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In defence of NATO

by JakeS Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 06:04:59 AM EST

This is actually a diary that I've been wanting to do for some time, but always kinda pushed back because there were Other Things To Do. But with front page story on the issue, and Frank's review of NATO's potential irrelevance, I guess that excuse no longer applies.

So without further ado:

One of the questions that has been raised a couple of times on ET but never quite, in my opinion, adequately answered is "what is NATO good for?" For some reason, most people who write diaries on how NATO and the Union can integrate their political and military command and control structures seem to develop urgent appointments elsewhere whenever the question is raised...

The only coherent response to the question (that I've seen) is Marek's analysis, which can - I think - be briefly summarised as "Eastern Europe suffers from a severe case of rysskräck, and view NATO membership as the only way to obtain a credible (read: American) security guarantee against a hypothetical Russian violation of their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

While that's not entirely unreasonable, I don't find it completely satisfying as justifications go: If the Poles and Estonians are not convinced that Paris will nuke Moscow over an invasion of Eastern Europe... what possible justification can they have for believing that the US would? At worst, the US would stand to lose some core client states - but Western Europe - including the independent French nuclear deterrent - would be directly threatened on its very existence, if Russian troops were to suddenly stand at the German border.

And besides, when Russia was "pacifying" Chechnya, it had to pour the next best thing to a hundred thousand soldiers into the meat grinder. This was in order to "pacify" a backwater third-world country that nobody cares about (to the extent that they ever managed to do that...), and with a population of around one million people. I am, shall we say, less than convinced that Russia could win a serious land war against all of Eastern Europe.

But enough of that - the title was "In defence of NATO" - so let's get down to that. I'll advance two core arguments here:

  1. Military interdependency is A Good Idea, because it increases the number of people who have to sign off on a war. If the European Union is unable to operate its military independently of the US outside our own territory, it would mean that we would have to get active US support every time our Dear Leaders thought it right and proper to go bomb the stuffing out of some random brown people in a country nobody cares about. All else being equal, this leads to fewer people getting bombed. Which, in my book, is A Good Thing. (The converse - making the US dependent on European support for their colonial adventures - is a nice pipe dream, but will probably prove, ah, impractical.)

  2. Nothing in the NATO framework forces European countries to join the US in its colonial adventures: The NATO treaty speaks exclusively of defencive military commitments. The fact that our Dear Leaders find it opportune to join the US in its colonial wars is problem with European political culture, not with NATO per se. Bluntly put, if NATO does not force European governments to go along with American adventures, then removing NATO would do nothing to curb Euro-American adventurism.

An addendum to point 1) is that having an integrated military structure with one of the two powers on the planet that possesses the logistical capability to fight a serious shooting war with the EU probably decreases the probability of such a shooting war. Can't hurt, at any rate.

To that end, I'll examine the NATO charter in some detail below the fold [my bold everywhere].

From the diaries - afew


Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

This article really says everything that European governments would need to say, if they decided not to back an American colonial adventure: The NATO framework cannot, as stipulated right there, in the first friggin' article, be used for colonial wars. Punkt, aus, schluss.

Article 2 looks to me like standard diplomat-speak for "we're gonna be good buddies and not fuck each other over in general." I don't see anything objectionable. It is sufficiently vague that it could potentially be interpreted as a commitment to copying the American political economy. But if that's true it would equally bind the US to copy the European political economy: The only place in the treaty where the US is given specific mention is in a technical detail vis-a-vis ratification.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

The ability to resist armed attack is not the same thing as offencive strike capabilities, and this article speaks only of the former - there is no commitment here to maintaining or supporting any overseas strike force, "rapid response force," or any other form of imperial gendarmerie.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

The security guarantee is not, in other words, a carte blanche to stage some kind of provocation or false-flag operation, and then come running to the other NATO members for support.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

In other words, the treaty only commits us to defencive wars. There is no commitment to carry the fight to the enemy's turf, unless that is necessary to prevent him from prosecuting war against us. Certainly, it involves no obligation to conquer or occupy foreign territory.

Article 6 defines what constitutes an aggression against the sovereignty of a NATO member, and AFAICT does not contain anything fishy.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Among the most important "rights and obligations" of a UN member state, which are "not affected," is to refrain from waging aggressive war and not using or collaborating with torture or any other gross violations of the UN charter of human rights. NATO membership does not obviate these obligations.

The rest (Articles 8 through 14) is boring bureaucratic arrangements. No matter how hard I squint, I can't see any land mines buried there.

So, in summary, I can't see anything in the treaty that makes NATO an instrument of the US State Department and/or Pentagun. That this may have been an unstated assumption when the treaty was drawn up (and for that matter may still be) seems entirely irrelevant to the discussion: Such collaborationist tendencies would exist even if NATO disappeared tomorrow. What Europe needs, in other words, is to (re-)assert its sovereignty over its foreign policy, and NATO is - if the letter of the law is to be taken seriously - not an obstacle to this.

- Jake

Disclaimer: IANAL, so obviously I have to go by the assumption that the words used in international treaties have at least approximately the same meaning as they do in ordinary English.

Display:
I suppose the question is whether the various articles are interpreted to mean what they appear to mean in plain English. For example, the "consultation" seems in many cases to be somewhat pro forma...
by asdf on Thu Feb 26th, 2009 at 10:53:15 PM EST
But if that is the case, does the problem lie with the NATO architecture, or does it lie with Europe's supine "leaders?" I haven't seen anything to suggest that NATO encourages our politicians to behave like spineless vassals, but of course that may be because I've not kept my eyes on the foreign policy ball.

Looking at recent conflicts presents a somewhat mixed bag: Kosova and Afghanistan were NATO operations that were in the former case clearly illegal and in the latter case of at least questionable legality (Afghanistan was, as far as I can tell from five minutes on Google, never explicitly authorised by the UNSC). But Iraq wasn't a NATO operation - it was carried out by a Quisling Coalition formed in an ad hoc fashion.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 01:14:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In Diplospeak, Afghanistan was authorized by the UNSC. See UNSC 1373 and 1378 in particular. (Declared supporting or harboring terrorists a threat to international peace and security, invoked the right to individual and collective self-defense, declared the Taliban to be engaged in supporting terrorism, expressed support for getting rid of them, and encouraging member states to provide security in Afghanistan.)

Or to translate it into normal language, the post 9/11 resolutions declared 9/11 to be an act of war allowing for force to be used by the US and whoever wished to support it against those who planned it or who sheltered them. It then said that the Taliban were those people and must be removed. Finally, that foreign states should provide military forces to maintain security in Afghanistan after the Taliban are removed. A pretty clear authorization. The initial ambiguities of the post 9/11 resolutions were put there to allow the US wide latitude in attacking whoever was responsible.

by MarekNYC on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 01:59:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I thought I remembered Afghanistan being authorised, but when I couldn't find anything on the Danish Wikipedia (which mentions only UNSC resolutions 1267 and 1333 - from '99 and '00, respectively), I started wondering if it was one of those cases where old, unrelated UNSC resolutions had been dug up and postdated, the way they were in the run-up to the Iraq adventure.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 02:05:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Interestingly, after 9/11 NATO put out a statement to the effect that this was an act of war under Article 5, and the US' response was basically "thank you, kids, you're cute but we can manage on our own".

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 03:40:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]
To chim in on the supine "leaders" Sweden has occupation troops in Afghanistan. With broad support in parliament, except the commies and greens, which everyone knows are not serious.

And we are not even in NATO.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 07:10:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, I think "occupation" is pushing it a bit. Our troops are in the north and the locals there aren't pashtuns, so they don't dislike us that much.

Further, the troops are so few and so spread out over a huge territory that most locals probably never even see a single patrol.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 12:00:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The swedish troops are part of ISAF and stands under NATO command. Making them part of the occupation army.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
by A swedish kind of death on Sun Mar 1st, 2009 at 06:58:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Just like the British Army on the Rhine was part of the occupation of Germany in, say, 1980?

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 02:22:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
No, nothing like that. For the obvious reason that there weren't many Germans who were actively trying to win a war against the British.
by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 06:43:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Exactly. And not many Hazaras, Tajiks or Turkmens are actively trying to win the war against the Swedish either.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 01:23:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
What happened to Swedish neutrality?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 01:54:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It was formaly phased out in the early 2000's.

From this years Foreign Policy declaration:

Det råder bred enighet om att vårt lands framtida säkerhet bygger på gemenskap och
samverkan med andra länder. Det råder också bred enighet om att Sverige inte kommer
att förhålla sig passivt om en katastrof eller ett angrepp skulle drabba ett annat
medlemsland i Europeiska unionen eller ett annat nordiskt land. I detta ligger också en
förväntan om att dessa länder agerar på samma sätt om Sverige drabbas.

Sweden is not a member of a military alliance, but the old sentence "Sweden is non-aligned in peace and aiming at being neutral in times of war" hasn't been used for years and years.

When the Soviet Union disappeared neutrality became an impossible stance, as there was no one to be neutral against left anymore.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 03:10:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]
By the way, the mission in Afghanistan is nothing compared to our war in the Congo in the early 60's. Unlike in the Congo, we haven't even brought or used any ground attack aircraft, nor had any really major combats.

Unlike the Dutch and Danes down in Helmand.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 03:12:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... from the charge of obsolescence ...

... indeed, quite the opposite, it reinforces the fact of obsolescence.

NATO is a collective defense treaty to defend against a threat which does not exist.

As the diary repeatedly highlights, the primary role of NATO in the post-Soviet world has been to engage in activities that are not NATO Treaty obligations.

IOW, the argument of the diary is that the NATO Treaty is unobjectionable, because all of the objectionable things that have been done in the name of NATO did not involve treaty obligations.

OK, so the NATO Treaty is not objectionable ... merely obsolete. It is "merely" the use of NATO to leverage American projection of force overseas beyond our own capabilities that is objectionable ... leverage obtained based on a demand that you Yurpeans "demonstrate your commitment to NATO".

I fail to see why you should do so. You'd have a much stronger bargaining position if you demonstrated a commitment to only use the NATO structure inside the boundaries of the signatory countries.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 01:18:38 AM EST
I don't think it's necessarily obsolescent. If European governments were to insist on strict observation of the terms of the actual treaty, instead of going on colonial adventures with the US government, then it would be essentially a mutual security guarantee. That might be of rather questionable value to the US, given the disparity of destructive power, and the lack of European ability to meaningfully contribute to any serious shooting war in the American Pacific (and any serious shooting war from the other direction would kinda have to go through Europe anyway...). But I can't see how it hurts European interests.

And I'll repeat the second point: NATO makes it both politically and logistically harder for the US to prosecute war against the Union. The only physically plausible threats today are Russia and the US. China, India, Asean and Mercosur simply do not posses the navy - whether merchant or military - to sustain operations in Western Eurasia. So it makes sense to create a patchwork of interlocking security guarantees between the US, EU and Russia.

If NATO were actually employed as its charter suggests, it would form the US-EU leg of such an arrangement without giving any reason for Russia to feel threatened - the current NATO threat to Russia arises entirely from NATO's extracurricular activities. And while the Union can probably do little about Russo-American relations, other than moral suasion, it can and should consolidate ties to Russia, including a credible mutual security guarantee. Which would probably piss off Washington no end, making a European withdrawal from NATO politically problematic: Staying in the NATO framework would be a way of reassuring the Americans that nobody is out to create a Eurasian power bloc aimed against the US' legitimate (caveat lector: legitimate) interests in Europe.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 01:52:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... reassure those in Eastern Europe who might suffer from rysskräck that the Union isn't being gobbled up by The Evil Empire(TM) 2.0

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 01:55:03 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... virtually impossible, while making wars that are likely more likely.

Given the likelihood weighted risk to the EU of getting into a shooting war with the US, and the likelihood weight risk of the EU bearing costs from blowback from unwanted US presence and ill-advised US adventures, its hard for me to see that the "benefit" of NATO pays for the costs of making it easier for the US to carry our overseas base network empire.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 12:17:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
With the current crop of political "leadership" we have to contend with on our side of the Pond, I'm not convinced that the US needs NATO to get European support for their colonial adventures. Guys like Sarko, Bliar, Corruptioni and Aznar seem to like bombing brown people who speak funny for its own sake. Do you really think that, if NATO went away tomorrow, Brown and Sarko would take a less belligerent, anti-Russian stance on - say - Georgia than they do today?

I'm reasonably confident that Russia is able to distinguish between different European countries, and between Europe and the US. I think their different relationships with - say - Germany and Britain prove that well enough. The problem is that that distinction is meaningless unless there is a substantial policy difference. And if and when such a substantial policy difference manifests between the Serious People in Europe and the US State Department, NATO will look like a quite different beast from what it does today.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 01:40:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... charge:
And if and when such a substantial policy difference manifests between the Serious People in Europe and the US State Department, NATO will look like a quite different beast from what it does today.

It will instead of the current beast merely be a big waste of resources that could be better devoted to other social needs.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 02:01:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... most of the military budget, not just NATO.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 04:40:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
As a reason to continue wasting resources on NATO, that's on par with continuing to smoke because the habitual drunk driving is likely to kill you before the lung cancer will.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 11:15:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... if it would be disproportionally politically expensive to withdraw from NATO, compared to the economic and political gains, there's a case to be made that we have Bigger Fish To Fry.

I think that's essentially the point I'm trying to make - not so much that NATO in and of itself is necessary (although I would not take the possibility of conflict with the US some years down the road quite as lightly as you do... alliances can shift rapidly in a multipolar world), as that NATO is a red herring. As long as we have servile Quislings in charge of our foreign policy, NATO/not NATO is a sidetrack - a waste of political capital.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 03:35:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... vague charge that they are Quislings, you get rid of them by mobilizing public support on an issue that, as Quislings, they cannot go along with, so that pollies who are not Quislings get a competitive advantage at the polls.

"STOP THE ABUSE OF NATO" seems like one such issue.

My perspective is, of course, from the other side of the Lesser Pond, and the political leverage point that would undermine support for NATO would certainly be substantially different over here.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 08:29:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Foreign policy is something that can cost you an election, but it is not something that can win you an election. After all, it is only about faceless strangers who speak funny and live in far-away lands.

So you get rid of the Quislings on the charge that they're running our economy into a ditch (in Denmark's case, you use past tense here...), and that this is a feature, not a bug of their ideology and political vision. Unfortunately for that strategy, we're living in a bizarro world where pro-cyclical policies are considered "responsible economic management," and counter-cyclical policies are considered "old-fashioned" and "unserious."

But at the end of the day, a thousand dead brown people matters less to most Europeans than half a percentage point of real estate taxes or two weeks waiting list for hospital treatment. Disgusting, but not, I guess, terribly surprising.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 09:32:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This sounds like a passive mass marketing view of politics to me, "taking the current concerns of the electorate as a given, how do we sell our political party to them as the next best brand of soup powder to buy"?

Review what I've written in this diary, I believe I have not fallen into that frame of reference, but have stuck to the active networking / organization frame.

That is, the "we" in what I am writing is not "us people who make these decisions, trying to sell them to the populace", but "those of us among the populace concerned about these things, trying to hold the pollies and bureaucratic elites feet to the fire".

People will always be concerned about those things in their sensorium that appear to be issues of concern. And of course, absent an organized movement, the issues that appear to be of concern in people's sensorium will be considerably dominated by mess media and pop culture sensory streams. The main point of an organized movement is to restructure the sensorium of those who come in contact with the movement so that the issues salient to the goals of the movement enter into view as issues of concern.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 12:47:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That's a pretty neat trick if we can pull it. I'd absolutely love to see a government fall because it used murder as political theatre.

How we do that is less clear to me.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 01:20:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't know about Europe. I do know that there is a general shape to popular progressive movements in American history, and since I'm living here in America, that's what I'm focusing on. How you build a popular progressive movement in a European country, I'd not be the one to ask about that, don't have sufficiently detailed cultural, institutional, or political-historical knowledge.
 

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 02:02:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
BruceMcF:
NATO is a collective defense treaty to defend against a threat which does not exist.

NATO is a defense treaty to defend against a threat which must exist.

Russia is simply too convenient a way to avoid peace breaking out.

To answer Jake's points:

  1. Chechnya is not comparable with Europe, because Chechnya already had an armed separatist independence movement. Hardly anyone in Europe has any idea how to run a resistance movement, so a hypothetical Russian invasion wouldn't necessarily find it hard to roll over Poland.

  2. The lack of explicit obligation to support the US doesn't mean the implication isn't there. In fact the implication is often made explicitly, as when Obama suggests that the European countries should pull their weight in Afghanistan, or some such nonsense.

NATO exists largely to formalise that obligation. Breaking from NATO would make it much harder for President Whoever to imply that we need to send more boots into the grinder of RocksAndScrubistan.

So I think it works like this - Russia is used as the bogeyman to threaten the vassals, and then when other projects become expedient it's useful, but not necessarily obligatory, for the US to be able to call in the sense of obligation which rysskräck creates, and redeem it politically or militarily.

This relationship is what's known as NATO. It doesn't always work - the UK didn't join in Vietnam - but sometimes it does. And practically of course it gives the US a military and surveillance beachhead in Europe for free, which it might not have otherwise.

In the real world I can't think of any good reason why the fuck Russia would want to invade Europe. It would be a political nightmare to manage, with no obvious gains to be made, and plenty to lose, including some useful revenue streams.

The Soviet Union was stupid and ideological and paranoid enough to consider it. I don't think Putin's Russia is likely to - although there may be a similar mirror-effect eurkräck being played out in Russia for internal consumption.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 08:09:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
A few points

  1. The conventional Russian army is no match for the main European armies. They have far less troops and far inferior equipment
  2. Of course, they also have a shitload of nukes
  3. And the armies of the smaller countries don't provide them any protection absent NATO
  4. NATO is a way of getting more American influence in Europe and reducing Russian influence. Eastern European countries are fine with that and more are clamoring to come on board
  5. It would be nice if instead the European countries could agree to a common defence and foreign policy but that isn't going to happen (see: complete inability to agree over as marginal a territory as Kosovo after nine fucking years of having it as a de-facto protectorate; Ireland vetoing the Lisbon Treaty because its mothers fear they will lose their sons in some imaginary war fought by the EU; Prime Ministers and Presidents scoring points over who gets to be the first poodle)
  6. We will continue to have NATO for another generation or two
by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 08:38:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
As the diary points out, the NATO treaty is formally fairly innocuous, so it would be possible to withdraw from the use of NATO to leverage support for external foreign adventures from the protectorate states of the EU, and allow pressure to grow from the US, "if they won't support us, why are we over there protecting them".

And politically, "stop the abuse of NATO" would seem to be an easier goal to mobilize support for in EU countries than "withdraw from NATO".


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 09:52:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Good point that NATO is not simply the treaty but also the name of a relationship. I would add that it can also be the name of the organisational structure (with buildings, meetings, offices) that in it self forms careers, options and mold characters. The organisational structure could not exist without the treaty.

ThatBritGuy:

eurkräck

Oh, it would be euroskräck or euskräck. (Skräck is by the way most commonly used in swedish as the short-hand for the horror genre.)

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 09:45:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]
for having a good time?

notes from no w here
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 12:44:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Linguist! Linguist! We need a linguist over here! Stat!

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
by A swedish kind of death on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 07:02:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's more or less the same as 'screech'

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 03:39:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But directly translated is 'horror'

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 03:41:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The root is the same as schreck in the German schrecklich (horrible).

The only English word with that root that I know of is the animated character Shrek :-)

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 05:58:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
European Tribune - In defence of NATO
The only coherent response to the question (that I've seen) is Marek's analysis, which can - I think - be briefly summarised as "Eastern Europe suffers from a severe case of rysskräck, and view NATO membership as the only way to obtain a credible (read: American) security guarantee against a hypothetical Russian violation of their sovereignty or territorial integrity.
Also, a security guarantee against a German violation of their sovereignty (for some reason probably related to legitimised economic looting, the EU doesn't cut it).

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 03:33:37 AM EST
European Tribune - In defence of NATO
An addendum to point 1) is that having an integrated military structure with one of the two powers on the planet that possesses the logistical capability to fight a serious shooting war with the EU probably decreases the probability of such a shooting war. Can't hurt, at any rate.
Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 03:35:03 AM EST


Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 03:59:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]


The Fates are kind.
by Gaianne on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 05:41:22 AM EST
I haven't finished reading the diary yet, but I had to comment when I saw this:
making the US dependent on European support for their colonial adventures - is a nice pipe dream, but will probably prove, ah, impractical

As it happens, this actually takes place now in the NATO action in Afghanistan, where the US is all keen and hot to kill opium poppy crops wholesale by aerial spraying. The only thing holding us back is that everybody else on our side is saying, "no way are you gonna do that!"

Just thought I'd share.

"It Can't Be Just About Us"
--Frank Schnittger, ETian Extraordinaire

by papicek (papi_cek_at_hotmail_dot_com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 06:48:46 AM EST
Yeah, I saw that. There was rumours floating around in the Danish press (Fran reported) about death squads. My impression was that the US promised that it wouldn't involve anybody against their will, but were still going to go ahead with it.

But to clarify, I meant physically rather than politically dependent on European support, which I don't think is the case in Afghanistan (European non-intervention, yes, and lately also active Russian support, but AFAIK active European support is not technically speaking needed.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 07:29:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... additional support has been needed in Afghanistan ... NATO countries have only been one source of that support, but definitely the evidence on the ground suggests the existing US military does not have the capacity to engage in two major shooting occupations at the same time for an extended period of time.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 09:56:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
is that if Vietnam should have taught us anything, it's that the public here won't tolerate an overseas open-ended military commitment unless it's worth something highminded. Like "Democracy" and "Freedom." Regardless of our history.

Not that a nation with the eleventh lowest per capita income in the world (Afghanistan is tied with Ethiopia and Malawi at $800 US) and the third lowest literacy rate at 28% has much chance of a thriving democracy, at best Afghanis can hope for a benign dictatorship. Which was supposedly what they were going to get when Karzai rewrote the Afghan constitution. Never mind the $3.5 billion in opium money washing around the government there (the Taliban gets an estimated half billion), never mind the lousy security situation, the Afghan police are busy shaking down the populace and threatening the women. No wonder people are ready to welcome back the Taliban. At least then they could live.

All sorts of disconnects have taken shape since the invasion. I think, when Rumsfeld pulled out what troops were there to head to Iraq (which is smaller than Afghanistan and has about two-thirds the population), he left the "C" team in charge. Iraq was always the primary Cheney/Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz focus. And we had a president who barely had enough brain-power to work his legs let alone realize when his people were running an agenda on him.

"It Can't Be Just About Us"
--Frank Schnittger, ETian Extraordinaire

by papicek (papi_cek_at_hotmail_dot_com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 07:18:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Isn't that why he was elected president?
by vladimir on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 07:43:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It's very likely. You know who headed up Bush's Vice Presidential search in vetting team?

"It Can't Be Just About Us"
--Frank Schnittger, ETian Extraordinaire
by papicek (papi_cek_at_hotmail_dot_com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 08:51:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I haven't got that on my hard disk. Tell me.
by vladimir on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 08:59:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Dick Cheney - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In early 2000, while serving as the CEO of Halliburton, Cheney headed George W. Bush's vice-presidential search committee. On July 25, after reviewing Cheney's findings, Bush surprised some pundits by asking Cheney himself to join the Republican ticket.[13] Halliburton reportedly reached agreement on July 20 to allow Cheney to retire, with a package estimated at $20 million.[51]


Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
by A swedish kind of death on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 09:04:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The conflict of interest is just blaring. As is the potential to abuse power and allow a few to profit at the expense of the many. Has the Obama administration (not that it operates without oversight from its own Godfathers... but anyway) initiated any investigations into potential abuse of power by the Bush administration?
by vladimir on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 09:24:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Very few people were aware Cheney headed up that committee until about a year ago. The "Cheney Presidency" evidently was a plus for the power elite of the republican party (the wealthy, the Christian right is just along for the ride, and any security policy types are firmly wedded to capital's agenda), who would surely like a few of their own conflicts of interest ignored.

"It Can't Be Just About Us"
--Frank Schnittger, ETian Extraordinaire
by papicek (papi_cek_at_hotmail_dot_com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 09:58:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If you'd like to know where Obama's Security team comes from, it's CNAS, a think tank with technocratic orientation. Co-founder and past president, Michèle Flournoy was named undersecretary of defense for policy. The Quadrennial Defense Review is her baby. She oversaw the first one in 1996.

The DoD and the NSC are peopled with CNAS members. As for State, I get the feeling that Secretary Clinton is foundering a bit. Evidently, a raft of nominations is about to hit the US Senate soon.

Still too soon to see how things shake out.

"It Can't Be Just About Us"
--Frank Schnittger, ETian Extraordinaire

by papicek (papi_cek_at_hotmail_dot_com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 10:12:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Hillary was a non starter to begin with. She ran against Obama, going so far as to suggest that he might suffer the same fate as Kennedy (assassinated before the nomination). She's got no network with the Chicago boyz...

Only reason she's in there was because it allowed Obama to secure the support of Bill's network of financial and political supporters.

by vladimir on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 10:16:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
papicek:
Not that a nation with the eleventh lowest per capita income in the world (Afghanistan is tied with Ethiopia and Malawi at $800 US) and the third lowest literacy rate at 28% has much chance of a thriving democracy, at best Afghanis can hope for a benign dictatorship. Which was supposedly what they were going to get when Karzai rewrote the Afghan constitution.
How did it get that way? Afghanistan wasn't like that in 1970. Is there a clear turning point or was the country doomed anyway?

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 03:33:03 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It got itself itself stuck in the epicenter of the superpower conflict. To make matters worse the internal 'sides' are themselves factionalized by leader and ethnicity. That leads to an extended period of chaos after the superpowers leave it alone. Eventually things start getting a bit more stable.  Unfortunately the new bosses are products of a rather nasty form of religious revivalism, not to mention practicing a pretty vicious ethnocentric policy in an ethnically diverse land, and they have allied themselves with a faction whose greatest desire is to push the worlds top power into attacking the country.  And oh yeah, their next door neighbours see it as a great place to play out their rivalries. All this crap happening in a resource free country that even before things went to hell was very poor and underdeveloped.  
by MarekNYC on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 03:45:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
MarekNYC:
It got itself itself stuck in the epicenter of the superpower conflict.
Considering Britain and Russia were playing at it since the early 1800's...

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 03:48:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But at that point there was an interest in keeping it a buffer zone. Iirc, the little pointer at the norteastern top of Afghanistan was awarded Afghanistan in order to keep the buffer complete.

And there are advantages to being a stable buffer, as a trading channel between empires. Afghanistan was one of the first independent countries in asia to get the telegraph, still reflected in its low country number code (93).

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 06:21:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Asia gets codes starting by 8 and 9. The only distinction is between countries with a 2-digit code, and those with a 3-digit code (North America and the Caribean get a 1-digit, but then they need 3-digit area codes; Russia has kept the Soviet Union single-digit 7 code, as have some of the FSU countries).

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 08:38:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I mean 2-digit.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
by A swedish kind of death on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 09:04:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
To clarify, later on three digits were needed on many continents (Europe, Asia, Africa). So on continents with three and two digits the two digits were earlier.

Though on second thought, it appears all existing seperate countries (including colonies) got their numbers at the same time. So it does not show what I thought it did.

Nevermind, Afghanistan was anyway early with telegraph and had diplomatic presence when the standards for telegraphy was drawn up.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 09:09:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]

While that's not entirely unreasonable, I don't find it completely satisfying as justifications go: If the Poles and Estonians are not convinced that Paris will nuke Moscow over an invasion of Eastern Europe... what possible justification can they have for believing that the US would?

From a Czech perspective,I suspect few things

  • "Polarity inversion" of politician's brains. It used to be "SSSR the best, Imperialist US the bad", now it's the other way around.

  • Hey, they helped us in WW2 and to get rid of the communism, which we have to be eternally thankful! (This argument seems to be used a lot during the Ballistic Defense Radar 'debate')

  • Lack of understanding how international politics works.

  • Certain mysticism in viewing the US. (almost like some Americans have)

  • Extreme right-wing/neoconservative bias of the media.

  • Language compartmentalization of the population.


 At worst, the US would stand to lose some core client states - but Western Europe - including the independent French nuclear deterrent - would be directly threatened on its very existence, if Russian troops were to suddenly stand at the German border.

But.. but, the French already betrayed us during WW2!


Sadly, the Czechs always seem to be prepared to fight the previous battle, like after WW1, Czech intelligence services were so preoccupied with what the Habsburg heirs had for the dinner that they almost missed the rise of Hitler.
by jv (euro@junkie.cz) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 12:29:56 PM EST
I wrote this comment as a response to the conversation on my diary before I say this diary - and many thanks for responding to the challenge:

Frank Schnittger:

I'm not a defence expert and my diary was polemical and simplistic and designed to provoke some discussion on the thinkaboutit site - which has been a bit dead as far as discussion is concerned.  I'm surprised I haven't been eaten alive here because I thought that I was dipping my toe in waters I don't know enough about.  Many thanks for your informed contributions.  It's you who should be writing the NATO diaries around here - along with a few other Defence experts here.

I suppose I would summarise my views as follows:  The post WW2 US security guarantee to western Europe was invaluable in creating a secure space in which western Europe could recover from the war and also facilitated the development of the fore-runners to the EU.

Increasingly, however, the benefits of that guarantee began to be outweighed by the costs in the form of needlessly exacerbated Cold War and arms race tensions, then Vietnam, and the requirement to be subservient to an increasingly arrogant and imperialist USA throughout the world.

A negotiated end to the Cold War - as opposed to a Soviet implosion - would have included a negotiated end to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact but instead we effectively had a western takeover.  Again, this was mostly to be welcomed, but a western capitalism, untrammelled by any fear of socialism, also resulted in a widespread defeat of social democracy and the dominance of Reagan/Thatcher style robber baron capitalism so ably chronicled here as the Anglo disease.

So in some ways the one sided defeat of Communism has also resulted in the one-sided excesses of Capitalism which we are seeing imploding at the moment.  My hope is that we will see a more united, cohesive, and assertive Europe emerging from the debris determined to have good relations with both the USA and Russia and pursuing a more sustainable and equitable model of economic, social and economic development.

Smaller nations have no option but to club together to compete with their larger neighbours in a globalising economy and to create a shared security space.  However our interests are not always identical and so it is very important that we have a strong and democratic EU where those differences can be thrashed out.

A strong EU needs to promote not just economic and political cooperation, but also military and security policies to ensure they are aligned with their member's interests.  So I do see the EU gradually supplanting NATO as the primary guarantor of security in Europe but I appreciate we live in a dangerous world and provided the USA and Russia can continue to behave well and get on with each other I don't have a problem with also having close Treaty relationships with both the US and Russia.

What we don't want, however, is to be caught in the middle if hard-liners in either the US or Russia, or elements in their defence establishment who benefit from increased tensions between them manage to take over again.  That is why we need our own independent European defence, security and foreign policy capability to enable us to stand on our own two feet in the world - and not as a dependent subservient partner to any outside power.

So to summarise - NATO may be a very good thing to maintain good EU/US relations and to discourage provocative actions by either - but we should not let it remain a joint EU/US front to encircle/scare the Russians.  We should therefore either invite the Russians to Join NATO, or if the US objects, to conclude a separate comparable mutual protection Treaty with Russia.  

We cannot allow adventurist provocations like  South Ossetia to become a casus belli between us and Russia and must thus work jointly with Russia to prevent such local tensions getting out of control.

Longer term the same strategy which enabled enduring peace in Western Europe - the development of joint economic and political interests through the EU should also be developed with Russia - whether through direct membership of the EU or through bi-lateral treaties providing for much greater economic and political cooperation.

Either way, we shouldn't allow good relations with the USA to come at the expense of bad relations with Russia.

notes from no w here

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 01:07:15 PM EST
We should therefore either invite the Russians to Join NATO

Well, Yeltsin begged the west to admit Russia and the west demurred. I don't know why. I brought up Dimitri Trenin in another comment and he makes a strong case that Russia is very old Europe. In language, culture, civil society (even if dysfunctional - look at the US if you want to see more dysfunction), Russia is European. The trouble is, Russia has been part of the Asian political sphere for centuries. I think it was just too big a stretch for Western leadership.

That being said, I think the plan wsa for Russia to join the EU first, and NATO at a later date. It was talked about and I think it reflects an uncertainty about the nature of Russia's policies and emerging society. Then Putin comes along on a nationalist plank and tries to pull a totally unwieldy country up by the bootstraps by means of a strong central authority managing things. How does he do as well as he does? He blames America for all the world's troubles. Though, when I reflect, I don't think Putin has put a foot too far out of place, even in Georgia. The resulting hysteria, I feel, showed a western weakness in it's conceptions.

Not that the past administration hasn't helped Putin make his case. . . .

"It Can't Be Just About Us"
--Frank Schnittger, ETian Extraordinaire

by papicek (papi_cek_at_hotmail_dot_com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 08:13:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Napoleon Bonaparte didn't believe in a science of economics or politics - that there were ways to mentally model how the social and political world works - but he did have his own mental model of how power and its exercise worked for him (his genius), and the principal part of that model was what he called the "indispensable" actor. That is, regardless of whatever other institutional arrangements, commitments, or powers other actors might have, as long as there is one actor whose participation is indispensable for the success of any collective endeavor it means that all other institutions and powers are necessarily subservient to the interests of that actor.  Napoleon arranged his life to try to be that indispensable party in every possible aspect, and he was, by and large, spectacularly successful.  

What does this have to do with NATO?  Well, although it is just a sub-point in your overall argument, your whole post seems to imply this as the principle counter-argument you're attacking:  

So, in summary, I can't see anything in the treaty that makes NATO an instrument of the US State Department and/or Pentagun.

For better or for worse, it is losing argument to try to pretend that the United States is not an empire.  And with the exception of a few hold-out powers (what Washington calls "rogue states") the entire planet is part of that empire, even those antagonistic political factions such as Venezuela, or, recently, Russia, or rising competitive factions in the future such as China  or India.  A large literature has developed, mostly on the Left, making this case and usually with the hopeful promise that the American empire is actually on the decline (such has been the prognosis since the 1970's and World Systems Theory, anyway, despite all the evidence of increasing US power and expansion of authority territorially ever since that time up to and including the present).  But the United States is an empire, not because it controls, directly or even indirectly, foreign political entities or territories as pre-modern imperial systems did, but rather, it is so because the United States is the indispensable actor in almost every international situation today, particularly regarding Europe.  

Because of this asymmetry of power between the US and any other power in the world in all spectra of social organization - economic, political, cultural, military - it means that so-called interdependent relationships are predominantly one-way relationships of dependency upon actions of the United States.  

Therefore, if you like NATO because of your arguments in 1) and 2) and the reduced chances of war that should result, you make a reasonable point (not sure I entirely agree, but they're good arguments).  But if you somehow think that NATO is not just one more way of surrendering European power to the Americans' vision, whatever that might be, then I think you are mistaken.

by santiago on Fri Feb 27th, 2009 at 05:25:26 PM EST
That is, regardless of whatever other institutional arrangements, commitments, or powers other actors might have, as long as there is one actor whose participation is indispensable for the success of any collective endeavor it means that all other institutions and powers are necessarily subservient to the interests of that actor.

Assuming that the other parties are neither willing nor able to simply sit on their hands and do nothing if and when the "indispensable actor" makes unreasonable demands. In other words, throwing temper tantrums only works if the other guy cares more about the project than you do.

Which is where the collaborators come in. Except for the political collaboration of our "leaders" there is no reason why Europe should care more about NATO than the US.

Yes, the US has an empire. But I would argue that it is more a matter of cultural and political habit, than because they are truly necessary to any (desirable) collective endeavour on our part. Europe has a larger population than the US, a larger industrial plant, a larger merchant marine, a better infrastructure, a more convenient geographic location and not noticeably greater dependence on external resources. What we lack is political coherence.

So essentially all questions regarding American power over Europe boil down to this: Is the institution in question one that can be used to fracture European political coherence and create mental and institutional compliance with American visions, or is it not? And seen in that context, I suspect that economics curricula, television shows and the way trade agreements are structured are all far greater threats to European independence than NATO.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 03:49:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Assuming that the other parties are neither willing nor able to simply sit on their hands and do nothing if and when the "indispensable actor" makes unreasonable demands. In other words, throwing temper tantrums only works if the other guy cares more about the project than you do.

I think the US is "the indispensable actor" because of its ability to destabilize any regime or region. Seriously, since the collapse of the Soviet bloc I see most US interventions as destabilizing influences.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 05:53:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But that's got nothing to do with NATO - the objection to NATO is that it helps the US destabilise states, so if the US can destabilise states well enough on its own, what's the point of NATO in that logic? Political legitimacy? The Russians aren't buying it. And I doubt that the Chinese are. And if it can't, destabilise states on its own, then it can hardly use that ability to blackmail the rest of the alliance.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 08:07:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
NATO provides political legitimacy in NATO member states. Who really cares what the Russians and Chinese think?

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 09:52:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If American empire was merely a matter of habit, that is the same thing as saying that European political authorities are either lazy, fools, or chumps.  I doubt that's the case.  What's more likely is that they're doing, by and large, the best they can with the hand they've been dealt -- a European world created by the United States after the Americans won World War II and Europe did not.  

The key question regarding indispensable actors is this: Could the EU have ever come into existence without the acquiescence of the US? Napoleon, looking from his grave, would say no.  Just the fact that the EU happened means that the US must not have opposed it, given American hegemony.  If the US had opposed it, the EU would never have happened. That's the case with almost any collective action of international institutional importance. This is not to say that the EU is an American tool, but rather that it serves enough of American interests to warrant a US okay.  The opposite, however, that an EU okay is necessary for American-led collective action, could never happen, as has been shown, unfortunately, by the invasion of Iraq.

by santiago on Sat Feb 28th, 2009 at 09:24:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If American empire was merely a matter of habit, that is the same thing as saying that European political authorities are either lazy, fools, or chumps.

Yes. That is one of the main arguments of this diary. Our continent is, by and large, run by traitors who are willing to sell their countrymen's interests down the river to please Washington.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Mar 1st, 2009 at 02:53:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But why would anyone with the proven capability to get to the top political jobs in any major European country suddenly become a dimwit or a sellout when it comes to playing politics with Washington?  
by santiago on Sun Mar 1st, 2009 at 11:09:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The capabilities required to get a top political job are very different than those required to hold it. For example, navigating a party hierarchy requires keen understanding of when to obey the top dog, and when to betray him ; whereas such an approach isn't the best point of view when dealing with diplomatic relationships...

Un roi sans divertissement est un homme plein de misères
by linca (antonin POINT lucas AROBASE gmail.com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 03:39:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not sure that I agree that is true.  But assuming you're right, you are making the argument that it is because of something endogenous to European political structures that make European political authorities inherently subservient to the interests of strong foreign powers who aren't so encumbered with the poor statesmanship training that "navigating political hierarchies" in Europe provides.  Something just doesn't seem correct about that, but if true it would be an even more cynical argument than the one I'm making, and it certainly still fits the NATO serves American interests as much or more than Europeans' thesis I've made here.
by santiago on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 10:49:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They have always been collaborators, or at least ever since the first generation of politicians that had its formative years (late teens and early twenties) after Churchill's Iron Curtain speech.

What's changed is that American and European interests on the European subcontinent have diverged in four noteworthy ways:

  1. The American foreign policy is now much more explicitly tied up with outright world domination and deliberately creating failed states, whereas before the fall of the Berlin wall, the American foreign policy was at least partially about containing the Big Neighbour to the East. Which kinda sorta made sense for Europe to collaborate with (at least until Gorby got the ball rolling on Glasnost and Perestroika, at which point the belligerent American containment policy can be argued to have become counterproductive).

  2. With the Reagan Revolution, American economic policy went from being undesirable, but basically reasonably civilised, to being toxic, radioactive contamination.

  3. After Maastricht (and I'm with Mig here, in that the US State Department probably didn't realise the full implications of Maastricht - few enough in European capitals did, and they wrote the thing), the Union gradually began to evolve a political coherence that the Americans began to realise would eventually threaten their dominance on the subcontinent. And in going from being a free trade area (which the Americans liked) it went to become a political union (which the Americans didn't like - witness their attempts to torpedo Lisbon), American interests went from being supportive to being opposed to the European project.

  4. After the enlargement, the Union has become the dominant player, as opposed to the junior player, in an EU-Russian balance of power. Divide and conquer being classic imperial policy, the EU has now become a problem.

You might argue that the latter two points could have been averted if the US state department had been on the ball... but being five or ten years behind the curve on major changes to the geopolitical landscape isn't that unusual in a multipolar world, particularly when you've got a cadre of civil servants trained to view the world in bipolar terms (in a bipolar world, the enemy of my enemy is my friend - in a multipolar world, that's not necessarily true). Witness, for example, the way German re-armament during the 30s caught Britain and France with their pants down, despite the signs of increasing German belligerence being quite a bit more obvious than the signs of increasing EU political coherence.

A final thought - partly in jest, but only partly - is that the Union bureaucracy overwhelmingly speaks French (and a little German), and the US state department may be of the opinion that anything interesting or significant that goes on in the world will happen in (or be translated into) English.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 04:01:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I agree with you on the general point that the EU does provide a much more powerful political entity with which to challenge US power in some areas, particular with policy in and around Europe, if it ever had reason to do so.  However, American policy has only been undesirable and viewed as toxic to Europeans during Republican adminstrations since Reagan.  Clinton was viewed almost universally as consistent with European public opinion and its political leadership, including Clinton's controversial intervention in the Balkans (which I opposed).  And Obama looks to be even more popular with Europeans, so I don't think that there's a very strong argument for a divergence of interests.

There's only one reason that Europe would want a closer alliance with Russia (or China, which is the real concern among the more paranoid US strategists): to thwart US political power in the world.  Other than that, better relations with America is the only game in town.  Now that the main source of toxic geopolitical friction has been removed in America for the time being, and the current American ruling party is now viewed favorably by most Europeans, I find it hard to come up with a scenario where the EU would seek better relations with Russia at the cost of worsened relationship with the US.

by santiago on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 11:02:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
There's only one reason that Europe would want a closer alliance with Russia (or China, which is the real concern among the more paranoid US strategists): to thwart US political power in the world

Or because we had common interests with them. That is, of course, unpossible.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 11:36:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
However, American policy has only been undesirable and viewed as toxic to Europeans during Republican adminstrations

"Has been" and "viewed as," however, are not quite the same thing.

There's only one reason that Europe would want a closer alliance with Russia (or China, which is the real concern among the more paranoid US strategists): to thwart US political power in the world.

Not necessarily a closer alliance with Russia than with the US. But a more balanced system of international relations, which would necessarily take the form of a re-orientation away from the US and towards Russia, China and whatever other emerging powers are out there. Not so much out of any overt hostility to the US as for the obvious reason that putting all your eggs in one basket is A Bad Idea.

Also, Russia is closer.

And if, perish the thought, we could actually make a Union that would act with principle rather than from convenience on the international stage, that would put us on collision course with the US pretty fast, because it has a human rights record that's not precisely pristine, shall we say. A consistent human rights position would also piss Russia off, but our current hypocritical position on the issue (it's bad, bad, bad when Putin tortures people - it's fine and dandy when Bush the Lesser does it) is probably pissing them off even more.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 01:52:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Think about it:  A reorientation away from the US and towards neutrality and Russia does not present a threat to US power because, alone, neither an independent EU nor an independent Russia can do much to thwart American action.  However an alliance between the EU and Russia (or, more seriously, the EU and China) could be an effective entity that challenges American indespensability for global collective action. But the only reason to do that is if America is such an enemy that Europe thinks it worth the costs.  That looked more probable with a re-election Republicans in 2008, but it looks a lot less likely now.  
by santiago on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 04:08:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I think you underestimate the amount of hurt Europe could cause the US.

The European union controls Gibraltar and Bosphorous and looms like a very big shadow over the Suez canal, areas over which the US has in the past been perfectly willing to fight proxy wars.

By levying a punitive duty on (or outright preventing) - say - Israeli cargoes leaving through Gibraltar, we could choke off much Israeli commerce with the US (particularly if we - or the Russians - sent a task force to the Gulf of Aden for the same purpose...). Combined with a total EU embargo against Israeli goods, this would destroy the economy and severely destabilise the political situation in the principal US beachhead in the Arabian peninsula.

Does that challenge global American hegemony? No, but it challenges American control of the Mediterranean (and in the other end of the subcontinent, we could kick them out of the Baltic if we wanted to). By itself, that may not be a problem, but when Mercosur starts doing the same thing with the Panama canal, and Asean or China starts to assert control of some of the maritime choke points around Jakarta, you can see why it might cause some consternation in Washington.

Add to this the fact that if and when Turkey joins the Union, our interests in the Mideast will be a closer relationship with Iran (assuming that Iran is not a radioactive glass desert by that time). Partly because Iran is a big player that we won't want to piss off, and partly because Iran arguably has one of the least spotty human rights records in the region (which says rather a lot more about the rest of the countries in the area than it does about Iran, though...). Which runs completely against American policy in the area.

You are right, of course, that the current zeitgeist does not share this analysis of Europe's strategic position - it is substantially in denial about the scope of Israel's atrocities, and has bought much of the American propaganda about Iran. But zeitgeist changes faster than geography: When the current Atlanticism is dead and buried, Gibraltar will still be there...

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Mar 3rd, 2009 at 05:17:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The key word is "could."  The rest of the world "could" also get together and oppose American power in any number of ways.  Lots of things "could" be done in the imaginations of would-be statesmen.  But they don't get done, and at least since Thucidides political thinkers have operated under the premise that they don't happen for real reasons:  "The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." There is no benefit that Europe can enjoy by injuring American power.  That's what hegemony means -- it's in everyone else's best interests to support the hegemon's power.
by santiago on Tue Mar 3rd, 2009 at 05:02:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Physical reality trumps political reality eventually. As I said, when the American Empire is dead and gone, Gibraltar will still be there.

Any empire that is based purely on perceptions and political reality will unravel sooner rather than later, much in the same way a stock market bubble does. Witness the British Empire - or, for that matter, the Soviet Union.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Mar 3rd, 2009 at 07:32:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
We're not talking about how empires end.  Of course they do, and America will turn to dust like all of the others someday. What we're talking about is your thesis that NATO is not, primarily, an instrument of American empire.  It clearly is, and Europe's use of NATO is means of surrendering European interests to Americans.
by santiago on Tue Mar 3rd, 2009 at 09:53:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Ah. That is not quite my contention. My contention is that as long as our continent is run by collaborators, any and all diplomatic relationships with the Empire will be a suzerein-vassal relationship - NATO or no NATO.

On the other hand, I contend that if and when Europe makes the collective political decision to cease to be American vassals, there's bugger all the Americans can do about it, NATO or no NATO.

Thirdly, I make the separate argument that Europe's interests in a number of areas are drifting ever farther apart from US policy, so it makes sense for Europe to break our vassalisation.

These three arguments are, of course, thematically connected, but they are logically independent. One can subscribe to either of them without necessarily agreeing with the others.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 12:12:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Let's take your points one by one:

My contention is that as long as our continent is run by collaborators, any and all diplomatic relationships with the Empire will be a suzerein-vassal relationship - NATO or no NATO.

True enough, but you haven't made the case that it is possible for ANY political leaders in Europe to avoid collaboration.

I contend that if and when Europe makes the collective political decision to cease to be American vassals, there's bugger all the Americans can do about it, NATO or no NATO.

Agreed, but there's alot Americans can do to make such a collective political decision too expensive fo Europe to consider in the meantime, and one way to do that is to maintain European cooperation with an American defense establishment so that such a decision anction remains unthinkable by both political elites and a large portion of the public.

Thirdly, I make the separate argument that Europe's interests in a number of areas are drifting ever farther apart from US policy, so it makes sense for Europe to break our vassalisation.

Actually, I don't see where divergent interests are growing at all.  Especially with the election of Obama and 100,000 people in Germany cheering him last summer, I see growing internal political pressures for closer relations with the US due to similar rights-based civic values compared to the rest of the world where other forms of rationality are more common.

by santiago on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 11:49:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
True enough, but you haven't made the case that it is possible for ANY political leaders in Europe to avoid collaboration.

They can simply cease to collaborate. For example, there is nothing the American government can do if the European Union declares the blockade of Gaza an illegal act of piracy and sends blockade runners to resume trade with, and humanitarian aid to, Gaza. There's no way that the Americans, or their Israeli clients, are going to start shooting at white people crewing a high-profile convoy with grain and medicine - they already demonstrated this with the Free Gaza boats a couple of months back.

Similarly, there is nothing the US government can do if the EU decides to go tough on trans-nats (many of which are US-based). The US government cannot, for example, effectively enforce Microsoft's intellectual property if the European Union decides to revoke it in punishment for abusive monopoly behaviour.

Oh, in principle, the US could send their bombers to bomb a couple of major cities. Or levy punitive tariffs on some of our goods. In principle. But in practise, Europe has too many white people to be a viable bombing target, and too much economic clout to impose serious sanctions against.

Agreed, but there's alot Americans can do to make such a collective political decision too expensive fo Europe to consider in the meantime, and one way to do that is to maintain European cooperation with an American defense establishment so that such a decision anction remains unthinkable by both political elites and a large portion of the public.

So any cooperation between Europe and the US must necessarily take the form of a suzerein-client relationship, or is it something in the way NATO is structured that makes it so?

Actually, I don't see where divergent interests are growing at all.  Especially with the election of Obama and 100,000 people in Germany cheering him last summer, I see growing internal political pressures for closer relations with the US due to similar rights-based civic values compared to the rest of the world where other forms of rationality are more common.

Perceptions and policy are not - quite - the same thing. Policy-wise, the US position on Russia, Egypt, Iran, Palestine and the Caucasus are contrary to European interests - and increasingly so.

And as for the perceptions... we'll see how well they hold up when Obama actually starts doing things that Europeans care about. If you're going to be in Europe in two years' time, I've got a beer that says that there'll have been at least one widely publicised TV documentary about torture and other nasty things going on in various American concentration camps that Obama didn't close.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Mar 5th, 2009 at 12:59:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
So any cooperation between Europe and the US must necessarily take the form of a suzerein-client relationship, or is it something in the way NATO is structured that makes it so?

Yes, because the asymmetry of power between the two is still so vast -- even more so since the credit crisis and recession became manifest.  In addition to its much larger military, intelligence, and diplomatic resources and global networks in each area, and in addition to its huge economy and being the center of the trade and financial system, the US is structurally much more politically unified than Europe, which means that when it acts geopolitically, it acts already having subjugated its internal political contests much more so than Europe has or ever will be able to do.  All of these elements are what political scientists call "power resources" that make the United States much more able to compel others to follow its interests in any group setting.  It makes it very unlikely that non-collaboration with the United States can occur within a collective group such as NATO, even if it is nominally possible to do so in theory. Except in extreme cases, not enough European countries will want to stop collaboration because the costs of doing so are so high and uncertain compared to the benefits of maintaining collaboration.

If Europe really wanted to stop collaborating with the US, it would end participation in NATO.

by santiago on Wed Mar 11th, 2009 at 01:55:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
santiago:
There is no benefit that Europe can enjoy by injuring American power.

You mean apart from creating peace around the Mediterranean, becoming the world's reserve currency, using a new climate of political and military stability to create solar farms across North Africa, capitalising on a new peace dividend to invest in new ideas and new technologies, and generally becoming a nicer, saner and more reality-based place to live, economically, financially and politically?

Without the economic or political hammerlock maintained by Europe's supposed ally, many things could become possible.

"The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."

Empires are bubbles writ large - and that's all they are. Like all bubbles, they inevitably collapse.

It's lack of awareness of symbiosis and mutual benefit that's most lethal in the long run.

There is no 'must' here - except the one created by poverty of imagination.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Mar 3rd, 2009 at 07:54:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Your thesis only holds water if Jake is right, and Europeans are governed by fools or suckers.  That might well be true, but I think it's more reasonable to conclude that for all their errors and apparent stupidity, it's really pretty capable people that end up governing major democratic industrial powers, and mistakes are made not because of idiocy or lack of imagination, but because the limits of power required it.
by santiago on Tue Mar 3rd, 2009 at 10:18:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]

it's really pretty capable people that end up governing major democratic industrial powers, and mistakes are made not because of idiocy or lack of imagination, but because the limits of power required it.

So how should we describe the policies that led to the current financial meltdown? Rational but narrow minded?

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 08:44:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
No, not narrow minded. Rather, rational given the bounded parameters of the competing interests they are beholden too for the limited power they have.  Most world leaders would have been laughed out of office if they'd proposed nationalizing banks four years ago when the bad lending really took off, even though there were many prominent scholars (Schiller of the "irrational exhuberance" and Case-Schiller Housing Index, for example) who were predicting disaster back then or earlier.
by santiago on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 10:41:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You don't "propose nationalizing banks". Your banking regulator "intervenes" them as a matter of course when they are about to fail. That's why this whole debate is so frustrating. The FDIC has intervened over 20 banks this year so far. They close on a Friday and reopen on the following Monday under new ownership.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 10:48:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Or you can even propose doing something undramatic like tightening up some very loose regulations.

That's one of the ironies here - the banks could have prospered quite happily with tighter regulation. Bonus culture would have continued to be insane but not politically suicidal. Profits would have been made. Mortgages would have been mortgaged. Houses would have been bought and sold.

Instead the banks decided to drive off a cliff, and the so-called regulators decided that a 'light touch' would work better than intervention.

Regulation would have been better for everyone - including the banks. And the politicians.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 12:05:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
a clear case of more being the enemy of plenty.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 02:35:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
True, but the policy precedent of "too big to fail" was already in place due to the collapse of the Merton and Scholes hedge fund in the 1990's, so policymakers would have had to propose allowing big banks to fail instead of bailing them out as they did.  
by santiago on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 11:30:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
LTCM was, like Lehman, an unregulated entity. Retail banks can (indeed, must, if their deposits are at risk) be intervened by the banking regulator as a matter of course, with no prior notice. LTCM and Lehman could not be intervened so they had to be left to fail or be bailed out to save the rest of the financial system.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Mar 5th, 2009 at 02:25:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But regulation or not had nothing to do with the reasons to intervene in LTCM at Fed expense.  The reason it was too big to fail was that the marked-to-market balance sheets of too many regulated entities would have been severely affected (as they are all affected now) if their investment and hedge positions with LTCM were to suddlenly become close to zero. Intervention was required to mitigate the effects of its failure on other entities.  

That's the same argument used in the current crisis, and it was a reasonably good one until the world economy collapsed.  Since we're already in the toilet economically, there isn't a good reason any more to continue to prop up insolvent entitites unless someone can point to the costs of doing so being less than the costs of liquidating assets and liabilities.  If the FDIC takes over Citibank, for example, it still means the Federal government is on the hook to cover the liabilities to other financial entities (including the huge housing GSE's) due to the regulators requirements that banks hedge their interest rate risks for longer term loans. It is not necessarily cheaper for the FDIC to "nationalize" than to just pump money into the capital stocks of an insolvent bank, like it did.  Problem is, I haven't seen that argument being made by Geitner or other officials.

by santiago on Thu Mar 5th, 2009 at 11:35:15 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Or you could declare the entire shadow banking system to be an odious way of circumventing the law, and repudiate any debt to it that there isn't a good political reason to pay.

If that makes a couple of hedge funds roll over and die... well, though cookie. They shouldn't have been in the business of counterfeiting money.

If it makes a couple of private pension funds roll over and die... well, there's nothing wrong with that that cannot be solved by higher Social Security payments.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Mar 5th, 2009 at 12:35:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Law?  What has law got to do with anything?  Law is just one way in which people try to impose power on one another.  There are many other ways, and at the high levels of world society we're talking about here, law just isn't as important as those other forms of power.
by santiago on Wed Mar 11th, 2009 at 01:59:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't see why your assumption is justified. The people that end up getting elected to high office are very good at getting elected. That doesn't necessarily speak to their competence at actually doing their jobs: it may even be incompatible with competence.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 08:52:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Maybe, but that is what is called an empirical question. Is there systematic evidence that statesmen and stateswomen are incompetent today? (wait .. don't answer that)
by santiago on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 10:22:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Quite.
by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 12:00:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]
santiago:
There's only one reason that Europe would want a closer alliance with Russia (or China, which is the real concern among the more paranoid US strategists): to thwart US political power in the world.
Russia is our neighbour, so we might want to have a better relationship with them on that basis alone. We need to have them at the table when discussing the Baltic and the Black Sea basins. They are a major provider of energy.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 03:28:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The missing word related to Jake's argument is "than."  I meant "closer alliance with Russian THAN the United States."  There are very good reasons for both Europe and the United States to have closer relations with Russia.  But there are not such good reasons for either to have better relations with Russia than with each other.
by santiago on Wed Mar 4th, 2009 at 11:57:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The European Communities were not a threat to the US, but the EU does seem to be. The thing is, by 1990 the European Communities had enough autonomy to progress to the next stage whether the US (or the UK, or Denmark) wanted or not. It is also quite likely that the US didn't understand what was in the Maastricht treaty until after it was signed.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Mar 1st, 2009 at 05:11:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The EU is not a threat to the US.  The EU makes life easier for US foreign policy in a myriad of ways.  Empire never requires obedience and always leaves room for some degree of dissent. There are some things about the EU, such as agricultural policy, that are threats to some American interest groups, but if the US as a collective body had wanted to prevent the Maastricht treaty from occurring, it would have been relatively easy to do so giving the institutional hurdles required for its passage.  As it is, the EU project in one form or another, has been an explicit part of US foreign policy since the 1940's, and the benefits of having an EU authority to deal with in the current economic crisis instead of an even greater rabble of conflicting European interests shows the wisdom of this.

Could a combined alliance between the EU and China some day present a challenge to American power?  Yes, but that doesn't mean that opening trade with China and encouraging economic and political unification in Europe were contrary to American interests.

by santiago on Sun Mar 1st, 2009 at 01:26:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
santiago:
The EU is not a threat to the US.
You need to read more neocon writings :-)

In the age of full-spectrum dominance any regional power centre is a threat.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 04:09:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The worst nightmare the US would face would be Russia joining with the EU - not necessarily joining in the EU, but becoming a clear trade ally and diplomatic and military non-threat.

In the unlikely event that anyone in the US is thinking strategically about this, it's possible that the real point of the Polish/Czech missile nonsense is to reinforce the meme of Russia as The Enemy and prevent closer ties.

Not that a Russian/EU meeting would ever be simple or straightforward. But politically, financially and militarily it's the only scenario which would literally terrify the US.

And from a local point of view, it makes as much long term strategic sense as closer ties with the US do. As JakeS said, US financial and military policy is toxic and radioactive. Russian financial and military policy is unlikely to be more insane, and ties with the EU might even tame some of the wilder elements on both sides.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 07:00:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
My mother always said..."if you don't have something good to say, don't say it".

It ain't in the treaty, but if the words in the Constitution made a society, Colombia would be the most advanced on the planet, they've a helluva constitution. As long as we're in Nato, it will be an instrumentalisation of our FP by the Americans.

 

The Hun is always either at your throat or at your feet. Winston Churchill

by r------ on Mon Mar 2nd, 2009 at 01:50:33 AM EST


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