who understood it

Only as long as the technology was lite, using machines made of wood and other natural materials a craftsman could assemble. The colonists and later Americans did develop foundries and metal-working, but it took time to build an industrial infrastructure. It wasn't as quick and easy as you describe.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 01:44:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
We would have to get into a serious discussion of the history of technology to decide this. Worcester, Massachusetts, was in the middle of the industrial revolution pretty much from the start.

http://www.nps.gov/spar/upload/Tho%20Blanchard%20bulletin%201206%20A.doc

I suppose the first thing to do would be to choose some dates for comparison, say 1850 and 2000...

by asdf on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 09:43:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
My remark applies to the colonial and early American period (your reference to 18th century). By the mid-nineteenth century America had built up considerably more infrastructure.

The Blanchard story is interesting, but more a story of an individual craftsman's ingeniosity than the mobility of technology.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 09:59:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I suppose to be fair, the first date would have to be 1800, when Ricardo was still alive. However, I agree that the U.S. was at least 50 years behind Britain in industrialization, up until perhaps 1850. I suspect it was more a matter of population than anything else; even in eastern New England, the population was pretty low in 1800. Massachusetts had fewer than 500,000 people, mostly farmers. Sure, they could put up a mill, but why bother? The standard of living even for regular farmers was astoundingly high at the time.

Look at this house that Bronson Alcott lived in in Concord, for example. And he was broke most of the time.

by asdf on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 08:06:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The first ironworks in the Mass. Bay Colony was established prior to 1640 so as to support ship building and other local industry, some of the most advanced technology of the day. The Puritans came from the north east of England and brought with them the best practices of all the various trades of the time required for this industry. The volumes were relatively low and the source of iron was limonite or rock ore from bogs, which was the same source as in England. And timber, both for ships and for furnaces was much more abundant in New England than in England. See Creating the Commonwealth by Stephen Innes, p.239 & fff.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 06:17:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
As I understood it (and his book is still in my queue, so this is second-hand) the point of Ricardo's work, as if often the case, was to debunk the people who claimed that trade was always, at best, a zero-sum game. He showed that it was possible for both sides to benefit, not that they always would - in rather the way that Smith's work was aimed at errors and debates common in his time.

As ever, later economists bastardised Ricardo's argument to claim that trade was intrinsically good.

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 07:02:23 AM EST
I very much like your piece, but it should be pointed out that modern trade economics doesn't rely on Ricardo for anything other than providing a simple heuristic on how trade might work.  The state of the field has advanced far beyond Ricardo by now. The most recent major theoretical addition was by Krugman, using your same hypothetical world of two countries with the same shaped PPFs.  Trade also can occur due to increasing returns to scale and as such result in positive economic outcomes for all actors.  By combining the PPFs of two countries, a single larger economy allows for those firms with increasing returns to scale to increase in size, resulting in increasing intra-firm transfers between the two countries.  The automobile industry is one good example. Because the benefits of such forms of trade are not based upon transferring wealth from owners of factors -- labor or capital -- to each other they may result in higher wealth for all workers and capitalists in both countries, alike.
by santiago on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 10:30:23 AM EST
Nevertheless, precisely the logic discussed under the "Theory" section remains in the textbooks used at the undergraduate level in fresh- and brownwater schools of economics. Discussions of the underlying assumptions and limitations are normally omitted.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 02:51:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, it is, because at the introductory, undergraduate level the heuristic of trade is an important concept to grasp in order to begin to understand how to use and criticize the tool sets that economists employ. By the undergraduate intermediate (3rd and 4th year undergrads) level, the up-to-date works that either advance beyond or refute Ricardo and other classical economists such as Marx and Smith are central parts of the standard curricula.  The fact that such courses are more difficult and advanced, mathematically and otherwise, leaves too many people -- non -economists who just took the intro courses -- with just the misleading, intro 101 concepts -- and I agree that this is an important pedagogical problem in the field.
by santiago on Fri Dec 11th, 2009 at 09:53:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You give econ majors far too much credit.

Whenever you construct toy models, you reach back to the first- and second-year textbooks. Because that's where you learned to build toy models. So if you teach people nonsensical toy models in the first- and second-year textbooks, they will come away with a nonsensical conventional wisdom.

You can teach more sophisticated models later to your heart's content, but the qualitative, intuitive understanding - their bullshit detector, if you will - will still be based on their conventional wisdom.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Dec 11th, 2009 at 08:39:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... teaching a model - any model - without even mentioning the most constraining assumptions is simply inexcusable. Particularly when you provide a number of non-essential assumptions that mislead people into believing that the assumptions underlying the model have been stated.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Dec 11th, 2009 at 08:43:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Looking at it from the outside, I would say that teaching one set of models the first years and then showing the more advanced ones that show the faults of the first year's models serves multiple purposes.

  1. You can indoctrinate a large number to serve as loyal footsoldiers - bureacrats in companies in the case of economics - while
  2. educating those that show talent for the subject further to keep some a second line of intellectual defense.


Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
by A swedish kind of death on Tue Dec 15th, 2009 at 06:27:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It doesn't have to be that Machiavellian. Physics envy is plenty sufficient.

Those advanced models "replace" the simple first-year models, "in the same sense that quantum theory replaced classical mechanics." And since the undergraduate-level stuff has been supplanted, it doesn't need to be revisited. After all, you don't revisit the classical physics textbooks much either.

The difference that this physics envy conceals is that the relative importance of the simplifications that go into physics models does not change over time. The three assumptions that were most constraining on a model of the motion of the gyroscope two hundred years ago (air resistance, contact point friction and rigidity) are still the three assumptions that are most constraining today.

The same cannot, alas, be said for economic models. So you have a toy model that stipulates liquid, competitive markets as the three most important assumptions, and doesn't even bother to mention capital immobility. Which was not a bad way to prioritise the assumptions two hundred years ago. Unfortunately, today competitive markets is an afterthought compared to the enormity of assuming that capital is immobile. But toy-model trade theory is Settled Science, so there's no need to revisit those models. Right?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Dec 15th, 2009 at 07:49:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
santiago:
Because the benefits of such forms of trade are not based upon transferring wealth from owners of factors -- labor or capital -- to each other they may result in higher wealth for all workers and capitalists in both countries, alike.

There is no doubt that the rise of global corporations - with hugely expanded access to global markets, levels of capital, and scope for applying technological innovation has hugely expanded their total wealth, productivity, value added etc.  But what evidence do we have that this incremental wealth is spread to all workers and capitalists in all countries ALIKE?

notes from no w here

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Wed Dec 9th, 2009 at 07:26:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Read Krugman's numerous works on the topic and for which he was awarded the Nobel prize last year. What he found was that most trade occurs NOT between countries with comparative advantages between each other, but between countries with almost identical factor costs in labor, capital, regulation, unionization, etc.  Most trade occurs between countries that are almost entirely alike.  US-Canada. EU-EU. Japan - US.  Etc.  Krugman asked how this could be true if the neo-classical trade theories of Storper-Samuelson (which models trade as returns to labor and capital in different countries) or Heckscher-Ohlin (a more advanced version of the classic Ricardo model of abundant and scarce factors) were also true, and he finds that they can't -- that another explanation of trade was required to explain the most common type of trade in the late 20th century-- intra-firm transfers.  
by santiago on Fri Dec 11th, 2009 at 10:03:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That would be trade measured in money right?

So if 5 tons of raw materials are shipped from country A to country B that keeps 4 tons within their borders and sell 1 ton (with labor added) to country C for more then 5 times the value/ton of the original raw materials most of the trade will be between B and C?

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Dec 15th, 2009 at 06:25:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Because the benefits of such forms of trade are not based upon transferring wealth from owners of factors -- labor or capital -- to each other they may result in higher wealth for all workers and capitalists in both countries, alike. (My bold)

At times benefits have accrued to workers as well as capitalists, but not particularly in the USA in the last 30 years. As J.S. Mill noted, there is no reason that the distribution of wealth has to follow the same pattern as the generation of wealth. In fact there are substantial reasons why the distribution of wealth should be significantly more equal than the generation. After all, those who became rich through their industry in fact did not do so in isolation from the rest of society, but rather by relying on the laws, human resources and social structures provided by that society and by being able to harness those factors to his benefit.

Unfortunately, social science is so badly taught in the USA that a majority of those who would benefit personally from such a more equitable distribution of wealth think that this would be wrong. I do not believe this is an accident.  

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 08:08:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I haven't done my homework (ie. read your article together with its links).  However, with just a cursory glance, I would question this assumption:

The PPFs of these countries have precisely the same shape, so there is no expansion in the aggregated PPF from Ricardian free trade.


"Beware of the man who does not talk, and the dog that does not bark." Cheyenne
by maracatu on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 01:04:19 PM EST
That assumption is only there to aid in the illustration. It is perfectly possible to dispense with it, but that would require three paragraphs of additional explanation and qualifiers that are unimportant for the conclusions at hand.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 02:49:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Oh dear.  You're forcing me to sit down and read it closely (when?  Ha!  That is the question!!).  I teach graduate international economics and I use Krugman's book, so this has nefariously conspired to grab my attention and it won't let go.

"Beware of the man who does not talk, and the dog that does not bark." Cheyenne
by maracatu on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 05:45:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
P/N time!

There is also the labor wage rate compared to cost of living.  A worker in a high cost of living area requires a higher base salary then one in a low cost of living area.  A $20,000/yr salary in some 3rd world country is a "Middle Class" wage.  $20,000/year won't hack it in the US.

This process drives down wage rates in the high cost of living countries, reducing surplus funds for non-necessary purchases, and reducing the purchase of the ball bearings.  Eventually there's the situation where no one can move because we're all standing on each other's hands.

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

by ATinNM on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 07:16:56 PM EST
Demand-side effects like that are beyond the intended scope of this diary, which deals exclusively with debunking the Conventional Wisdom on its own (supply-side) turf.

I'm not quote confident (arrogant?) enough yet to venture a model of supply-wage-demand feedback.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Dec 8th, 2009 at 08:28:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... is a robust argument about the benefits of balanced trade in finished products between two self-sufficient economies, and applying it to globalization indicates either ignorance or duplicity.

It does point to something more than just criticizing the appeal to Ricardo for globalization policies - it also points to a checklist for how to build trade institutions that benefit all participants, which is to build a set of institutions under which Ricard's assumptions are valid:

  • Balanced Trade - which implies there is no need for foreign exchange market transactions provided that the shipping can be paid for in the currency of one of the two trading countries. This makes it useful for a "Progressive Shock" strategy policy, since it can still function if all participants currencies have melted down in foreign exchange markets - provided that within the participating countries is the physical capacity to perform the shipping
  • Finished products - raw materials, component parts, financial "services", all lay outside the assumptions of Ricardo's argument.
  • Freedom to trade or not - the restriction to trade in finished goods is part of that. However if there is a dependency relationship, then it would be strongly preferable that there is at least multiple countries participating that can sell the product that other participants are dependent upon.

One example would be a trade catalog system, in which each participating country lists products in own-currency prices, and prospective importers from other countries bid in their own currencies, and the bid book is periodically converted into an order book using shadow exchange rates that maximize the number of cleared transactions. One (or more) of the participating countries must have shipping capacity, and all prices (either way) would be at the port of the other party.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 12:06:17 PM EST
Are Ricardo's assumptions necessary? How far can they be relaxed?
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 12:13:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Lessee:

Finished goods - relax those and you open a Pandora's box. Its an open question whether a robust argument arriving at similar conclusions can be provided without that restriction, but in the past hundred plus years, there hasn't been. The H-O approach of neoclassical economics rests on counter-factual assumptions, so it only says what would be true if we were a different species of animal entirely living in an economy organized on different lines.

So for that, the answer is, I don't know. I don't know of anyone who has successfully relaxed it, but it may be that the ones who have tried have been using tools that only address fictitious economies, while those who use tools that address real world economies have not actually been trying.

Balanced trade - no, that can't be relaxed and ensure the Ricardian result. Without balanced trade, there is either unrequited transfers or credit/debt relationships. When there are unrequited transfers, that blows the "all participants gains from the increase in production possibilities" line of the argument, and when there are credit/debt relationships, that brings in intrinsic uncertainty about what one or the other side of the transaction is actually getting in return. Indeed, one of the main ways that neoclassicals and their heirs bullshit themselves into thinking that globalisation is covered by the Ricardian argument is by working with models in which credit/debt is simply arbitrage over time, ignoring that fact that completion of the transaction takes place in an uncertain future under unknown conditions.

Self-sufficiency - no, that can't be completely relaxed - that is the immiserating trade literature, it all hangs on trade dependency allowing one participant to be forced to accept outcomes because of the incapability of declining to trade at all leading to a fundamental inequality in economic power. However, as I noted, if rivalry between multiple sources of the things that the dependent participants are dependent on, it can be mitigated. Under post-Industrial Revolution political economies, that dependency has been on capacity to produce capital equipment, though of course the specific strategic capacity that defines core, semi-peripheral and peripheral economies in a trading system will vary over longer stretches of economic history.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 01:49:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
One of the true dawn-time civilizations, the Indus River people of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa, seem to have built rather elaborate water and sewage systems.  Ancient Persian civilization was built on a series of underground aqueducts that drew mountain water to farms and cities, some of which are still functioning today.  The Minoans are another example.

These were all strong civilizations, yes.  Then again, building underground canals carved out of rock is a lot harder than building a basic water system would be today.

by Zwackus on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 04:30:16 PM EST
Oops, this was supposed to be attached to Linca's comment on my comment above.  Sorry.
by Zwackus on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 04:30:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But that was my point : water management is not really tied to technology but to large, stable civilisations. Indeed, the dawn-time civilisations are intrinsically correlated with the need for large scale water management...

Also, large civilisations were the first political tool that allowed to make peasants work at digging rocks 40 kms from home rather than goofing off in one's field during lower times of agricultural activity. And that's actually quite hard to achieve.

Un roi sans divertissement est un homme plein de misères

by linca (antonin POINT lucas AROBASE gmail.com) on Thu Dec 10th, 2009 at 10:11:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]


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