Welcome to European Tribune. It's gone a bit quiet around here these days, but it's still going.

What were they thinking?

by Jerome a Paris Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 06:27:18 AM EST

Option ARMs See Rising Defaults

As of December, 28% of option ARMs were delinquent or in foreclosure, according to LPS Applied Analytics, a data firm that analyzes mortgage performance. That compares with 23% in September. An additional 7% involve properties that have already been taken back by the lenders. By comparison, 6% of prime loans have problems. Problems with subprime are still the worst. Just over half of subprime loans were delinquent, in foreclosure, or related to bank-owned properties as of December. The nearly $750 billion of option ARMs issued from 2004 to 2007 compares with roughly $1.9 trillion each of subprime and jumbo mortgages in that period.

Nearly 61% of option ARMs originated in 2007 will eventually default, according to a recent analysis by Goldman Sachs, which assumed a further 10% decline in home prices. That compares with a 63% default rate for subprime loans originated in 2007. Goldman estimates more than half of all option ARMs outstanding will default.

These numbers give an idea of the size of the financial woes we are facing: more than a trillion dollars of net losses just in the US real estate market, before taking into account knock-on effects on the economy and the recession.

But more than anything else, they underline the dismal failure of the banking world: a 50% loss rate in retail banking is absolutely stunning. Remember that banks will make roughly, to keep it simple, a couple percent margin on the money they lend towards home purchases. The banks do not get any upside if prices rise: at best they get paid back their loan, plus some interest income. Which means that they make money only if default rates are significantly below that couple percent figure. Which, in turn, means that loans have to be provided to creditworthy clients, with acceptable collateral, and conservatively sized, ie that risks have to be properly assessed over the period of the loan, in order for banks to be reasonably confident that loans can almost always be repaid.

A 50% default rate demonstrates an absolute failure by lenders to do their only job, their most basic trade: risk analysis. If there ever was an indictment of the banking industry as it was structured lately (under the "originate, bundle and distribute" model, ie agents selling loans, passing them on to investment banks which repackaged them into vast arrays of securities that they got rated and sold to bond investors), this is it. It did not do its job, and, quite frankly, that part of the industry should be closed down and all people involved forbidden from ever touching a financial instrument again.

Any cursory look at what was happening in that market since at least 2004 made it obvious that the people involved were betting vast amounts of money on the real estate market continuing to go up - and, more importantly, that they knew it. That the underlying products were called "liar loans" and the clients "ninjas" (no income, no job or assets) shows beyond any doubt that everybody was aware that this was not traditional banking, but pure gambling on the party continuing.

Those bankers that did not relax their lending practices (including the majority of local banks in the US) can understandably feel a little miffed, or even betrayed, by the practices of their brethren, especially when they were told along the way that they were obsolete, stodgy losers and relative pay moved accordingly. Even if their moral and professional compasses can be described as lacking, those that took advantage of this situation can be understood, given the rich reward they could get with almost no downside; but the full risk and management apparatus of the banks and investment houses that employed them or financed their products has to be blamed for not doing its job properly. Where were the credit committees? where were the risk officers? What was management thinking?

And the very worst is that it is the very same risk & management people that are now turning the screws on the economy in order to try to save their skins - presumably, displays of absolute risk 'virtue' today will help interested bystanders (ie shareholders and regulators) that they are competent at their jobs and should keep them. In fact, they are compounding their initial mistakes and making things yet worse - including for their own institutions, showing once more than they don't actually understand risk...

Thus - why are these people still in charge? They are absolute failures, and are taking down the economy with them by their incompetence.


Display:
European Tribune - What were they thinking?
Any cursory look at what was happening in that market since at least 2004 made it obvious that the people involved were betting vast amounts of money on the real estate market continuing to go up - and, more importantly, that they knew it.

I don't think this is quite right. The people involved in perpetrating the scam knew it, but they weren't the ones betting.

The first investors/ unwitting gamblers who got shafted were the people who bought the diced, sliced and AAA-rated heaps of shit, and I don't think they could actually have been said to "know", any more than Madoff's customers "knew".

They let the returns blind them to the Golden Rule of Investment...

...If Something Looks Too Good To Be True Then It Probably Is.

While the property buyers now losing their arse followed the Golden Rule of Property - and the Siren Song of real estate middlemen everywhere...

...Property Prices Can Only Go Up

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 06:58:52 AM EST

The people involved in perpetrating the scam knew it, but they weren't the ones betting.

That certainly is true.


The first investors/ unwitting gamblers who got shafted were the people who bought the diced, sliced and AAA-rated heaps of shit, and I don't think they could actually have been said to "know", any more than Madoff's customers "knew".

Well, if I knew, as simply an observer of the market, the people whose job is to purcahse securities, even rated ones, should have known if they had done their job - and if they had simply bothered to read the prospectuses that the investment banks prepared, and which outlined potential risks in loving detail, even if only as a theoretical exercise.

And what do you make of the people in the banks that lent money to the very same investors they were selling the junk to?

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 07:31:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Jerome a Paris:
And what do you make of the people in the banks that lent money to the very same investors they were selling the junk to?

Indeed. One couldn't make it up.

Your comment made me think about this event in May of last year.

UBS, BlackRock: Another I-Bank Shell Game -- Seeking Alpha

UBS (UBS) sold $15 billion of mostly subprime (junk) assets to BlackRock (BLK), while financing $11.25 of it (75%). So, the assets are gone, but the bank is still on the hook for $11.25 billion through the loan. If it is a recourse loan, they are using this depreciating stuff as collateral (some indirect market risk) and they have the credit risk of the counterparty. If it is non-recourse, well, that speaks for itself. In addition, they probably sold it at a discount, hence took the loss there as well.

I am not saying the deal will blow up (!...CC), but the risk of the assets were not really transferred off of the banks books. Would UBS normally offer a loan of this type with these terms for subprime assets in this environment? I doubt it.

That little lot must be stewing nicely.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 08:00:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Someone will have made a nice commission on the deal though. And they're probably still expecting a hefty bonus for it.

What were they thinking? 'Ferrari or Porsche?', probably.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 10:40:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
And they're probably still expecting a hefty bonus for it.

Paid for by tax payer's money, of course.
by Bernard (bernard) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 11:31:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The fees were paid willingly by investors who bought the junk. These investors have now significant bits of their money, and passed on a fraction (big or small, depending on their financial structure) to the banks that financed them, which may or may not have been those that sold them the junk.

Those banks have taken some of these losses, or more likely at this point, are hiding them in their balance sheet (but the markets know that they are hiding big holes).

So bank shareholders have lost money, via lower stock market valuations, and dilution through capital increases, with more to come.

Those who are being protected by the bailouts are bank creditors (those that lent money to banks), including of course other banks and financial players. For normal companies, creditors take a loss; in the case of banks, this has been judged too dangerous (banks taking more losses might mean other banks failing in turn), so government have stepped in to avoid such bankruptcies. This was a mistake, because it has still triggered a winding down of banks, which was was the intervention was supposed to avoid, without creating an alternate banking system.

My point is that the bonuses are paid and gone, but now we're paying the banks to not recognise their losses. The mistake is there. What one could say is that governments are endorsing the system that created the bonus (and the holes that paid for them) by refusing to make the holes visible (out of fear of... what? a financial crisis??)

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 12:12:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Jerome a Paris:
(out of fear of... what? a financial crisis??)

no, a lynch mob. we already have a financial crisis, it's the economy that hasn't taken the full hit yet.

wil.e.coyote, they're on borrowed time.

and when the british public realise the depths of government corruption with regards to energy, they will be even more furious.

that'll come right after the economy...

wasn't that tony b's baby, flogging off n.sea gas for pennies and pandering to the city whizz-kids?

and now 'nerves of steel' el gordo's carrying juggling the white-hot potato of britain's future.

they're painted into a corner, no way out but through. the media's buying them time, they'll wriggle and mystify as long as they can before leaping into a helicopter for the caymans, but it can't last long now.

where's the IMF when you need 'em?

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 09:15:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
they're painted into a corner, no way out but through. the media's buying them time, they'll wriggle and mystify as long as they can before leaping into a helicopter for the caymans, but it can't last long now.
Now that would indeed be the most opportune time to cut the cables, jamb the satellites and send in the marines to clean up the financial swamp that has developed in the Caymans.  If "New Labor" would only be so thoughtful to stage a conference in the Caymans and invite W, Cheney, Paulson...  

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 10:19:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The first investors/ unwitting gamblers who got shafted were the people who bought the diced, sliced and AAA-rated heaps of shit, and I don't think they could actually have been said to "know", any more than Madoff's customers "knew".

Legally speaking, though, participation in a pyramid scam, witting or not, can result in an obligation to repay the money received. Perhaps this kind of liability should be extended...
by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 04:38:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
EVEN I CAN ANSWER THIS ONE!

What was management thinking?

Ans: I bet I can make a ton of money before this house of cards collapses and NOBODY will punish me in any way when it's over.  My path to wealth and the good life.  Aaaaaaah, I am SO brilliant!  Where's the chicks?

They tried to assimilate me. They failed.

by THE Twank (yatta blah blah @ blah.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 06:59:56 AM EST
As one of the miffed bankers, I am no longer in the spirit of the times. The Economist is now making fun of bankers who expect bonuses given that their work was "unconnected to mortgage losses" with the following throwaway line:


(whatever happened to collective responsibility?)

Collective responsibility? For bankers? What has the world come to?

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 07:26:20 AM EST
In Gideon Rachman's blog:


Part of my job involves mixing with people who run or staff think-tanks. And like a lot of the other people I mix with - journalists, bankers, middle-class layabouts - they are a worried group.

The think-tanks with large endowments like Brookings, the Rand corporation and the Council on Foreign Relations have seen a lot of their cash-pile go up in smoke in the stock-market slump. Things are even more precarious for a lot of the smaller think-tanks - many of them in Europe - that do not have big endowments, but rely heavily on corporate donations and sponsorship. As company bosses and investment banks look for easy items of expenditure to take the axe to, donations to think-tanks for research are an obvious target.

The world of public-policy research will soon be feeling the effects.

Will they blame the bankers that feed them, too? LOL

(the comments in that thread are pretty good)

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 07:28:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't have a good impression of "think tanks".  

Does this mean that there will be decreased funding for the right-wing wealthy propaganda machine?

They tried to assimilate me. They failed.

by THE Twank (yatta blah blah @ blah.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 08:26:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
"Does this mean that there will be decreased funding for the right-wing wealthy propaganda machine?"

Oooooh, good point---but maybe too good to be true?

by jjellin on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 07:28:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Problem is it will hurt the few less endowed "progressive" think tanks more than the conservative ones.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 10:21:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Jerome a Paris:
The think-tanks with large endowments like Brookings, the Rand corporation and the Council on Foreign Relations have seen a lot of their cash-pile go up in smoke in the stock-market slump.

[Steeples fingers]

Excellent.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 10:33:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, The Economist has played a significant role in the promotion of the failed model. Do you think the Economists's journalists and editors will gladly accept a reduction of their wages for "collective responsibility"?

"Dieu se rit des hommes qui se plaignent des conséquences alors qu'ils en chérissent les causes" Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet
by Melanchthon on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 08:59:31 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That's easy:

As noted, at some point in the growth of a boom all aspects of property ownership become irrelevant, except the prospect for an early rise in price. Income from the property, or enjoyment of its use, or even its long-run worth are now academic.

- Galbraith, The Great Crash of 1929

Only, they seem to have taken The Great Crash as a manual rather than a cautionary tale...

Oh, and of course a lot of them were thinking "This time it's different."

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 11:37:55 AM EST
Ooo, I know, I know.

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ ->  me.

by tjbuff (timhess@adelphia.net) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 12:51:00 PM EST
One step closer to public acknowledgement of Anglo Disease:

This crisis raises fundamental questions about globalisation, which was supposed to help diffuse risk. Instead, it has enabled America's failures to spread around the world, like a contagious disease.

Stiglitz, "Fear and Loathing in Davos"

also

... some American financiers were especially harshly criticised for seeming to take the position that they, too, were victims. The reality is that they were the perpetrators, not the victims, and it seemed particularly galling that they were continuing to hold a gun to the heads of governments, demanding massive bailouts and threatening economic collapse otherwise. Money was flowing to those who had caused the problem, rather than to the victims.

Worse still, much of the money flowing into the banks to recapitalise them so that they could resume lending has been flowing out in the form of bonus payments and dividends.

But still, not one wants to talk about the root of our present civilisational disaster in the concept of compound interest and the need for ever-growing returns to pay back the interst on debt.  The biotic world -- the physical world -- cannot sustain ever-growing returns (geometric progressions are anathema  to living systems).  So, joining our friend C Cook, I suspect that any attempt to solve our resource problems will fail miserably so long as two geometric progressions remain unchallenged:  limitless population growth and compound interest on debt.  Previous civilisations managed to shoot self in foot without the compound interest mechanism and its offshoot, industrial capitalism;  but given these advanced, modern tools, we can do it far faster and more thoroughly, on a global scale.

The difference between theory and practise in practise ...

by DeAnander (de_at_daclarke_dot_org) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 01:56:32 PM EST
Good to see you around! I really hope to see you again around these parts.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 06:56:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
um, it's kinda great you are back blogging, ya know?

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 09:40:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Where were the credit committees? where were the risk officers? What was management thinking?
And where were the bloody owners?!

A bank with strong owners, where the interests of the shareholders and the management are closely aligned would have stood a much better chance of avoiding this.

So, what to do? Create some function where listed companies can be taken private to avoid the senseless short-termist pressures of the market?

Uh... that's called private equity and didn't really work well in that respect either...

Maybe we could have some kind of function, where privately owned non-listed companies get tax breaks if they keep their balance sheets strong?

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 02:06:13 PM EST
No, what you fundamentally need is to get all the people who - excuse my French - don't know shit about what they're buying out of the securities markets. I don't know anything about aluminium mining, so I don't put my money (well, I don't have any money to begin with, but you get the point...) into shares in an aluminium mining company. It may be the best aluminium mining company in the entire world, but I have damn all of a way to figure out whether it is or not.

Sure, I can pay money managers to try to figure out whether the company is worth investing in. But that just pushes the problem back a step: How do I know that the money managers aren't selling me a pig in a poke? I don't, because I know damn all about money management - if I knew something about it, I'd be doing it myself.

The intuitively obvious corollary to this is that we need to get out of the private pension funds mindset - by their very nature, private pension funds make Joe Schmoe an investor in the securities markets. And Joe Schmoe knows nothing about investing in the securities market, so he shouldn't be doing it.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 02:23:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But following your logic, and bearing in mind that the majority of Joe Schmoe's know vanishingly little about investment of any kind at all, then should they just keep their cash under the mattress?

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 05:34:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
They can earn a modest but risk-free interest from an ordinary savings account. They can also invest in treasury notes and bonds. There is not much to understand about sovereign debt. Going back to JakeS' logic
The intuitively obvious corollary to this is that we need to get out of the private pension funds mindset - by their very nature, private pension funds make Joe Schmoe an investor in the securities markets. And Joe Schmoe knows nothing about investing in the securities market, so he shouldn't be doing it.
the way I put it is this:

We understand that "widows and orphans" shouldn't be investing in risky assets and so we create "pension funds" subjected to strict regulations on the kinds of assets they may hold (e.g., no "speculative" or worse-rated bonds) and the kinds of strategies they may pursue (e.g., no "short-selling") so that they may be "safe" for widows and orphans to invest in. But that means that we regulate pension funds to behave like widows and orphans, so they get scalped by sharks like widows and orphans would.

In addition, the whole "private pension fund mindset" is predicated on the argument that public pensions are insolvent because they will eventually be unable to pay the promised premiums. We are told that instead we should invest in private pension funds. But the question arises: if the government is not going to be able to raise the necessary cash to meet its pension liabilities, where is the stock market supposed to get all that cash from? After all, the government and the stock market share in the same GDP pool. In addition, the government's "cost of capital" is lowest (in absolute terms considering "cost of debt" and relatively speaking when "risk-adjusted").

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 05:47:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, if they did, they (we) would probably be better off right now.  Since I don't have a 401(k) in some kind of mutual fund or stocks, I'm not finding it to be down 20+ percent right now.  My little measly bank CD is doing just fine, not much better than mattress rates, but not less than zero percent.  What is the answer for us Joe Schmoes?
by jjellin on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 07:35:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Not necessarily. As Mig pointed out, a savings account (with the accompanying government depositor guarantee) or sovereign debt with no ForEx risk would do perfectly fine. It's one thing not to trust a private pension fund. But if you cannot trust sovereign debt in your own currency, then chances are that you're either living in a banana republic, or your local economy is in full meltdown mode already - not that the two are mutually exclusive. In both cases, you have bigger (or at least rather more immediate) problems than the solvency of your pension plan.

That aside, the vast, vast majority of Joes invest heavily in only two or three assets: Their house, their pension plan and perhaps their own business/skill set/education/etc.

For a variety of reasons, both ideological and practical, I think that private pension funds are the work of the Devil, and should be replaced with public pension schemes of various descriptions.

On a similar note, I am rather conflicted about privately owned housing. On the one hand, I can see the appeal of not having to ask a landlord for permission to, say, repaint your living room in another colour. On the other hand, widespread home ownership has not done anything good for any political economy that I know of. I think we need a legal framework that would permit Joe Schmoe to control the place where he lives, and make whatever upgrades and upkeep he sees fit, but divest him of the price fluctuations of the house. Essentially the reverse of what Galbraith describes for the Florida Land Boom, in which there was a great desire to divest oneself of every aspect of ownership, except the price fluctuations. Kind of a cross between renting and owning, I guess.

The third kind of investment I have no objection to: Presumably, Joe knows more about his skill set and his own business and education than anybody else in the world. If anybody at all is to invest in those areas, it's Joe. And if anybody at all is to judge whether those areas present good investment opportunities, it's Joe.

After you remove those three money sinks from the cash flow of Joe Q. Median, he usually doesn't have any serious money left to invest, whether in the Bank of Serta - which right now is looking rather good, actually - or elsewhere.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 12:02:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
On a similar note, I am rather conflicted about privately owned housing. On the one hand, I can see the appeal of not having to ask a landlord for permission to, say, repaint your living room in another colour. On the other hand, widespread home ownership has not done anything good for any political economy that I know of. I think we need a legal framework that would permit Joe Schmoe to control the place where he lives, and make whatever upgrades and upkeep he sees fit, but divest him of the price fluctuations of the house. Essentially the reverse of what Galbraith describes for the Florida Land Boom, in which there was a great desire to divest oneself of every aspect of ownership, except the price fluctuations. Kind of a cross between renting and owning, I guess.

Well, I like to think that such a framework is achievable without any change in the law by using a consensual framework based on partnership law, as I outlined in my lecture here...

Equity Shares: a solution to the Credit Crash - Video

Equity Shares: a solution to the Credit Crash - slides

The outcome of the Land Partnership Iadvocate is a new form of "Co-ownership" between Occupiers and Investors where land and property is never sold again, being held by the Custodian member of what I call an "Open Corporate".

Occupiers may change, Investors may change and Managers (if any) may change, but land is never sold again. The outcome is essentially a new form of tenure with an indefinite or "open" term.  

For as long as an Occupier occupies land he shares the usufruct with those who invested money or money's worth to create it. Since Communities add value to land by providing infrastructure, part of the rental that Occupiers pay should IMHO go to the community in relation to the Location Value. ie a Land Value Tax can be built in as a policy option.

Investors have no control over how the Occupier occupies the land, provided he doesn't affect the value of it (improvements and damage to property would require a valuation and dispute resolution mechanism).

Occupiers may become Investors simply by paying the agreed rental ahead of time, either in money, or in money's worth of (say) maintenance ("Sweat Equity"), or improvements.

If a country does not have a suitable legal entity for such a partnership-based framework, then it may simply use another country's entity. Because partnerships cross borders countries would soon legislate an Open Corporate (limited liability is a bug not a feature).

It was exactly in this way that the big accountants bought themselves the Jersey LLP and used it to blackmail the UK government into legislating the UK LLP. They did this in search of limitation of liability: they inadvertently created the "Open Corporate" which I believe renders all other corporate forms obsolete. Unintended consequences, indeed.

I digress.

The outcome is a simple but radical combination of:

(a) affordable "rent to buy";

(b) index-linked investment in "unitised" property rental values.

Moreover, unitisation of rental values in this way provides a solution to the Credit Crash by allowing the replacement of secured debt with the new class of Units in rental values. Such rental values would rapidly become acceptable in exchange, and would comprise a domestic form of "land-based" currency.

A very large part of the National Debt would therefore come to be replaced by a "National Equity" as property owners "opt in" to what is a complementary system. Some of the Location Rental value collected by the Community would be reinvested in infrastructure improvements, but most would probably be redistributed equally as a form of "National Dividend" in Units or in services.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 07:01:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Investors have no control over how the Occupier occupies the land, provided he doesn't affect the value of it (improvements and damage to property would require a valuation and dispute resolution mechanism).

And the bolded part is the part you have to explain in rather greater detail... Because the bolded bit here is one of the three differences between renting and owning (the other two being speculation and the possibility of arbitraging disparities between money rents and living space rents).

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:43:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I was thinking more on the line off.. well... why do we have the stock market?

We have it to supply businesses with capital.

Now, the people who know most about any given company are the ones who started it.

Myabe we should have some mechanism where the original owners can buy their issued shares back from the market?

Maybe give them taxbreaks for it if they regain a certain amount of the shares, like 20 %, 35 % or 50 %...

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 07:25:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The stock market is there to provide liquidity to normally illiquid assets (shares in a company's future profits). Turning normally illiquid assets liquid has ups and downs - on the one hand, it makes valuation easier (if you accept the market price as a reasonable proxy for value), and it allows a larger group of buyers to buy into the asset. On the other hand, liquidity facilitates bubbles and outright Ponzi scams - bubble psychology being that the principal value of an asset is the resale price, freezing the market reduces the scope for bubbles considerably (and the defining feature of Ponzi scams is being liquid but not solvent... so take away liquidity and the emperor suddenly looks starkly naked).

I don't think that there's any magic-bullet solution to stock market misbehaviour. At the end of the day, you need regulators who keep their eyes on the ball and gatekeepers who keep the people out who want to turn the exchange into a casino. As someone wrote above, you can't legislate away stupidity. So you'll have to counteract the worst of its excesses on a case-by-case basis.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:28:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You urgently need to read JK Galbraith's The New Industrial State.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:34:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Me or Jake? :)

I know I should really do it no matter what.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 11:37:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You, to disabuse you of the notion of shareholder sovereignty.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:23:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, I do think it does have some weight... though not as much as it should have.

I mean, I specifically talked about creating situations where the management and the shareholders are the same people, didn't I?

The very idea here is to create the kind of shareholder sovereignty which I, just like you, do not believe exists to any reasonable degree under our current system.

The idea of having less listed and more non-listed companies might not be a bad idea. After all, non-listed companies need not be unsuccesful.

Koch Industries, Bechtel, Cargill, Chrysler, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Flying J, Ernst & Young, Publix, and Mars are among the largest privately held companies in the United States. IKEA, Victorinox, and Bosch are examples of Europe's largest privately held companies.


Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:33:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Galbraith distinguishes between "Entrepreneurial Corporations" with owner-managers, and "Mature Corporations" with a professional management and rather remote shareholders. What Galbraith did not envision when he wrote 40 years ago was the rise of the "CEO class", separate from both managers and shareholders, with its "executive compensation" culture.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 02:05:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]
What is the difference between a privately held company and a listed company with a single controlling shareholder?

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 02:12:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, you have stuff like listed companies with a strong owner, maybe the people or the children of the people who created the company, and who has maybe 20 % of the shares, which should be enough to run the company as they please most of the time.

Both should be able to be run in a rational way in the the interest of the owners, though it's always a very good thing to get away from the stockmarket.

Both the founders of IKEA and Bechtel have claimed they'd never been as succesful as they've been if they'd taken on outside share capital.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:35:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
According to Galbraith, Henry Ford nearly drove his company into the ground in his later years. When a corporation matures it becomes too large to remain entrepreneurial. Also, it is not obvious that a company will be run best when it is run in the interest of the owners.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 04:07:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You know, the more I look at this, the more I think that one should really distinguish between the professional private equity types, and the wannabe kind. All stuides show that the top guys have really been smarter than the rest of the industry, and than the markets - consistently and systematically. These guys do have the long term in mind, and they do seem to be able to make companies grow (or at elast make more money given a set of constraints), including creating jobs. The rest, ... not so much.

I keep on meeting "locust" type investors, and it's relatively easy to see which ones know what they're talking about.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 07:02:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Nearly 61% of option ARMs originated in 2007 will eventually default, according to a recent analysis by Goldman Sachs, which assumed a further 10% decline in home prices. That compares with a 63% default rate for subprime loans originated in 2007. Goldman estimates more than half of all option ARMs outstanding will default.
I have no words to describe this but "holy fucking shit".

Apart from Jerome's absolutely on-the-mark observation that

A 50% default rate demonstrates an absolute failure by lenders to do their only job, their most basic trade: risk analysis. If there ever was an indictment of the banking industry as it was structured lately (under the "originate, bundle and distribute" model, ie agents selling loans, passing them on to investment banks which repackaged them into vast arrays of securities that they got rated and sold to bond investors), this is it. It did not do its job, and, quite frankly, that part of the industry should be closed down and all people involved forbidden from ever touching a financial instrument again.
I have another observation to make. When a commercial bank makes a loan it creates money through the "multiplier effect" of fractional reserve banking (this is standard monetary theory and practice, but little discussed and even less understood: a secret in plain sight). We are now being told that anywhere between 1/2 and 2/3 of the money created by the banking sector in recent years should never have been created. This is as close as you can get to counterfeiting massive amounts of money without printing fake notes. And in another comment to this diary Jerome says
My point is that the bonuses are paid and gone, but now we're paying the banks to not recognise their losses. The mistake is there. What one could say is that governments are endorsing the system that created the bonus (and the holes that paid for them) by refusing to make the holes visible (out of fear of... what? a financial crisis??)
Governments have allowed the creation of massive amounts of counterfeit money through a failure of regulation, and now they are validating that counterfeit money by helping the forgers to not recognise their losses.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 06:02:09 PM EST
I had to rate this 4, but this is the most depressing comment I've seen, and I think absolutely correct in its scary assessment.  I haven't heard this idea that the money created was essentially counterfeit and that the present government bailout is basically rewarding that.  I have heard the idea that the banks or some unknown proportion of them are actually insolvent, and this would become apparent if they could ever be persuaded to put the actual cards on the table.  It makes some sense that the government wants to provide them all with towels to shield us from the reality, at least for the time being.  But how long is this going to go on.  Will there be some kind of trigger event that causes the whole charade to blow up?  
by jjellin on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 07:42:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have been banging on the "counterfeit money" drum for some time. For instance last october. Then in December Jerome wrote
The fact is, we're getting overwhelming evidence that the "success" of the Anglo economies in recent years was counterfeit, that GDP growth was fake (even if its increasingly unequal sharing was very real), and that a lot of dollar-based and pound-based value is dubious. The autumn burst came from liquidation, now the underlying trend is coming back, rather than the other way round as RGE suggests.
(my emphasis) and I threw in two comments to that effect in the thread: this and that. I have commented a lot about the failure of regulation, for instance last May and I came up with the "secret in plain sight characterisation of fractional reserve banking last December. See also this comment from November about the need to investigate various players and events for fraud, along the lines of Jerome's
that part of the industry should be closed down and all people involved forbidden from ever touching a financial instrument again.
but less forcefully.

You say

I have heard the idea that the banks or some unknown proportion of them are actually insolvent, and this would become apparent if they could ever be persuaded to put the actual cards on the table.
Well, Paul Krugman has been saying as much:
In past financial crises -- the stock market crash of 1987, the aftermath of Russia's default in 1998 -- the Fed has been able to wave its magic wand and make market turmoil disappear. But this time the magic isn't working.

Why not? Because the problem with the markets isn't just a lack of liquidity -- there's also a fundamental problem of solvency.

and there is a precedent for forcing the banks to put their cards on the table (my emphasis):
On March 5, 1933, the day after Roosevelt's inauguration, he called a special session of Congress which instituted a mandatory four-day bank holiday. This act provided for the reopening of banks after federal inspectors had declared them to be financially secure.

The bill also gave the then-Secretary of the Treasury, Ryan Hemeseth, the authority through an amendment to the Trading with the Enemy Act to confiscate the gold of private citizens, excluding dentists' and jewelers' gold and "rare and unusual" coins. These citizens received an equivalent amount of paper currency which was subject to later devaluation with relation to gold. This was how the US dollar was devalued by approximately 40%, ending the deflationary spiral the American economy was experiencing.

Within 300 days of the act's passage, 5,000 banks had passed inspection and were reopened. Roughly two-thirds of U.S. banks quickly reopened under this act, and faith in banking institutions was somewhat restored.

Two weeks after Obama's inauguration nothing of this sort has been done: Obama is no Roosevelt.

The fact really is that the problem is a failure of regulation through ideology

Washington could have revised the rules to cover this new "shadow banking system" -- but that would have run counter to the market-worshiping ideology of the times
The governments and the monetary authorities allowed all this to happen. We know this is the case because there is one OECD country whose banking regulator didn't allow any of this to be done. See here, here and the "transcript" here. Is it so surprising that governments won't want people to see their responsibility? We have seen Greenspan recant his belief in deregulation and admit some responsibility but business continues as usual.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 06:13:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Good post.

But you don't say that a monetary system based upon interest-bearing debt must mathematically run up against the constraints of finite resources. Which it did last year.

ie deficit-based finance is inherently unstable and unsustainable.

I think we should actually thank Greenspan and all the greedy bastards in the City and Wall Street that they have brought the system to a conclusive end maybe 10 years sooner than it would otherwise have done.

There are two possible conventional "solutions".

Firstly, we may - as we have always done - change the quantity of financial claims over productive assets either through:

(a) massive defaults (which reduces the quantity); or

(b) massive creation of new claims - which reduces the value of existing claims. ie inflation.

I believe that there is a new option, which is to maintain the quantity of claims, but amend their quality simply by removing the obligation to repay by a set date, and making the claims open ended.

I call this "Unitisation" and I believe a "Debt/Equity swap" provides a once and for all transition to a new "asset-based" economy.

Such unitisation will stem the credit bleeding from the system which governments cannot do anything about. ie the huge amount of investor capital - the shadow banking system - which was principally responsible for inflating the Mother of All Bubbles in property and private equity.

The collapse of the latter bubble is just "kicking in" and the rapid effect on employment will create a second order effect on property prices.

In a nutshell, the system is terminally fucked.

The way out IMHO is:

(a) Unitisation - "Peer to Peer" investment in productive assets, which stops the bleeding; and

(b) Credit Clearing Union - a new generation of "Peer to Peer credit" which enables the necessary transfusion.

Banks cease to be middlemen, and become service providers, or go out of business.


"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 07:28:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But you don't say that a monetary system based upon interest-bearing debt must mathematically run up against the constraints of finite resources. Which it did last year.

Prove it.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 07:41:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Compound interest is an exponential function, and money supply looks like this as result

Resources are Finite, particularly carbon-based fuels

My thesis is that in 2007/8 - maybe around late 2007 - the level of production of carbon-based energy became insufficient to meet the demands of economic growth required by exponential growth in the money supply.

I can't prove it any more than I can prove climate change: why don't you try and refute it?

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:25:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You said must mathematically...

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:37:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]
What happened between 1990 and 2000 with the money supply? I thought you were implying a simple exponential function suffices.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:40:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Nothing is ever simple. But in the absence of defaults, a money supply based upon money as interest-bearing debt has to increase - mathematically.

The higher the rate of interest; the faster the increase.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:50:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You are assuming all the debt has
  1. the same rate of compound interest
  2. no maturity date.


Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:54:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Migeru:
the same rate of compound interest

Not really. I'm just looking at "money as debt" in the aggregate.

Migeru:

no maturity date.

I don't think so.

Where there is a maturity date - and there usually is - then new money must necessarily be created - somewhere in the system - to repay the loan, or the system collapses.

If there is no maturity date then the effect is of quasi-Equity.

The redeemable Units I advocate are identical in function to an open-ended credit such as notes and coin.

The difference is that the Units I advocate are redeemable for something with a use value (eg energy value or land rental value) instead of being redeemable only for another IOU.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 09:19:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not long ago we were discussing an article about long-term econnomic history which made the point that the average rate of interest has been declining from upwards of 25% in old Babylon to below 2% in real terms in recent years. So the rate of interest, in the aggregate, does not stay constant.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 09:24:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This is interesting. No pun intended.

Interest has not been declining. The market price of capital has been declining as its supply has increased.

The problem, as usual, is one of definition.

"Interest" is actually a hybrid, because the interest-bearing money as debt created by credit intermediaries that we are now accustomed to using has two - qualitatively different - applications.

There is firstly unsecured credit in its function of "time to pay" - ie the "working capital" necessary for consumption and the creation of productive assets. This credit has a cost, consisting of system costs; default costs; and any profit demanded and obtained. Any such profit is IMHO by definition inflationary.

There is secondly the use of "secured credit" - which contitutes a temporary claim, at a fixed rate of return or "interest" - over productive assets - typically land.

You are confusing "interest" with the use value over time of the productive capital which is used to meet the interest charge, and usually also to provide a return to the "Equity" owner of the asset.

Essentially, the stock of "productive capital" consisted for thousands of years almost exclusively of land, and in order to have the use of it one had to pay the "market price" of this form of productive capital.

In Babylonian times this was 25% pa, but by medieval times, investment in agriculture and in buildings with a use value increased the stock of "Real Property" - and reduced the market price to around 10% pa. This market price has since decreased further over time as the amount of productive capital has grown, and also as new types - industrial machinery in the Industrial Revolution, and intellectual property in the ongoing Knowledge Revolution - have evolved.

As A Farewell to Alms documented we have seen the return on prodcutive capital - or rather, the market price of its use value - fall over time, and I reckon it's probably now between 0.5% and 1.0% pa.

This is of course the "real" (risk free) rate of return which would be available to rentiers in a perfect market.

All of the above is anathema to conventional economics which:

(a) does not recognise the "productivity" of capital (since to do so leads to demands to tax it) - and assumes that only Labour is productive ie the Sun of Capital goes around the Earth of Labour;

(b) defines as Money something which is not "value" but is an interest-bearing claim over value.

...and this is precisely why we have seen

the Corruption of Economics

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 10:15:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Are you claiming that "interest" has stayed constant even though the average cost of capital has declined? Is this "interest" rate observable? You seem to assume that "secured credit" has a fixed rate of interest and is secured on land. Considering that mortgage loans are increasingly made at variable interest rates, they don't seem to fit your definition of "secured credit".

"Problems of definition" go away when one considers observable quantities. The average cost of capital is an observable quantity. The time value of money is an observable quantity (taking, e.g., interbank lending rates at various maturities as a proxy for it). And so on. This supposedly constant rate of interest on debt secured on land doesn't seem to be observable.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 10:30:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Interest is a construct based upon the concept of Money as an interest-bearing IOU or Debt Object.

Money in fact has no cost: credit has a cost; productive capital has a market price.

Most of the money in existence came about as loans secured against land ie most of our money is deficit-based and land-backed.

I am saying that the "use value" of productive capital is an observable quantity.

It's called rent.

When I rent a building, in fact I am also renting the location/land under it, and that may well constitute the majority of the value. The capital comprised in the building depreciates; the capital comprised in the land does not, although it may vary.

Equally, when I buy Microsoft's software I am actually paying a capitalised amount of the use value of this "Intellectual Capital".  

As for secured credit, yes, that would have to include fixed and variable rates in its definition. The point is that secured credit - whatever the rate of return - is a financial claim created ex nihilo by credit institutions (or rather, based upon a de minimis amount of capital).

Time value of money depends upon what money is: at the moment it is a purely arbitrary interest rate.

I believe that the unitisation (through creation of Units redeemable in land rentals) of land rental value will enable most domestic monetary value to circulate in the form of land-based value units. International exchange will IMHO take the form of Units redeemable in energy.

Money as interest-bearing credit is IMHO obsolescent, which is just as well.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 10:55:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
ChrisCook:
Time value of money depends upon what money is: at the moment it is a purely arbitrary interest rate.

In fact, Money has neither "cost" nor "time value"; Credit and Capital may have, however.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 11:01:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Hmm, money being the unit of account in which credit and capital are measured...

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 02:14:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
...unitisation (through creation of Units redeemable in land rentals) of land rental value will enable most domestic monetary value to circulate in the form of land-based value units.

Smacks of Henry George.

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

by ATinNM on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 02:16:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Do you have a link to that thread? It sounds very interestingly!

Intiutuvely, one would think the opposite true: due to lack of good investment opportunities and economic growth back then, interest rates should have been really low.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:43:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Spelling.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:46:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But back then capital was very, very scarce - that is Chris' interpretation.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:50:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
See Chris Cook's top-level comment to The Industrial Revolution Unplugged: An Interview With Author Gregory Clark by Intrepid Liberal Journal  on October 2nd, 2007.
Interesting perspective. I agree with much of it, but not this.
The measure of patience in these pre-industrial societies is the interest rates? Because the interest rate tells you much you have to reward people to own land or own houses.How much do you have to pay them not to consume immediately, but instead own that asset and wait for future consumption? If you go back to ancient Babylon they had mortgage markets but the interest rates were typically twenty to twenty-five percent.
I think the fundamental point here is that the earlier you go, the less Capital there is knocking around a Society, and the more expensive it was.
Um, not exactly "recently", I see.

Oh, by the way, mortgage rates around 18% were not unheard of in the 1980's in some European countries, you don't have to go back to ancient Babylon.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 02:01:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Migeru:
Oh, by the way, mortgage rates around 18% were not unheard of in the 1980's in some European countries, you don't have to go back to ancient Babylon.

Chalk and cheese. We are looking at real rates here with inflation stripped out.

When mortgage interest rates were 18%, what rate was inflation?

In ancient Babylon, and pretty much right up till the dawn of the Industrial Revolution there wasn't any deficit financing and consequently little if any inflation. Whole centuries went by with level prices and it only started to get in to the current paradigm at the dawn of the deficit financing/ Central bank-centric system at the turn of the 17th century.

IMHO inflation is caused by a combination of deficit financing and the "For Profit" enterprise model. Deficit-based private finance (monetary deficit) causes asset price inflation: deficit-based public (fiscal deficit) finance tends to cause retail price inflation....

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 02:23:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
So you ARE a Friedmanite! ;)

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 02:25:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I doubt whether Friedman regarded Profit as a principal cause of inflation, though..... :-)

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:22:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I seem to be lost in a morass of definitions. Can you spell out what you mean by "deficit financing" or "deficit-based" finance?

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:04:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Deficit-based finance and deficit finance could I guess be conflated.

Deficit-based finance as I see it occurs when credit is created:

(a) privately by credit institutions (aka banks) beyond the institution, capital(ie fractional reserve banking).

(b) publicly by governments/ Central Banks in order to fund a fiscal deficit.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:20:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But there was large volatility in commodity prices, because they were mostly agricultural and agriculture was a lot less scientific and predictable than today (which means, it really sucked very badly).

So you needed high interest rates even on short maturities, to hedge against the possibility of a terrible inflation, even if there was none on long averages (this "long" being irrelevant to lender or borrower, because life expectation was much shorter then...)

Pierre

by Pierre on Thu Feb 12th, 2009 at 11:13:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If there is no maturity date then the effect is of quasi-Equity.

You may find it interesting that Veblen considered both debt and equity forms of "loan finance" there was no substantive difference between the two as far as he was concerned, except in so far as debt has known cash flows and equity has unknown cash flows. In Spanish "equity" is called "renta variable" (variable rent) as opposed to "renta fija" (fixed rent) for "debt".

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 09:27:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Very interesting!

I've been entertaining thoughts in those directions myself, but haven't managed to spell it out that clearly and succintly.

It becomes even more interesting when one figures out what it tells us about islamic finance...

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:45:22 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You would probably enjoy Veblen's Theory of Business Enterprise.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:47:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
What does it tell us about islamic finance?

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:02:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That it's just ordinary debt-based finance with some bells and whistles nailed on.

Or rather, an exercise in semantics.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:37:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And we didn't know this already?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:55:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Most of what passes for Islamic Finance is indeed as you say, but it need not be.

The partnership-based financing models I advocate are Islamically sound at a very deep level.

I spent an hour and a half in Qom with Iran's most senior cleric to discuss my work, and his view was that the Sharia'h compliance of such partnership-based finance is self evident.

Conventional Islamic finance is, as it often said, "a halal window to a haram palace", and many Sharia'h scholars make small fortunes in applying their skills in sophistry to a modern day Islamic equivalent of Papal indulgences.

In a nutshell, "gearing" can never be Islamically compliant however it is dressed up. So an Islamic Hedge Fund is and always will be an oxymoron.

Moreover, quite a few Sharia'h scholars think (as did many Victorians in the 1850's when it was introduced) that "free" limitation of liability is equally suspect, but most do not make an issue of it,and just like to make sure investment using it is "halal".

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 05:27:22 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I like Veblen more and more.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:48:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I've been trying to follow this and your comment further down in the thread:

"I believe that the unitisation (through creation of Units redeemable in land rentals) of land rental value will enable most domestic monetary value to circulate in the form of land-based value units. International exchange will IMHO take the form of Units redeemable in energy."

I'm not sure I understand what you are talking about, but I think you are pointing the way to bringing the value of "money" (for lack of a better term--not sure I can accept the idea that money just means debt) to a realistic basis in land, or perhaps other "stuff" such as energy.   I think we could use a dose of land and water (mud pies!) to counter the sever case of abstraction our economy seems to be suffering from.  But I'm not sure how your idea can be put into practice, without a severe alteration in our current government-business relationship model (some flavor of state-capitalism?).  

It sounds like you are prescribing a kind of bartering system based on land and other resources, and I don't think current government practice looks kindly on bartering because it tends to cut out the govenment as middle-man taxer.

This could very well be the answer, but I'm not sure how it happens.  Maybe if the federal reserve and ebay had a baby . . .

by jjellin on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 12:16:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
jjellin:
But I'm not sure how your idea can be put into practice, without a severe alteration in our current government-business relationship model (some flavor of state-capitalism?).  

It can happen with no change of legislation in pretty much the same way that the music industry has had to change in response to the internet's ability to "cut out the middleman". The enterprise model is essentially a new synthesis between Public = State and Private = Limited Company.

I suggest you have a look at this lecture

Video

and the slides are here

Slides

We are accustomed to using as money what are essentially IOU's issued by banks. While credit is a necessary part of a monetary system it need not necessarily be used as money

The fact is that a barter system incorporating "time to pay" or credit actually is a monetary system.

The best example of such "credit clearing" is the WIR Complementary Currency which has been humming along in Switzerland since 1934.

Adopting such credit clearing more generally is quite straightforward: it's a "utility" perfect for the Internet - "Peer to peer finance" not a million miles away from what eBay tried to do by gobbling up PayPal.

The question is what sort of "money's worth" people would be prepared to accept in settlement of credit transactions.

That is where the "Unitisation" of land rentals I outline in my lecture comes in. For international exchange I advocate unitisation of energy, and that is why I have been making presentations in Iran.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 12:55:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not the only one looking at the possibilities,but this guy obviously isn't into the credit aspect...

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/373902.htm

To help pull the world out of economic crisis, German Sterligov, one of Russia's first multimillionaires, has swapped his valenki for polished office boots.

After spending four years in a wooden hut in a forest outside Moscow, Sterligov has leased out almost an entire floor atop a skyscraper in the Moskva-City business district to launch a global barter system.


"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 01:15:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Courtesy of solveig the google queen...

THE TERRORISM OF DEBT

Ten years ago, economist J. W. Smith warned, "The size of the debt trap can be controlled to claim all surplus production of a society, but if allowed to continue to grow the magic of compound interest dictates it is unsustainable. The third world debt has been compounding at over 20 percent per year between 1973 and 1993, from $100 billion to $1.5 trillion [only $400 billion of the $1.5 trillion was actually borrowed money. The rest was runaway compound interest]. If Third World debt continues to compound at 20 percent per year, the $117 trillion debt will be reached in eighteen years and the $13.78 quadrillion debt in thirty-four years."

THE TERRORISM OF DEBT

After the G8 summit in Okinawa in 2000, President Obasanjo of Nigeria made this comment on Nigeria's debt: "All that we had borrowed up to 1985 or 1986 was around $5 billion and we have paid about $16 billion yet we are still being told that we owe about $28 billion. That $28 billion came about because of the injustice in the foreign creditors' interest rates. If you ask me what is the worst thing in the world, I will say it is compound interest."


"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:43:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... will be stealthly defaulted on via serious inflation of commodity products, eventually permeating the entire economoy.

It does not make the system unsustainable from an accounting perspective. It only means the "great moderation" of yesteryears was a short lived anomaly.

Pierre

by Pierre on Thu Feb 12th, 2009 at 11:17:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But you don't say that a monetary system based upon interest-bearing debt must mathematically run up against the constraints of finite resources.

I don't say it because I don't know it's true, mathematically.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:39:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But you don't say that a monetary system based upon interest-bearing debt must mathematically run up against the constraints of finite resources. Which it did last year.

ie deficit-based finance is inherently unstable and unsustainable.

Suppose that you have a factory that makes ball bearings, Mig is the government and I am the banking sector. Jerome runs a railway, that requires ball bearings at regular interval, as they wear out. He pays for these ball bearings with money, that he earns for transporting grain from the countryside into the city.

Mig thinks that having a monetary production economy is, on balance, A Good Thing, so Mig decides to lever taxes in various ways, and lever them in fiat currency. He then issues fiat currency to state employees instead of paying them in goods and services. Since not everyone works for the state, but everyone needs to pay taxes, there is a demand for fiat currency, and policeman-hours can thus be converted into bread or ball bearings or lightbulbs or electricity on the open market.

Now, realising that the supply of iron from which to make steel from which to make ball bearings is finite, you decide to build a new factory, this one to convert scrap metal into industrial-grade metal. You also enter into a contract with Solveig to buy wind-generated electricity from her, so your new factory has power.

You and Solveig thus need money. So you go to your local friendly loan shark investment banker - me - and borrow one million bottle caps each.

So now the cash flow for this toy economy looks like this:

Jerome buys ball bearings. This gives the old factory money. The old factory pays your new factory for the steel that it would otherwise have had to buy elsewhere. Your new factory pays Solveig for electricity, it pays me to amortise the loan and it pays you profits (we assume that scrap metal is readily available). Solveig pays me to amortise the loan, and pockets the difference between the amortisation and what you paid her as profits. And everybody except the farmer uses their profits to pay for grain.

So the farmer earns money, from which he pays taxes. The civil servants in the city get paid in fiat currency, which they use to buy grain. Jerome, you and Solveig all earn money, which you use to buy grain and pay taxes.

So far, so boring. But what happens in my bank?

I take some money each month - i.e. I transfer a sum from yours and Solveig's checking accounts to the bank's checking account, and then write down my assets (i.e. your loan liabilities) by the same amount. Then I use part of the money I just transferred to my own checking account to pay my employees - that is, I transfer it from my checking account to the checking accounts of my employees.

But the money that remains in my own checking account after paying my employees balances precisely assets and liabilities, so I might as well strike it from my balance sheet. So I do, and money is destroyed in the process. But since you paid a little more than the principal plus the salaries of my workforce, my liabilities (the amount in your checking account plus the amount in my employees' checking accounts) shrunk a little faster than my assets (your amortisation schedule). Thus, I made a profit, which goes into my equity.

In other words, my profits destroy money. There is then less money available in the world.

Now I'm hungry. I need to buy grain. And I need to pay taxes too, 'cause otherwise the government is gonna come around with some goons and take my stuff. So I take some fiat money from my vault, and use it to pay the farmer for some grain. He then immediately redeposits it in my bank. So effectively, I've moved a part of my equity into the farmer's checking account. This creates money. And I take some fiat money from my vault and use it to pay taxes to the government. The government then immediately pays salaries to its employees (in this society, taxes are collected at the same time government salaries are paid). But the government employees all immediately go and deposit their fiat money in my bank. So, once again, what has happened is that part of my equity has turned into checking accounts for other people.

Assuming that the tax code is properly constructed, I can see no reason whatsoever that anybody has to end up with more or less money in their checking accounts (resp. equity) at the end of such a cycle. You may argue that establishing such a tax code is politically difficult, but I don't see how it violates any mathematical theorem or law of physics.

Assuming such a tax code is put in place, at the end of the cycle, we'd all have the same amount of money (resp. equity) as we did before, by your and Solveig's loans would be paid down a little bit. Everyone is happy.

Now, this picture only works when there are profitable ways to invest money. If there are no profitable ways to invest money, I go out of business (or, more likely, I turn my business from being investment banking to being a clearinghouse for people's debit card payments, salaries, etc., which is a valuable service, which means that I can take a cut).

But I don't see why that's a problem.

More fundamentally, I don't see why, in the presence of technological progress, there should necessarily be a scarcity of profitable investment opportunities, given constant industrial production.

Suppose that you realise that ball bearings are a thing of the past - superconducting magnetic bearings are the thing of the future. Your ball bearing factory is now fully amortised, so you can call it quits, close it and be happy that it fed you and your family for a while, and be proud that you contributed something of real value to society. You want, however, to build a magnetic bearings factory, and for that you need more money than you have at present, and can raise from the recycle value of the means of production in your ball bearing factory. This means that you have to go to your local, friendly loan shark investment banker - me - and borrow money.

So, all else being equal, that means that your profits go down for a while, my profits go up for a while. But that's a mirage of accounting: If you had anticipated this technological change, you could in principle have written down your factory over time, and thus claimed a smaller profit in the past, in anticipation of a need to change technology base.

You didn't, and that's why you have to give me a bit of your stuff now. That's a distribution thing, and one can consider it fair or unfair, one can legislate for or against it (or compensate for it in the tax structure), but I don't see how it prevents a steady-state economy built on debt-money.

(Jerome's (who owns the railway that will use these new magnetic bearings) profits go up permanently (presumably he wouldn't switch technology if he didn't expect his profits to go up as a result). If we want a steady-state economy, the government can take these extra profits away from him and distribute them equally among the citizens, so that everyone can just work less. Again, that's a political issue of distribution.)

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:43:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I think you ignore the government's ability to create and destroy money through taxation and spending, thus creating sinks and upwells in the money supply.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 03:54:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
between conventional value and actual value at their peril.

A simple example is that of someone burning a banknote. He "lost" the face value of that banknote (ie his assets went down by that amount, and the State's - or the Central Bank's - liabilities ent down by the same, but the only real thing that got lost was a bit of paper (and maybe you can even deduct from that the value of the heat coming in the process).

Money was destroyed, but nothing was lost. The same happens the other way round when money is printed. What matters is what people do with the change in their assets and liabilities, which is a way more complex question - one of investment opportunities, one of trust that makes circulation of money (ie assets/liabilities) possible, and one of time horizons.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 04:30:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I think that national accounting is complete bollocks and that public investment in public assets can and should be accounted for as a National Equity - which would essentially be the "sink" you refer to.

Public investment in public assets (eg affordable housing and green energy) gives rise to an immense "use value" which users will pay for, and the resulting Pool of revenues may be distributed as a "National Dividend".

ie the "upwell" you refer to.

Unfortunately the conventional "enterprise model" precludes both of these by definition.

The only "investment" that may permissibly take place  is through the enterprise model known as a Corporation. I'm pointing out that Corporations are not only obsolescent and sub-optimal, but rapidkly being overtaken by new alternatives emerging because they work.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 05:06:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There probably is a theoretical limit to the system (it seems unlikely that there is an infinite amount of technological progress to be made) but there's no sign that we're near it now - that's just confirmation bias run rampant. Which describes 95% of commentary I see pretty much everywhere at the moment.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 04:24:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Leaving to one side the limits to monetary creation, my point is that the level of economic activity - which is IMHO driven by monetary growth -  began to test finite levels of liquid fuel resources not that long ago.

And monetary growth is driven by the mathematics of compund interest.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 05:12:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You keep saying that, but I don't think it's generally true. I think it's a bug (feature?) in the broader political economy, more than the monetary system.

Or, more bluntly put, if you have a political class that believes that "what is our gas doing under your tundra?" counts as an energy policy, you're gonna find yourself outta gas whichever monetary system you employ.

The fact that neoliberals have driven the current monetary system into a ditch no more proves that it is the system itself that is deficient than the inability of a drunken five-year-old to play the violin proves that the instrument in question is deficient.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 08:05:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There has been no serious attempt to build an economic system which hasn't bred the local equivalent of neoliberals.

I'm more extreme than Chris - I think economic and political activity is inherently flawed, in the same way that cannibalism was flawed.

Eating the brains of friends and/or enemies has nothing much to do with nutrition - just as today's models of economics and politics have nothing to do with mass participation or mass prosperity, except accidentally and in spite of themselves, on rare and random occasions.

What we have today is a system designed to calculate and externalise status differentials, which can lead to breeding and survival opportunities. It's a farmyard pecking order run on a global scale.

There isn't any more intelligence built into the system than there is in a chicken coop. Nothing much will improve until that changes, and husbandry and symbiosis become more important as acknowledged and externalised values than the chance to get your stick your face in the food trough ahead of someone else.

It's not impossible to change habits on a mass scale. Cannibalism doesn't happen any more, except as a news item, and physical hygiene is much better than it was a few centuries ago.

But it does need people to point out that the current system is inherently not a viable answer for the longer term.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 09:47:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
You keep saying that, but I don't think it's generally true. I think it's a bug (feature?) in the broader political economy, more than the monetary system.

The monetary system is one of the axioms of our political economy. And it is unsustainable. It leads to periodic crashes: always has done, and always must do.

JakeS:

Or, more bluntly put, if you have a political class that believes that "what is our gas doing under your tundra?" counts as an energy policy, you're gonna find yourself outta gas whichever monetary system you employ.

"What is our gas doing under your tundra?" is the response of the neolibs to the other question posed:

"How the hell do we keep the (monetary) beast fed?"

With a rational monetary and property system there would be no neo-lib class.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 09:56:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But there are other axioms that are at least equally important, such as the inviolability of private property. It is not clear to me that replacing the monetary system but leaving the concept of private ownership of the means of production as a right rather than a privilege would lead to any substantially different result.

"What is our gas doing under your tundra?" is the response of the neolibs to the other question posed:

"How the hell do we keep the (monetary) beast fed?"

Rubbish. It's the answer to the question "how can we enrich ourselves and our friends?" And everything else is just window dressing. Pretending that their arguments are motivated by a genuine desire to improve the common good is giving them a credit that they have historically proven themselves unworthy of.

With a rational monetary and property system there would be no neo-lib class.

Aha. I am all for reforming the property system - specifically the distribution of property - in ways that make neoliberals less likely to appear and even less likely to succeed. But the property structure and the monetary system are not inextricably linked. And, if anything, I should think that the property structure goes a greater way towards determining the monetary system than the other way around.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 04:04:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
And, if anything, I should think that the property structure goes a greater way towards determining the monetary system than the other way around.

but isn't that exactly the point chris is forever trying to make?

Excuse me chris if i have misunderstood!

ie that all money is credit in paper, gold or pixels, and the original wealth is in the land and sky, therefore if you go upriver far enough, you're always going to have money 'imitating' real wealth and the 'security' it offers.

if we use what the earth and sky's productivity is capable of sustaining, the magic 4%, then we can use money, and stay within natural limits, except chris wants to call money 'energy units' instead of rubles, shekels or whatever, and make them (allow them to be) cross-border fungible.

at first i thought he meant a kind of smart-energy marxism, with no private property at all, with the state as owner-of-all, and we citizens allowed to accumulate energy credits in much the same way as money now, depending on how ambitious and hard working.

no more inherited wealth, iow. i'm still not fully clear on this, being the sorriest of economists.

please set me straight(er), anyone, on what i've missed!

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 05:33:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Thanks melo.

In the first few pages of this rather unstructured paper

Re value

I set out my thinking in relation to the nature of "Value" and its relationship with the concepts we think of as "Money" and "Property".

The reason I did this is that I was unable to explain to myself (never mind anyone else!) what it is about the partnership-based structures I first identified 8 years ago that is so special.

I believe that by using an "Open Corporate" as a partnership-based framework/protocol it is possible to encapsulate the relationships of Money and Property (private Capital arises out of the concept of private Property) holistically within a complete continuum.

Jake rightly disapproves of the "Private" sector, but he, like everyone else, never actually identifies that when we say "Private" we mean "owned by an individual or by a Joint Stock Limited Liability Corporation". That's because we take this as a "given".

So he shares virtually everyone else's view that the only alternative to the "Private" sector is ownership by "the State" - ie the monolithic legal entities and the bodies of statute and regulation which constitute the "Public Sector", .

I am pointing out that there are other ways to achieve fair sharing of the fruits of the Commons which involve new - consensual, rather than imposed - partnership-based protocols.

The architecture / enterprise model I advocate is what I call the "Capital Partnership", as follows.

"Ownership" of an asset eg land is held in perpetuity in the public interest by a "Custodian" subscriber to the Capital Partnership agreement.

The User Member has the right of use of the asset and pays an agreed amount (in production or the revenues from the sale of production) for that use. This amount is shared between "Investors" of money or "money's worth" (ie Financial Capital) and "Managers". (ie Human Capital).

I believe that this enterprise model is optimal in its sharing of risk and reward, and that this is why people are increasingly using partnership enterprise models. I think I am certainly the first person, possibly there are now more, actually looking out for and observing the emergence of these forms.

As I understand it, this model also happens to be in accordance with the values that underpin all the great religions, for those for whom that is relevant. ie I think that Ethical may in fact be Optimal.

The enabling factor has been the emergence of legal entities such as the US LLC and UK LLP which allow "open" legal agreements to be concluded between stakeholders on whatever terms they consensually agree.

So to come back to the point, Capital is not a consequence of Money, and Money is not a consequence of Capital. They together form (or rather - should form) a continuum of Value.

I see Value as being definable only in relative terms: ie Value may be said to be the Relativity of Desire. I see Capital as static Value, and "Money" as dynamic Value.

The congruence of energy and value is IMHO exact: Capital is potential Value, and Money is dynamic Value existing only instantaneously.

Indeed, I think Economics may correctly be described as the Physics of Value.

Whether or not I answered your question, melo, I am not sure.... ;-)

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 06:33:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Jake rightly disapproves of the "Private" sector, but he, like everyone else, never actually identifies that when we say "Private" we mean "owned by an individual or by a Joint Stock Limited Liability Corporation". That's because we take this as a "given".

So he shares virtually everyone else's view that the only alternative to the "Private" sector is ownership by "the State" - ie the monolithic legal entities and the bodies of statute and regulation which constitute the "Public Sector".

I do not disapprove of "the private sector" - that is overly broad. I disapprove of the private sector being tasked with doing things for which it is ill suited.

And I don't think that non-private (as in, non-individual, non-charter company) ownership is limited to state organisations, or what is known as "the public sector," either. There is a rich school of thought (with which I am unfortunately only vaguely familiar) in Anarchist and Syndicalist tradition of cooperatives, co-governance, employee democracy and other (quasi-)collective, non-state models of governance.

In fact, I think that monolithic state entities suffer from severe problems (the greatest of which is the ease with which they are subverted by a concerted lobbying effort), and would much prefer, all other things being equal, to devolve power to the primary stakeholders - i.e. those who are actually touched by the actions of an organisation, whether it is an organisation that you want to term "public" or "private."

At the end of the day, money is just tokens that we use to represent control and exchange of the means of sustenance and production. And when the wheel hits the rail, the monetary system matters a lot less than who has his hands (and guns) on the stuff.

But maybe that's just me being excessively Marxist again...

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 07:10:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
At the end of the day, money is just tokens that we use to represent control and exchange of the means of sustenance and production. And when the wheel hits the rail, the monetary system matters a lot less than who has his hands (and guns) on the stuff.

Money currently is indeed "just tokens".

But in fact it is possible to create a monetary system - the Swiss did so in 1934, and it is still ticking over nicely - in which money is not a token, but rather the outcome of the system.

WIR Bank - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The WIR Bank, formerly the Swiss Economic Circle (GER: Wirtschaftsring-Genossenschaft), or WIR, is an independent complementary currency system in Switzerland that serves small and medium-sized businesses. It exists only as a bookkeeping system, with no scrip, to facilitate transactions.

The key point is that neither Swiss Franc "tokens" nor WIR "scrip" tokens change hands.

The WIR is purely an accounting system.

Transactions take place not in exchange for Swiss Francs, but by reference to Swiss Francs as what I call a "Value Standard" or measure.

This is IMHO the future.

There is no reason at all why a network of WIR-style Peer to Peer credit systems should not be generally introduced, and more to the point, extended from "wholesale" B2B transactions to "retail" B2C transactions.

What is needed for that is a framework of trust - in the case of the WIR, that discipline is provided by a legal charge over business property, available should a business default on a debit balance.

I advocate a "Guarantee Society" agreement backed by contributions into a default pool.

This is not an alternative to the preseent system - it is complementary to the existing system, which would, if such a P2P Credit system works the way I think it could, simply wither on the vine.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 07:35:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That's all well and fine, but it's still just an accounting system. The accounting system has meaning only by reference to real, tangible power relationships involving real, tangible resources and products.

At the most basic level, I think that trying to engineer our way out of economic problems by jiggering the monetary system is putting the cart before the horse: The bookkeeping exists to keep track of who "owns" which "property." The concept of "ownership" refers to nothing other than the ability to bring overwhelming violence to bear - either personally or by proxy through the government - upon anyone who uses your "property" (which is in turn nothing other than the tangible objects that are protected by an implicit threat of overwhelming violence) in ways that you do not approve of.

Political economy - indeed government itself - is fundamentally an exercise in deciding who is permitted to bring overwhelming violence to bear upon whom and under what conditions. Notions of "ownership" and "property" arise out of this interaction, and accounting and the notion of "money" arise out of ownership and property. You can change the monetary system all you like, but until and unless you change the allocation of property and the conditions under which extreme violence can be applied in safeguarding it, all you're doing is putting lipstick on a pig.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 10:03:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I think you underestimate the way in which the Internet is subverting power relationships. What you describe as "just" an accounting system - ie the "clearing" system - is the DNA of economies.

I am not talking about "jiggering" the accounting system - we are seeing an evolution into a completely new P2P architecture. Shared transaction and title repositories, rather than double entry accounting are one of the consequences.

This leads to a market economy - but a market without "profit" and "loss" - where it is in participants' interests to cooperate, rather than compete. Making payments to "rentiers" is simply inefficient, Jake. I think you underestimate the power of the Cooperative Advantage.

The mechanisms which will over-ride the power relationships you point to are consensual, networked partnership-based relationships. "They" are having the ground taken away under their feet.

Those enterprises (by which I mean public, private whatever) who do not use partnership protocols will be at a disadvantage to those who do. This process is well under way: it's about "what works".

Classic emergence.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 10:42:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
ChrisCook:

I see Value as being definable only in relative terms: ie Value may be said to be the Relativity of Desire. I see Capital as static Value, and "Money" as dynamic Value.

The congruence of energy and value is IMHO exact: Capital is potential Value, and Money is dynamic Value existing only instantaneously.

Indeed, I think Economics may correctly be described as the Physics of Value.

it keeps getting clearer.. thanks chris.

this custodian, would he/she be appointed, elected, or entitled by birth?

god knows it is elusive, trying to grok it.

value can change with fashion and tech growth (yesterdays model, heavier with less options).

capital is forests growing, wind blowing, land being well husbanded, right?

not owned any more by individuals, but LLP's? i leave my land to the collective, but can pass on the right of usufruict to my heirs? ie, income from wind turbines, pv panels, hay, clay, gravel, grain, lumber?

would i lose the right to sell the title, does that go into 'public trust'?

please excuse the simpleton questions, i've been wrestling with this for a couple of years now, and certain parts are still occluded...

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 08:03:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
melo:
not owned any more by individuals, but LLP's? i leave my land to the collective, but can pass on the right of usufruict to my heirs? ie, income from wind turbines, pv panels, hay, clay, gravel, grain, lumber?

Not quite.

You transfer the land to the Custodian and immediately become (Day One) the only  "Investor". All of the value of the land is now encapsulated in the agreement.

The land is then "owned" by a Custodian, whose function is as a steward, not just of the asset, but of the "Aims and Objectives" of the partnership agreement relating to that asset. The Custodian will have certain "veto" rights of governance. eg stopping the use of land for a particular purpose outside the purpose expressed in the agreement.

Once land is held by a Custodian, formal "title" is never transferred again.

Rights of use/occupation, and in relation to the fruits of use are allocated between the other "stakeholder" members of the framework agreement.

It is possible to divide these in different ways:

(a) proportional "Equity" shares (% ages or "n'ths") which are rights to the flow.

(b) Units redeemable in "money's worth" of production eg Kilo Watt Hours; Metric Tonnes of woodchip; pizza's; litres of beer.

These may or may not be transferable under the agreement.

Re land:

Occupiers may come and go, and service providers will facilitate that process.

Investors in the revenues/production from the land, may also come and go, and again, service providers will facilitate that process.

There may well be a "Manager" providing certain services in accordance with the agreement. He will probably be entitled to a proportional "Equity Share" in the flow, and you will see that, unlike in a Company, the interests of the Manager are then aligned with the interests of everyone else.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Mon Feb 9th, 2009 at 09:07:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
so the custodian (when he's at home), is a frontman?

he takes care of land affairs, permits, taxes etc?

is he a pro custodian, who does it for other investors too?

or is he a partner?

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:58:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
melo:
so the custodian (when he's at home), is a frontman?

Nope.

The custodian only has veto powers of governance to stop nasty things happening....

More often than not, it would be the local municipality, but it could be a different corporate entity.

It could even be an individual. We had a guy come to see us about a "land partnership" to build affordable housing on his estate, which had been in the family for 500 years. He didn't really see the land as "his" - he saw his role as a "steward".

It's the service provider/manager partners does all the work and receives a revenue share.....

The custodian doesn't actually "do" anything else other than safequard the asset, and the aims and objectives of the partnership.

But note that people can wear more than one hat. So in the landowner case, our friend would be the "custodian"; far and away the biggest investor; and also quite active as a "manager".

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 07:01:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
From 2005:

Greenspan and the Bubble - New York Times

Regular readers know that I have never forgiven the Federal Reserve chairman for his role in creating today's budget deficit. In 2001 Mr. Greenspan, a stern fiscal taskmaster during the Clinton years, gave decisive support to the Bush administration's irresponsible tax cuts, urging Congress to reduce the federal government's revenue so that it wouldn't pay off its debt too quickly.

Since then, federal debt has soared. But as far as I can tell, Mr. Greenspan has never admitted that he gave Congress bad advice. He has, however, gone back to lecturing us about the evils of deficits.

[...] But as recently as last October Mr. Greenspan dismissed talk of a housing bubble: "While local economies may experience significant speculative price imbalances, a national severe price distortion seems most unlikely."

Wait, it gets worse. These days Mr. Greenspan expresses concern about the financial risks created by "the prevalence of interest-only loans and the introduction of more-exotic forms of adjustable-rate mortgages." But last year he encouraged families to take on those very risks, touting the advantages of adjustable-rate mortgages and declaring that "American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage."

If Mr. Greenspan had said two years ago what he's saying now, people might have borrowed less and bought more wisely. But he didn't, and now it's too late. There are signs that the housing market either has peaked already or soon will. And it will be up to Mr. Greenspan's successor to manage the bubble's aftermath.

I don't think it's counterfeiting if the government and the Fed were directly involved in encouraging banks to take insane risks.

Systemic fraud though - quite possibly. Insanity - inevitably.

The plural of 'conservative' is 'disaster' - this is just another example of that apparently universal law.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 08:19:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
Systemic fraud though - quite possibly

so systemic it made accomplices out of little old grannies...

it was MALWARE and it's infected so many terminals, and now it's crashing the operating system.

the laws permitted the level of gambling (others' shirts off others' backs) that is bringing millions towards penury . if the laws change asap, and retroactively to boot, that just might mollify the public.

i guess it boils down to how much more insane they are, how far they are willing to push the lie, (how much cog-diss the tv heads can purvey without busting into the shakes), and how deep the corporate somnabulist consumer trance.

cuz' joe public is hearing the alarm go off, and he's grouchy, liable to step out the wrong side of the bed.

better throw some breadcrumbs, boys, we know the cake is long gone, but a few mouldy crumbs must be around, surely.

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 09:38:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Governments have allowed the creation of massive amounts of counterfeit money through a failure of regulation, and now they are validating that counterfeit money by helping the forgers to not recognise their losses.

As our Dear Leader has so memorably declaimed, "Mission Accomplished!"

by cambridgemac on Sun Feb 8th, 2009 at 12:36:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
THINKING?  WHO WAS DOING ANY THINKING?

The old joke goes: God gave man a brain, a penis and enough blood to run one of them at a time.  It would seem that the same principle applies when considering prospects for great personal profit and analyzing risk.  It is an old principle of law that no man can be an impartial judge in a matter of his own interest.

A reasonable response to this problem would be to require risk analysis to be totally separated from client contact and loan origination and for the two activities to be compensated differently.  Let those who originate loans continue to be compensated by current means.  Require those who analyze risk to be well compensated according to the inverse of the default rate and over the lifetime of their loan portfolio, regardless of the disposition of these loans by the bank.  In down markets, risk analysts could be compensated according to how their portfolio performs compared to the industry norm.  Further, require that they make regular reports directly to regulatory agencies.  Such an arrangement just might work, so it is highly unlikely that it will be adopted.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Feb 7th, 2009 at 10:17:12 PM EST


Display:
Go to: [ European Tribune Homepage : Top of page : Top of comments ]