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Digging us out of the hole

by JakeS Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 03:52:21 AM EST

The first part of this diary is a slightly edited copy of this comment.

When labour productivity goes up, some combination of the following must happen:

  1. The length of "the full work week" drops.
  2. Unemployment rises.
  3. Consumption rises (through private or state spending).1

But,

  1. Is considered ideologically unacceptable by the powers that be.
  2. Is considered tactically unacceptable by the powers that be (the bread must flow and the circuses kept running).

This means that, in order for the political system to continue to function as advertised, 3) must happen.

Increased consumption can happen either through2

A) Tax-financed fiscal and industrial policy (which usually ends up being redistributive), B) Increased real median incomes, or C) Loan-financed spending (public or private).

But,

A) Is prohibited by The WestTM's official religion (unless it takes the form of feeding a Mil-Ind complex...). B) Is considered ideologically unacceptable by the powers that be.

This leaves only C) which is precisely what created the current financial meltdown.

promoted by whataboutbob


Viewed in these terms, it is quite obvious how the progressive agenda is superior to the conventional wisdom:

  • Having the "full time work week" drop is entirely acceptable to a progressive platform.

  • Unemployment remains verboten, albeit for political rather than tactical reasons.

  • Effective industrial policy (as opposed to spending on shiny toys designed to kill and maim people) goes back on the table.

  • Increased real median incomes is not prohibited as a matter of policy.

This means that progressives have three levers to manipulate the political economy, which are not available to liberals. Furthermore, the progressive platform contains an explicit political parameter that can be used to accommodate flat (or even moderately declining) industrial production without throwing large numbers of people into serious deprivation: Reducing the work week.

I'll repeat that, because it's extremely important: A political economy run according to progressive policies does not have to be able to grow indefinitely, but a political economy run according to neoliberal principles does.

And as anybody who has even the most cursory acquaintance with the laws of physics will know, indefinite growth is physically impossible. Full stop. This is not a debatable point. Nature does not engage in political negotiation, nor is it amenable to economic arguments. So any economic theory that presupposes interminable and uninterrupted growth in the total industrial production will eventually crash catastrophically. And, because it presupposes interminable growth, such a political economy will in all probability fail to plan for the crash.

Now, it is far from certain that a progressive political program - even if implemented yesterday - would be sufficient to prevent such a catastrophic collapse. But no other economic doctrine out there has even so much as a theoretical chance, nevermind one that I'd be willing to bet our planet on.

- Jake

1In the original comment thread, santiago objects that investment can also increase demand. But for the purpose of short-term macroeconomics (which is what we're looking at here), investment and consumption are the same side of the same coin. If anything, the investment component fails to help, because it is more cyclical than consumption.

2In a response to the original comment, santiago objects that there is actually an option D) Taking other people's stuff. This can be subdivided into (at least) two kinds of plunder: The "debt reset" option, in which those who have lived above their means default on their debts, and the "go to war" option, where people who live above their means shoot other people and take their stuff.

But the debt reset option is merely another name for "the current financial meltdown," so that is already contained in bullet C).

Wars, on the other hand, are a form of industrial policy, and so belong in bullet A). In point of fact, it is the only form of industrial policy that the official religion in our part of the world is willing to countenance. It just happens to be an incredibly ineffective (not to mention morally dubious and ideologically unacceptable to a progressive platform) industrial policy. It is also not an industrial policy that a hypothetical global government could employ, because the global government would have nobody to go to war against.

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European Tribune - Comments - Digging us out of the hole
And as anybody who has even the most cursory acquaintance with the laws of physics will know, indefinite growth is physically impossible. Full stop. This is not a debatable point. Nature does not engage in political negotiation, nor is it amenable to economic arguments. So any economic theory that presupposes interminable and uninterrupted growth in the total industrial production will eventually crash catastrophically. And, because it presupposes interminable growth, such a political economy will in all probability fail to plan for the crash.
As Feynman said about the Challenger disaster:
For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled.
Replace technology with economy, and off you go.

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 07:36:43 AM EST
Even, and especially agriculture. This civilization is a giant technological artefact, so Feynman's observation should be front and center at all times. In general, economy should switch from the "invisible hand" (hedge funds? SIVs?) to the visible laws of physics.

Patrice Ayme Patriceayme.com Patriceayme.wordpress.com http://tyranosopher.blogspot.com/
by Patrice Ayme on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 02:57:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Sounds great, until we remember that the laws of physics are actually less fully supported and more rigourously disputed among physicists than are the laws of economics among economists.  Despite economists' penchant for physics-envy, there is little about the supposed conclusiveness and objectivity of the natural sciences that can be readily applied to a social dimension.
by santiago on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 06:14:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]


Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 06:35:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
While I broadly agree with him, I have to say that this is a terribly unconvincing quote. He was put on the spot in the interview, and he's doing precisely what he accuses social scientists/commentators of doing: making up an example and running with it.

His claim would be convincing if he gave an actual example of this, that truly happened. It shouldn't be too hard to take a topic like e.g. the nutritional properties of polyunsaturated fats and to chart over time the various contradictory claims made by various people.

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 09:42:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
more fully supported and more rigourously disputed among physicists
I believe that is what you meant? Of course, some of this is in the eye of the beholder. A typical mathematician is likely to dismiss any talk of rigour among physicists :)

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 09:28:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No, I mean LESS.  In physics, concepts such as gravity, to say nothing of relativity and quantum mechanics, are all still highly controversial and in some ways contradictory concepts over which physicists are in much greater dispute than economists are over things such as "fundemental theorems of welfare economics."
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 10:35:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well Even among Physicists, Gravity isn't contraversial, they may not be able to explain it, but they're fairly convinced it's there.

"fundemental theorems of welfare economics."  less so.

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.

by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 10:42:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Oh, the fundamental theorems aren't disputed: they're quite elegant and not all that difficult. The applicability of the underlying assumptions is another matter entirely ...
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 10:50:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And even if you do accept the underlying assumptions, what they have to say is overhyped, IMHO.

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 09:18:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
They are not. There are no disagreements on gravity, relativity or quantum mechanics. Even the youngest of these theories has been definitively formulated for 60 or 70 years now, and they are regularly tested, both by experienced experimenters who measure the various constants for the benefit of the world, and every year by lowly physics students who learn the basics of labwork. The final arbiter is an endless repetition of experiments, never concensus or theoretical beauty.

That didn't stop scientists from finding new formulations to replicate the effects of these theories (eg Feynman who was quoted in another comment, was a bit late), and it doesn't stop particle physicists from disagreeing about the interpretation of their experimental results, and inventing new particles or defining new fields of study as needed. Speculation about the true nature of physics is rampant, but never to be taken too seriously.

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 10:25:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Sounds great, until we remember that the laws of physics are actually less fully supported and more rigourously disputed among physicists than are the laws of economics among economists.

Despite the fact that there's more experimental support for physics' predictions than for economics.

Since, according to you, Economics "laws" are more fully supported and less debated among economists, it follows economists are not actually doing [social] science, but a exercise in [ideological] consensus-building.

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 02:26:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not so.  Mostly due to the much lower costs of observation and experimentation, there is much more empirical academic research to back up the theories of economists than there is for the theories of physicists. Both, however, are used in practice in everyday life through engineering and economic activity, mostly unnoticed because markets really do clear according to changes in price and gravity really does pull objects to earth at a more or less predictable rate.  
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 10:40:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Mostly due to the much lower costs of observation and experimentation, there is much more empirical academic research to back up the theories of economists than there is for the theories of physicists

[citation needed]
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 12:05:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You got me.  It's an assertion, not something I've looked up. It would be an interesting research question for a kid's masters thesis, however.
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 02:12:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
When I took some courses in economic history, the professors were quite snarky towards the nationalekonomi department. Like "and in this time period, we can observe that A happens, then B, then C. But if you take those other professors classes you will learn that that can never happen".

Between that and hearing some of the acceptance speaches when the Riksbankens economic price in memorial of Nobel - "then the theory made sit up and pay attention, the thoey, the theory, the theory" (hardly ever is empirical data mentioned, in contrast with the physics and chemistry speaches) - I am suspecting that observation plays at most a minor part in formulating economical theories. At least in the neoliberal economics that dominate here.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 04:14:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The problem is that in economics, econometrics is considered "too applied" to get the glory of a Nobel.  But most economic research that gets published, as well as that in the applied economics fields of management, public policy, and political economy, is actually empirical research where the question is, "theory says X, so what do the data say?"
by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 02:49:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Bah, mathematics is too "pure" to get a Nobel either.

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 05:28:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The problem is that in economics, econometrics is considered "too applied" to get the glory of a Nobel.

You know, in physics you can't get a Nobel prize for theory unless the theory has been confirmed experimentally. Which is why 't Hooft and Veltman had to wait nearly 30 years for theirs, for instance.

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 05:33:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The same is true for the economics Nobel.  But experimental evidence is more problematic, generally, for the reasons given in the present discussion.
by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 03:06:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But most economic research that gets published, as well as that in the applied economics fields of management, public policy, and political economy, is actually empirical research where the question is, "theory says X, so what do the data say?"

Right.

NYTimes.com: Economists question dominance of free-market ideas (July 11, 2007)

"There is much too much ideology," said Alan Blinder, a professor at Princeton and a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Economics, he added, is "often a triumph of theory over fact."

...

And free trade is not the only sacred subject, Blinder and other like-minded economists say. Most efforts to intervene in the markets - like setting a minimum wage, instituting industrial policy or regulating prices - are viewed askance by mainstream economists, as are analyses that do not rely on mathematical modeling.

That attitude, the critics argue, has seriously harmed the discipline, suppressing original, creative thinking and distorting policy debates.



The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 05:45:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
There is also the fact that mathematical modeling is typically based on assumptions about markets and about human behavior that are obviously and patently false.

Perfect information?  Rational maximizers?  Give me a break.

They're modeling a system of ideal fluids, and then looking to see how well the actual fluids match up to the ideal, instead of making any attempt to model or understand the reality.

by Zwackus on Tue Jun 30th, 2009 at 05:37:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Ideal fluids? They're doing comparative statics.

A man of words and not of deeds is like a garden full of weeds; a man of deeds and not of words is like a garden full of turds — Anonymous
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Jun 30th, 2009 at 05:43:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Regarding ideological consensus building, you're right on target. That is a hazard peculiar more to social science, although natural science is certainly not immune from it either.  (Which is why there are entire, growing  academics fields devoted to History of Science" and "Philosophy of Science" to uncover the ideological and institutional biases in science.)
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 01:05:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You make the Philosopy of Science sound something new, when It is one of the oldest branches of philosophical discussion, dating back to Empedocles at a minimum.

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 01:21:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You're quite right. Not my intention.
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 01:27:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... physics than in mainstream economics. The fundamental toolkit of mainstream economics puts some points beyond debate, as being necessary to reach any conclusions at all, that are not simply debatable, but have in fact been falsified.

Of course, this statement:

Sounds great, until we remember that the laws of physics are actually less fully supported and more rigourously disputed among physicists than are the laws of economics among economists.
is itself simply false unless one proceeds on the basis of the rule in mainstream economics to define economics in terms of adherence to the mainstream approach, rather than in terms of any particular object of study.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 11:33:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You're quite right.  In physics there is less (but not nearly as much less as you seem to presume) importance in buying into an already predetermined way of looking at the world in order to inquire about it than in the current field of economics.  In physics, one's mental model of physical reality can be wider and still make inquiries that others can respond to while in economics, for the math to be relevant, one's model of human relationships has to be comparably smaller for the math to still make sense.  

However, that's not really the main problem.  The main problem is that of unobservables.  In physics, unobservables are usually things that theoretically CAN be observed so the problem is finding out how to observe them in order to support or refute one's theory about how the physical world works.  What's interesting to physicists is what should be observable in the world but isn't.

In economics, like all social sciences, the unobservables are usually things that theoretically can never be observed but are presumed to exist based on thinking about the world in socially and existentially relevant ways. What's interesting to economists are what can NEVER be observed -- things like justice, power, happiness, and capability.  For example, in economics, one frequently is interested in human well-being, also called welfare.  However, we know that a large part of human well-being is relative to subjective judgements, a priori, just like aesthetics. This means that observable proxies for well-being have to suffice, such as income, or deprivation.  But they will always be proxies and there is always a danger when trying to apply discoveries based on those proxies to cases where the proxy might be a very misleading indicator of the underlying concept. The neoliberal prescription that economic growth necessarily makes the poor better off even if it helps the rich even more is a classic example of the perverse consequences of mistaking the observable proxy of income for the unobservable concept of well-being.

by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 12:54:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... you are restricting the definition of economics to a subset of economists, and then observing that the diversity among a subset of economists is less than the diversity among all physicists.

In economics, like all social sciences, the unobservables are usually things that theoretically can never be observed but are presumed to exist based on thinking about the world in socially and existentially relevant ways.

Part of this reads like an American Institutionalist critiquing mainstream economics, except for the false premise that this applies to all approaches in all social sciences.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 01:21:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Educate me then. Are not the unobservables -- human nature, motiviations, inherent attributes, justice, equity, well-being, etc. the interesting questions in all of social science -- not just economics or one part of economics?  What are the exceptions, and are then general enough exceptions to refute my assertion?

On the natural side, are not the observables, theoretically if not actually, the interesting questions in natural sciences?

by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 01:55:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Economics is the study of the material provisioning of society.

Look at your list.

"Human nature". What is relevant to providing cause and effect explanations are regularities of human behavior. As an evolved social primate, there will be innate biases, and to the extent that they are relevant to regular behavior, they will be subject to scientific observation. And of course, those behaviors include the internalization of the regular rules of behavior in the social contexts that we encounter, which leads to institutions that are themselves observables in their rules of behavior and the folkviews regarding those rules of behavior held by their participants.

Any unobservable element of human nature over and above that is beside the point in providing cause and effect explanations human behavior.

"Motivations". Mainstream economics has a strong reliance on unobserved and unobservable utility preference maps as the motivation for the incessant decision making followed by performance that is its unit of analysis. But that is required for the scientific study of human behavior, but only for application of that particular unit of analysis of evaluation followed by decision followed by performance. Replace the unit of analysis with social transaction followed by performance, and then to the extent that motives are relevant to the transaction, they are observables.

"Inherent attributes". Inherent attributes are either observables or excuses in lieu of study of regularities of human behavior.

"Justice". The various rules of appeal to various internalized models of justice are quite observable, as is the regularity that models of justice are formed and internalized. Often those models of justice have a folkview that the model of justice itself is intrinsically valid rather than socially grounded. There is an "unobservable" there if we attempt  to find that intrinsic grounding of some particular model of justice, but that is the same as the unobservability of the orbits of the sun and the planets around the earth ... we cannot observe what is not there.

"Equity". This is, of course, a specific facet of some specific models of justice.

"Well being". Basic needs of humans can be identified, without difficulty. The idea of some generic unstructured quantity of "well being" is, of course, more of the long falsified utilitarianism of mainstream economics. Those aspects of well being that are observable and identifiable are precisely those aspects that social science can address.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 02:31:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
First your definition:  "Economics is the study of the material provisioning of society."

Most economist wouldn't agree that your definition describes the field, currently or ever.  Certainly the classical economists, Smith, Ricardo, and Marx wouldn't have.  Economics was a branch of moral philosophy, and material provisions were always proxies for broader concepts of justice and ethics.  That hasn't changed.  Economics is the study of how to organize society in ways that provide for more justice and greater well-being.  It is a normative discipline, in that economists are expected to prefer social organizations that provide greater justice and greater well-being to those that don't.

Regarding your criticisms of my partial list of unobservable phenomenon that make up the basis of what are concerned "interesting" research questions in the social sciences, I refer to you the seminal work on the topic of causality by the eminent computer scientist and mathematician (not an economist) Judea Pearl (http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/BOOK-2K/) whose work on the science and philosophy of causality is considered foundational in both the natural and social sciences.  

(As a sad aside, Dr. Pearl is also, quite tragically, better known outside of academia as the father of David Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter who was beheaded on international TV by his captors in Pakistan in 2002.)

I'll take just one topic from your list, because it is the biggest problem in all of social science research, from psychology to sociology to economics -- inherent unobservable attributes.  A really good example that comes from the the controversial arena of teen pregnancy, sex education, abortion, and life outcomes. Up until recently, most research showed, unsurprisingly, that girls who became pregnant at a young age had worse life outcomes than girls who didn't when categorized into those two groups and other factors were sufficiently controlled for in statistical models of the relevent relationships.  However, that still never satisfied the on-going problem in statistics of missing variables -- what didn't get included, and how that might have biased the inference of causality between pregnancy and poor outcomes. What is a missing variable? It's almost always some unobservable phenomenon for which it is impossible, or nearly so, to find data.  In the case of pregnant teens, the question is, "Is there something else about these girls that both causes them to get pregnant early and also causes them to have worse life outcomes?" That is, is there some unobserved characteristic in some girls that causes them to BOTH get pregnant and have other problems unrelated to the pregnancy?  If so, pregnancy can't be the cause of poor life outcomes, and policies and social mores focusing on preventing teen pregnancy are probably misplaced.

Well, a few labor economists (http://jhr.uwpress.org/cgi/content/abstract/XL/3/683)came up with a novel solution to the problem by looking at the US longitudinal survey data and grouping teens into different categories -- those who got pregnant and gave birth, and those who got pregnant but didn't give birth.  Their finding was surprising to them. Girls who gave birth had as good or better life outcomes after 10 years than girls who didn't give birth.  This provides some evidence about causality -- that pregnancy cannot be said to cause poor life outcomes in and of itself.  Rather there is some still unidentified characteristic(s) inherent in some girls that explains both getting pregnant early and having poor life outcomes.  Girls should therefore not expect poor life outcomes if they have a child as a teen, ceteris paribus, but they should wonder if there is something else about them that might still lead to poor outcomes whether or not they carry a child to term.
 

by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 06:17:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I think you're mischaracterizing somewhat the nature of missing variables in statistics. A missing variable formulation does not in itself imply that there is a real unobservable phenomenon that science must grapple with, rather it only implies the much more mundane statement that the chosen statistical model (in your example) is inadequate as is.

There is always a tradeoff between modelling a process correctly (ie without missing variables, entirely in terms of what has actually been observed and nothing else) and adapting an off the shelf model while hoping it will work out.

The reality is that the substantial effort required to model a process from scratch is not justified in nearly all cases. The few standard (statistical and physical) models that were developed from scratch since the Renaissance have been reused and extended many times, to the point that the cost of using them is merely a few years of university education.

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 09:45:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
A missing variable is a problem IF there is, in fact, a variable missing from a statistical model.  The problem is that often only theory can tell you if it is missing or not -- not anything in your model itself.  This means that you'll never know if it's missing if you haven't thought sufficiently about your problem.

You're quite right that in most cases the substantial effort to make a new model from scratch is unjustified, and this gets to the heart of Bruce's issue with the institutionalist critique.  We're biased by the nature and necessity of our circumstances to accept and build on the models and mistakes of others.  Which means that we're likely to miss important things that don't fit the models, such as unobservable phenomenon.  

However, even in making a model from scratch there is still the non-trivial issue of unobservables. This is the real problem that most economists, as well as many other social scientists, and even medical researchers, struggle to answer: "What WOULD have happened if X were true instead of Y?" -- a counterfactual, in other words.  That's how causality is best inferred and how statistics is used to find the answer, but doing so is really hard work because counterfactuals are, by definition, unobservable, which means that a better theory makes all the difference.

by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 02:39:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
A missing variable is a problem IF there is, in fact, a variable missing from a statistical model.  The problem is that often only theory can tell you if it is missing or not -- not anything in your model itself.  This means that you'll never know if it's missing if you haven't thought sufficiently about your problem.

That is why you make control experiments.

This is the real problem that most economists, as well as many other social scientists, and even medical researchers, struggle to answer: "What WOULD have happened if X were true instead of Y?" -- a counterfactual, in other words.  That's how causality is best inferred and how statistics is used to find the answer, but doing so is really hard work because counterfactuals are, by definition, unobservable, which means that a better theory makes all the difference.

And this is why you do double-blind placebo-controlled clinical trials.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 04:27:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But in all of those cases -- medical research and social science, the ability to do double blind placebo controlled clinical trials is almost never possible.  There are also, as given in the Causality book by Judea Pearl that I linked to above, significant problems with inferring causality EVEN from double blind placebo-controlled experiments that are ignored in much published research in the physical sciences.
by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 03:10:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In medical research, it is possible to do double-blind placebo-controlled (or if not against a placebo, then against the standard of care) clinical trails more often than not. It's not always possible, but it is in the majority of cases.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 05:37:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
One could always go talk to the girls, and try to find out.  That's what anthropologists try to do.  The problem is, when you start talking to people, you get stuck dealing with the infinite diversity of humanity.  The problem isn't unobserved variables, so much, as it is putting together a set of concepts (the basis of variables) that comes anywhere close to representing the important factors of one's life.  And then assigning numbers to them, and plugging them into mathematical models.

Seen from the perspective of an anthropologist and a historian, the history of the field of economics has been one of a long flight from the complexity of reality into a warm numerical cocoon of fantasy.

We don't understand why people do things?  Let's just pretend that all people try to maximize their utility.  We can't model asymmetrical information in an adversarial market situation?  Let's pretend everybody knows everything.

The fact that these models and this way of thinking encouraged people to look away from the structural problems causing poverty, to look away from gluttonous parasitism at the top, to look away from the role of hierarchy and power in defining the market situation, was merely a bonus.  It's so much easier to just blame poor people for failing to maximize their utility.

by Zwackus on Tue Jun 30th, 2009 at 05:48:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The Institutionalist critique DOES apply to all social sciences, with neo-classical economics being just the current, egregious case study.  That is how the concept of reflexivity, for example, became so important for ethnography in the fields of anthropology and sociology, for example. The institutionalist critique is what changed those two fields from being consultants to imperialists into being critics and students of empire.
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 02:07:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... the institutionalist critique was taken on board, anthropology became something other than a social science, because all social science has been described as being blindly ignorant of the institutionalist critique.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 02:33:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No, not at all.  I'm saying that the institutionalist  critique -- that our questions about the world, and therefore our observations of it, are necessarily biased by the particular social circumstances in which we find ourselves -- applies to all forms of human inquiry (even natural science, although, by its nature it may be arguably less sensitive to such bias). Some fields have merely already incorporated that critique better than others.
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 03:42:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... incorporated the critique. You say:
In economics, like all social sciences, the unobservables are usually things that theoretically can never be observed but are presumed to exist based on thinking about the world in socially and existentially relevant ways.

A theory that is constructed based on what can be identified as unobservables that can never be observed but are presumed to exist ... is a theory that has been constructed blithely ignoring the institutionalist critique.

And then you continue to pander to the mainstream economists pretense that their's is the only approach with which to study economics by identifying the incorporation of the critique with a field of study rather than an approach to a field of study.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 04:32:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]
been "blithely constructed ignoring the institutionalist critique.  (Or at least not for that reason.)  

The institutionalist critique provides no solution other than maintaining some humility (also called reflexivity) about both the methods of inquiries and the discoveries one might make. Neoclassical economics frequently ignores the critique by (perhaps blithely) assuming that economic agents have more power and knowledge about things than can be possible if the institutionialist critique is true.  

The critique can also be modified and applied to much of physical science as well by attacking the assumption on the part of the researcher that there really exists some objective vantage point from which the world can possibly be imagined -- that you can imagine a world without you, but still call it the same world.  (This was the real mental breakthrough of Galileo, for instance, which has since been shown and accepted by philosphers since des Cartes as clearly false.  We can't really separate our first-hand perspective from reality -- to do so is imagination.)  But for most things in the physical sciences, like most things in social science, it doesn't make much difference. You can build sound bridges and supercomputers without resolving the existentialist dilemma.  However, as Einstein pointed out in relativity, there are places where it makes all the difference and ignoring that problem masks the truth.  Even the physical sciences must engage in unproven imaginations about how reality works -- called heuristics -- before analysis occurs, and the end result of analysis is always necessarily biased by possible misspecifications in that original, dreamed-up view. For Galileo, his epiphany was that human beings weren't the center of the universe. But Einstein had to have the opposite epiphany to solve the problem of relativity -- that he really WAS the center of it, as far as observing and measuring it is concerned.

Likewise, markets tend to work most of the time without taking account of the fact that institutional constructions bias actors through power and limits of information. The assumption that people really do know enough and are powerful enough to make rational choices is basically true regarding what we can observe. But there are certain cases where things go dramatically wrong when such ideas are applied, through policy or become ideological.

There's nothing wrong, in the institutionalist critique, with trying to find out the truth about things that cannot possibly be observed -- it just means that there are some reasonable limits to using observational methodologies to do it and researchers need to be honest about those limits.

And as a researcher within the radical school of economics, I've certainly never been accused of "pandering" to mainstream before.

by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 06:54:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There's nothing wrong, in the institutionalist critique, with trying to find out the truth about things that cannot possibly be observed -- it just means that there are some reasonable limits to using observational methodologies to do it and researchers need to be honest about those limits.

There is everything wrong, in the institutionalist critique, to trying to find "the truth" about things that cannot possibly be observed and calling it science.

This is not the point at issue:

The assumption that people really do know enough and are powerful enough to make rational choices is basically true regarding what we can observe.

This is only possible true by redefining "rational choices" away from what it means in the context of mainstream economic modelling ... people clearly can not know enough to make perfectly foresighted rational choices regarding each action that they make and do not have the capacity to engage in the incessant decision making at the foundation of the mainstream model.

So the "rational choice" in that statement is a shell game, a claim about the plausibility of a more constrained form of rational choice than is presumed in utility maximizing modelling on a more constrained set of actions than a model of human behavior based strictly on utility maximizing is engaged in modelling.

However, beyond that, there is the point that the utility maximizing model of rational decision making is invalid, so whether people are or are not in fact capable of engaging in the form of rational decision making specified in mainstream economic models, we know that they do not do so.

If you are a researcher in radical economics, it makes it all the more puzzling why you defer to the right of mainstream economists to define a single approach to economics as the same as the field of economics.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 07:09:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I refer (not defer) to mainstream arguments because you're not making the right arguments against it, and you're misstating the institutionalist critique of them.

I have never argued that the neoclassical approach is the same as the whole field of economics.  You've somehow inferred that yourself from things outside of my comments and have been misinterpreting my responses based on that.

The institutionalist critique is not at all concerned about searching for unobservables and "calling it science." That's what social science is, after all. The important thing is to recognize that it is what you're doing and presume that discoveries have universal conclusions. The institutionalist critique is concerned about presuming that one particular way of imagining the world is necessarily the right way, which is an assumption particularly strong today (although certainly not universal) in neoclassical economics and other fields that are "consultants to power" rather than critics of power.  In physical science today, the institutional critique may be most valid for medicine, where institutional bias as well as profit incentives appear particularly corrosive regarding health care questions.

by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 02:24:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I refer (not defer) to mainstream arguments because you're not making the right arguments against it, and you're misstating the institutionalist critique of them.

It would be good if you and Bruce took this debate to a separate diary...

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 05:52:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Good point
by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 03:34:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Some fields have merely already incorporated that critique better than others.
... you are equating the field of economics to mainstream economics and writing institutionalists out of the picture. Some approaches have incorporated that critique better than others.

The institutionalist critique is not at all concerned about searching for unobservables and "calling it science."

Clearly you are only willing to recognize a portion of our critique.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 01:44:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Fair enough, some APPROACHES have incorporated the critique better than others.

While there is a set of people who don't like calling social science, "science," (and which apparently includes you) that is really not a central part of the critique -- that is a mere semantic part.  The counter-argument to them is that much of physical science is not really "science" then either -- much of medicine, genetics, etc., including a lot of theoretical physics.  But that would be taking the argument too far, I hope you would agree.  So I refuse to get hung up on yours or anyone else's obsession over a word, choosing instead to go after the heart of the critique, which remains valid: Especially in social questions, which usually involve unobservables because of the subjective, social nature of social science, an observer's institutional bias must be taken into account in some way in order to preserve some degree of honesty.  

For example, Karl Polanyi, an important contributer to the institutionalist critique, did not expend a lot of effort pointing out how natural science was valid but social science was not.  Rather, he argued that neoclassical economics is a political philosophy first and foremost and that distinctions necessarily biases its so-called scientific conclusions.  Much work in History of Science uses the same strategy to critique virtually all of the natural sciences as well, particularly the applied parts of it in engineering and medicine.

So the critique is not centered, or really shouldn't be if some of you are, on categories of "real" science versus "fake" science.  Rather the critique is centered, where is is useful, on the concept of honesty in any rational inquiry.

 

by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 03:33:22 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... like Veblen, I view it as a label for characteristics that can be identified, and do not view mainstream economics as displaying those characteristics.

It is true that much of what goes out under the banner of social science is the fruitless chase of the unobservable, pursued sometimes by calculating the incomputable, sometimes by deploying the indecipherable in the attack on the inexcusable.

But much of what goes out under the banner of social science is indeed science, offering and contesting cause and effect explanations of observable social behavior and activity. Sadly, less commonly in my field of economics than in the other nomethetic fields of the social sciences.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 03:48:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You get a 4 for quoting Veblen.  I don't think we're in as much disagreement about this, after all.

However, a lot has changed in the field since him, even if his critique still has validity.  Heckman, for example, has re-focused much of what is considered economic inquiry precisely to question of cause and effect based on observables.  However, the primary focus of social science remains on what one can deduce about unobservables -- justice, well-being, inherent traits -- from observable data.  This differs from much work in natural science in one way very little: even if a phenomenon is unobservable to human senses, it's presence can be deduced from theory and observation of what can be observed.  However, the key difference in social science are that the unobservable components are dependent upon social contexts, which are not the case in most questions of natural science.

Anyway, Migeru has warned me to not discuss this anymore in this thread.  Good discussion.

by santiago on Mon Jun 15th, 2009 at 03:43:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No, I have suggested that the discussion be taken to its own diary because it is meaty enough (and tangential enough to the present diary).

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Jun 15th, 2009 at 04:11:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
However, as Einstein pointed out in relativity, there are places where it makes all the difference and ignoring that problem masks the truth.

No. Just... no. The equations involved are simply transformation properties of spacetime. Nowhere in the theory is the observer invoked, except in a same didactic sense that electrons are said to "want to go towards" the lower potential.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 04:18:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Then you don't understand how Einstein discovered it.
by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 03:11:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes I do. I've read his paper on special relativity. In the original German.

But far more fundamentally, the laws of nature involved do not invoke the observer. Special relativity states simply that the length of the four-vector is invariant under transformation between inertial systems. Full stop. This does not invoke the observer any more than stating that the length of the three-vector is invariant under rotational transformations.

How Einstein discovered this does not matter. He could have come to this conclusion while tripping on acid, he could have had a divine revelation, he could have consulted an astrologer, for that matter. None of that would have changed the way the equations behave, nor the experimental results that confirm their utility.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 05:52:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
How so very...impressive!

Keep on keeping on...

The Hun is always either at your throat or at your feet. Winston Churchill

by r------ on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 06:16:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And your point is?

Welcome back, by the way.

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 06:27:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That's very impressive, and I can't beat it.  

But I don't agree, either.  To say that intuition, or one's mental picture of the world has nothing to do with a discovery of a fundemental explanation of how the world works is just wrong.  Maybe he could have solved the equation from the insights of an acid trip, but he didn't.  That's says something about the difference between acid trips and human reason and experience.  Instead he spent much of his time in a patent office imagining the issue of observing the same phenomenon and getting different results at different vantage points when a constant was needed instead.  The observer was invoked for the expressed purpose of determining what is universal without an observer. And the implications of the theory are important for observers as well.  

by santiago on Mon Jun 15th, 2009 at 07:40:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The observer was invoked for the expressed purpose of determining what is universal without an observer.
The paper just says "let there be a clock at point A" and "at point B"... So, if something happens to an inanimate clock, it happens to an "observer". I don't see how the "observer" is so important.

But you have one point which is that, at the time Einstein wrote, they were still mentally wedded to coordinate systems and the important thing was the rules for changing coordinates. In that sense Einstein was concerned with observers and not with what was universal. It's been over a century since 1905 and in the meantime physicists have adopted the mathematical point of view that what matters is the transformation group and its invariants, and that coordinates are not important. This transition started almost immediately with the work of Minkowski and others, especially Wheeler in the mid-1900's.

So you may be right about Einstein's heuristic basis for his discoveries but we already have a different understanding of them. Nevertheless, Einstein's thought experiments about train conductors flashing lights around relativistic trains remain useful to build intuition - too bad they are seldom mentioned to physicists in training.

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Jun 16th, 2009 at 01:46:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
To say that intuition, or one's mental picture of the world has nothing to do with a discovery of a fundemental explanation of how the world works is just wrong.

But I'm not. I'm saying that there are three distinct aspects of science:

  1. Coming up with ideas for new models.

  2. Building models that enable you to make predictions, then testing those predictions.

  3. The body of knowledge derived from point two.

You seem to be talking about bullet 1) here. But when you say

However, as Einstein pointed out in relativity, there are places where it makes all the difference and ignoring that problem masks the truth.

You are using the language of bullets 2) and 3).

An insight to that effect may have inspired his discovery of special relativity, but it is not pointed out as an assumption in the theory itself. And the original source of inspiration is no more necessary to understand the theory of relativity than having an apple-induced headache is a prerequisite for understanding Newtonian gravity.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Jun 16th, 2009 at 06:29:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
an apple-induced headache
mmmm... cider!

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Jun 16th, 2009 at 09:13:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Good economics know they basically do history with an "algebra touch".

As Brad de LOng says he can not take a thousand different countires with the same population, the sam eindustries and indtroduce different level of M1, bonds, fiat, corporate incentives and see the different outcomes.

We , in physics do this all the time...and when we ahve  aquestgion there is always someone with the money and will to try again and agian..
The only problem wiht "physics" is the "fashion" problem.. if something is not fashionable it might not be repeated and some questiosn remain unanswered... but this is, ina  sense, good.. if it is not interesting to everybody  we do not bother..

The cosnensus -building in physics has ntohing to do wiht the consensus-building in hisotry and economy...

Economy has a fuandametnal intrinsic problem (they can not repeat experiments) and an extrinsic problem (incentives lead to economists which do not know anyhting about models, algebra and self-constrain) which  has lead to an "economic" social science which has absurd starting hypothesis.

A pleasure

I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. Levi-Strauss, Claude

by kcurie on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 11:51:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Most economists "know" no such thing. They "know" that they are pursuing a science because they use so much math, and that anything that cannot be quantified must be replaced with something that can be quantified.
 

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 01:23:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It is sad., really, then.

Most economists I have read use the algebra I learnt in my first course in phsyics. Pathetic.

I respect those making econometrics, since they know what they are doing and know the algebra necessary to present their data. It is probably the most impresive part of eocnomics. It reminds me of the ethnologists going to a foreign land to really get soem data bout human behvior.

And then you have a huge chunk of economists which do not look for data ina systematic way because all the y want is to poof a particular "way of looking at things". Generally , the models have a set of stupid hyopthesis, which are never true in real life. They also use extremlly low level algebra..and soemtimes they use it worng...

This is why I prefer, beside econometrics, those economsits that know what they are doing. They know that at the end of the day they are doing history with a bit of algebra (De Long, Krugman...) while playing the games of the other eocnomists trying to find an stupid model with stupid hyopthesis which could describe their historical insights using a more complex non-relistic model. And this is an statement (or simialr) that I have read again and again done by the economists I like more...

A pleasure

I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. Levi-Strauss, Claude

by kcurie on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 08:18:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not convinced of your extrinsic problem argument -- that seems more like typical conjectures of someone not in the field (which I am sure I am guilty of too) -- not familiar with the literature.

As I noted in an earlier comment, the large and growing academic fields of history of science and philosophy of science indicate that there may be more in common between social and natural sciences regarding consensus building than you're willing to admit.

But, as I also indicated in another comment upthread, the idea of applying the methods or discoveries of physical science to the social problem is mistaken.  Physicists and economists are interested in fundamentally different questions, which is something that too many economists today with "physics envy" for unnecessary appeals to calculus for argument should consider. Physicists want to know how the physical world works, or at root, "Did God have a choice?"  Economists, however, are interested in social questions -- questions of how human beings relate to each other. Issues of justice, power, and well-being are concepts for which the mental frameworks of physics have little bearing, and vice versa, even though there are notable crossovers at times (Darwin's theories of natural and sexual selection came from his readings of Adam Smith and other classical economists, for example, and Newton's writings on the nature of money were influential in the formative years of economics).

 

by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 01:26:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Physicists want to know how the physical world works, or at root, "Did God have a choice?"

Some physicists, that it.

Most published physics is materials science, nothing to do with metaphysical wankery.

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 05:47:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Darwin's theories of natural and sexual selection came from his readings of Adam Smith and other classical economists

Did they?... I thought they had more to do with his grandfather...

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 05:52:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I am personally not interested in how god workerd... in physics.. I lvoe it in the cafeteria.

In physics, as in any sect group, we work along consensus building , as much as in any other place.
The key point is that we can always device an experiment... or can always try to device an experiment to convince someone else.

In economics this is not possible. Whenever you want to argue if Keynessian politics are ok now, you can not make hundreds of experimetns.. youonly can try to understand the past and make some guesses.

Unfortunately, a lot of economists take themselves too seriously and think they are above thsoe limitations. Theya re not, and most economists textbooks apresent at least a couple of crazy assumptions which ina lot of cases are known to be wrong if youlearn enough about anthropology or development pshychology.

Don't get me wrong, a lot of physics also do (don't you know we are looking for the "theory of everythign"? cracking), the difference is that after we built the atomic bomb we are not that interesting anymore. We do not have the media power/projection and incentive structure that economists do to go around and proclaim they know everyhting because they do some basic algebra.

That's why I wil alwasy trust more a DeLong analysis that a Summers analysis.

A pleasure

I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. Levi-Strauss, Claude

by kcurie on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 08:07:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
European Tribune - Digging us out of the hole
It is also not an industrial policy that a hypothetical global government could employ, because the global government would have nobody to go to war against.

Not quite - it could always go to war against its own people.

Population collapse doesn't matter as long as you're not part of the population which collapses. If you're a king/pharoah/big man who plans to survive - who the hell cares what happens to the worker bees, as long as you're still on top?

Whether or not this is feasible or true - Mugabe might be a good person to ask about this - matters less than whether or not a hypothetical global government believes it might be.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 08:19:57 AM EST
A neo-liberal global government dominated by the existing financial elites will almost certainly end in catastrophic collapse.  Wars between nation states are probably preferable to that eventuality.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 11:49:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
Not quite - it could always go to war against its own people.

i was going to say, you think they'll ever run out of people to strip of dignity?

that's what the war on terra is all about.

how many fingers, winston?

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 04:13:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Wars, on the other hand, are a form of industrial policy

I have recently been wading slowly through J R Saul's ox-stunning volume Voltaire's Bastards, which contains a lucid and hence appalling chapter on the logic by which governments conclude that weapons manufacture is the key to economic and political well-being.  of course centring one's economy on weapons production produces neither economic nor political well-being, but it does produce enormous opportunities for graft, fraud, nepotism, and personal enrichment... which makes the dysfunctional logic hard to challenge or replace.  recommended reading, ch 6 and 7, "The Flowering of Armaments" and "The Question of Killing".

I don't know yet how much I like the entire argument presented in the book;  I'm instinctively in sympathy with his critique of Taylorism and technomanagerial zealotry, but otoh Jefferson-worship (of which I think he could reasonably stand accused) rubs me the wrong way.  but I'll give JRS his due and read the rest of it before passing any judgments.  certainly an interesting read -- I liked his coverage of the Corsican Republic, for example, an historical event that was certainly not featured in my schoolroom days :-)  I also like his nuanced view:  elites are trapped by their own logic, in addition to being divorced from reality and in some cases nasty people.  his ruthless portrait of Macnamara alone may be worth the price of the volume (used, anyway).

The difference between theory and practise in practise ...

by DeAnander (de_at_daclarke_dot_org) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 01:11:25 PM EST
Orwell covers much the same ground in his essay The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism (Emmanuel Goldstein's book in 1984): By wasting copious amounts of industrial production on fruitless wars that cannot possibly be won in any meaningful sense of the term, demand is artificially created that soaks up the excess industrial production made possible by mechanisation, and hence prevents the population from becoming so wealthy that it will have enough free time on its hands to seriously reach for political emancipation.

When I first read it (back in high school) it struck me as a ludicrous caricature. These days, though... not so much.

But Orwell clearly underestimated the ability of consumerism to artificially inflate demand in lockstep with increasing labour productivity. And he clearly overestimated the desire of a rich, well-fed population to reach for political emancipation.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 06:30:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
European Tribune - Comments - Digging us out of the hole
A political economy run according to progressive policies does not have to be able to grow indefinitely, but a political economy run according to neoliberal principles does.

If the monetary system you use in your progressive economy is based on interest-bearing credit created by credit intermediaries then your money supply is going to grow indefinitely.

Jerome's view is, I think, that smart investment and development will allow such money supply growth and the related debt to be serviced and accommodated indefinitely.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 04:20:15 PM EST
We're not talking money supply, we're talking resource use.

The brainless should not be in banking. — Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 05:52:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If the monetary system you use in your progressive economy is based on interest-bearing credit created by credit intermediaries then your money supply is going to grow indefinitely.

Not if those credit intermediaries have expenses (including taxes and dividend payouts) that equal the total interest.

There are three political variables to fiddle with here to maintain the money supply (above and beyond those employed by conventional monetary policy): Taxes, general wage levels and dividends. One of those can be directly dictated by the central government, and another of them can be heavily influenced by industrial policy in general.

But even if you're right, so what? What is the problem with an infinitely growing money supply? It's just bookkeeping - there is no problem with printing money that cannot be solved by even the crudest of direct distributional policies.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 06:12:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
When labour productivity goes up

I am more and more starting to doubt the concept of the ever-increasing labour productivity. My suspicion is that most of what we have learnt of labour productivity hides external costs in nature and that what we really are seeing is how one person through technology can turn (increasing) parts of nature into (increasing) mountains of stuff with (increasing) heaps of rubbish. Counted in man-hours alone it is effective, but counted in total stuff/resources used it is probably much less effective then many traditional means of production. Just that we use an increasing part of nature to do it all.

I suspect it is neither here nor there when it comes to the point of this diary though.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 05:21:45 PM EST
It is both here and not there...

The logic that I go through in the diary applies equally to sustainable increases in productivity (such as the increased productivity caused by wind farms displacing coal miners who used to be digging coal to power coal power plants) and non-sustainable ones (such as bigger earth-moving machines displacing coal miners for mining coal).

But it is extremely relevant to the issue I bring up in the second half: For simplicity, I have assumed here that a labour productivity increase does not decrease productivity w.r.t. other input variables (electricity, iron ore, land use, hardwood, etc.). If this is not the case (and it usually isn't), then obviously industrial production would have to actually decrease in order to maintain the same environmental footprint. That would further increase the need for reducing man-hour input in order to remain in compliance with our long-term survivable ecological footprint.

But adding this complication makes for a less straightforward argument, and one that can more easily be dismissed by the claim that Technology Is MagicTM. It could be argued that technology can sometimes increase labour productivity without decreasing productivity w.r.t. other input variables. What the version I've put in the diary does is to show that even if we make the most ludicrous assumptions about technological progress that can possibly be made without violating the laws of physics, we'll still need to accept industrial planning and shorter work weeks if we want to avoid mass unemployment and mass extinction.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 06:13:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
This concept of labour productivity is ideological bollocks.

Individuals do get more productive if they increase their knowledge, skills etc. Then they can use capital to better effect.

But they are no more productive if they use more Capital: it's the capital that's productive, not them.

Capital - in the form of property in productive assets - is independently productive of Labour, in that it has a use value independent of Labour.

Neoclassical economists have been funded by the rich to promulgate this bollocks because if all value is assumed to originate with Labour than there's no reason to tax Capital is there?

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 06:31:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
How does this work? You can only buy a combination of three things with capital:

  1. Natural resources
  2. Human time and energy
  3. Human inventiveness, which creates mulitpliers for the use values of 1 & 2 in the form of goods and services.

There's nothing else in the entire eco-system for sale.

So how is capital independently productive?

I think it's more that capital is a bullshit game played by people who monopolise these assets for their own personal benefit. It's a bizarrely persuasive game, but it's still just a con trick - like someone selling you something you already own, and then persuading you that you owe them a debt because of it.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 06:47:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Financial capital is a combination of permanent and temporary claims over productive assets. It is not independently productive, but rather the reverse: it's extractive. It is indeed a con game: it's antiValue, rather than Value.

What I mean by independently productive Capital is property/ownership of productive assets.

In my view the key productive assets are:

(a) Location

(b) Energy

(c) Knowledge

In the Coarse Economics which I have worked out for my own delectation, these are the Factors of Production.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 07:23:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's not inherently extractive - it's just used that way by default.

Commercial banking was originally developed to make it possible for farmers to grow their production, and also to insure against a poor harvest. The lender took on risk of loss of capital in exchange for a profit.

This was often used abusively, but investment - in the sense of sponsoring innovation and activity - isn't itself a negative thing. Nor is building up social reserves to hedge against future problems.

The problem is that these social relationships tend to be used abusively by default, and they also attract people with abusive personalities.

The social problem is that there's a split between personal and commercial/political morality.

Individuals are expected to act non-criminally in their social contacts and are punished for transgression. But in business and politics, sociopathy is rewarded and seems to be valued. It's non-sociopathic behaviour which is devalued and punished by loss of influence and personal opportunity - which in extreme, and sometimes not so extreme cases, can mean anything from mild aggravation, to homelessness, to death.

This is a very odd thing, and hard to justify, never mind explain.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 07:54:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
It's not inherently extractive - it's just used that way by default.

Equity - in the form of shares in  Joint Stock Limited Liability Corporation - is indeed inherently extractive. It exists so that rentier shareholders can make money from money.

Banking/credit creation as currently practised is also extractive to the extent that it is carried out for the profit of rentier shareholders.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 04:43:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
No, it's not inherently extractive.

Let's say I have some spare cash here and that city over there needs a windmill.

The windmill won't happen without funding. So I invest in the windmill project, the city gets a windmill, I get my original money back plus a return.

Overall, that's a net win for everyone.

Now let's say I have some spare cash here. I invest it with Trader B who puts together a portfolio which includes Corporation A, because he knows that Corporation A offers excellent and quick returns.

Immediately there's a difference in motivation. I'm not interested in funding a project, I'm interested in making as much cash as quickly as possible.

Company A is an M&A house. It makes its profits through hostile takeovers.

You can guess what happens next. Corporation A leaves a trail of lost opportunities and diminishing possibilities in its wake. But I have my quick 30% return, so I don't care.

That's clearly extractive.

The problem is that there's no financial or social distinction between investing and sponsoring, and raiding for profit. The shares, the trades and the markets used to mediate these relationships are indistinguishable.

It's the social disconnection that makes the process extractive, because it doesn't include social costs in the transaction.

If Corporation A had to pay a wealth destruction tax (or some other form of compensation) its business model would become obsolete overnight.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 05:33:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
The problem is that there's no financial or social distinction between investing and sponsoring, and raiding for profit. The shares, the trades and the markets used to mediate these relationships are indistinguishable.

it's the stone truth.

by social you could say ethical, same difference.

you succinctly describe the moral fault line whence the Great Quake cometh.

'blind eye' indeed. practically a whole society playing bingo on a raft going over niagara.

beam me up scotty

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 06:15:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
yep.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 06:30:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So, the investing model that is not inherently extractive sounds like the sorts of arrangements Chris has been advocating, while the models that are extractive sound like what the existing capital markets have been doing.  Could the difference be in how interests are compelled to align or allowed to diverge?

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 01:05:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Chris's models are no better and no worse than other instruments. It will depend on how they are used - they CAN be used for extractive purposes, just like traditional models can be, but need not be.

At heart, you have risks, and you have rewards, and these can be improperly assessed, and unfairly allocated, under any system.

Ultimately, it depends on incentives, social and monetary. If you can make a lot of money gaming the system, and this is seen as "success", then you will game the system, however well it is designed.

My job as a banker, on any project, is to try to outthink the people that will try to game the system, and put contractual safeguards so that they can't do it. It can also mean, simply, choosing to not work with some people because, no matter what safeguards you put, if they are in bad faith they will always find a way to fleece you - or try hard enough that you waste a lot of resources preventing them from doing it.

Just like there are no manthematical models that give you an exact number on what risks you are taking in a project, there is no legal framework that will protect you against human nature.

Thus the need for bankers, exercising judgement and able to understand what the underlying project hypotheses are and to evaluate them. It's, fundamentally, a qualitative job, not a quantitative one.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 04:42:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not sure about better or worse. That depends upon your viewpoint. It's worse for those accustomed to using leverage or externalising costs.

IMHO these partnership mechanisms are emerging in use - as did Income Trusts and Royalty Trusts in Canada and Australia - because they share risk and reward in a pre-distributive (sharing gross revenue or production) way that some investors find attractive.

It is therefore possible using such frameworks to raise necessary credit or investment "Peer to Peer" from stakeholders.

This is clearly more efficient - Coops call it the "Cooperative Advantage" - than to go to unproductive rentier credit or investment/speculation intermediaries who are interested only in making money from money, as opposed to being paid for the use of value/ money's worth such as location, energy or knowledge.

The need for banking as a service remains, both for:

(a) managing the process of bilateral Peer to Peer credit creation;

(b) bringing together Peer to Peer investors in productive assets with investment in productive assets.

Why go to to the trouble of setting up completing claims over productive assets  - ie those of secured debt and equity - when it is simpler and less conflicted (not to mention fairer) to share production proportionally?

But your point re human nature is absolutely valid. Although I believe that the partnership framework is capable of aligning stakeholder interests in an optimal way, that still does not mean that people will agree, or continue to agree. Partnerships are not a magic bullet, because human beings are fallible.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 05:23:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Labour productivity is not bullshit, any more than - say - iron ore productivity is bullshit. The industrial plant takes certain inputs (labour, iron ore, steel and electricity to name just a few) and produces certain outputs (steel, electricity, televisions, and so on and so forth).

For each possible pairing of these input and output variables, you can define a productivity - that is, you can measure the output variable in question, measure the input variable in question, and divide the two. This is clearly an interesting number, almost no matter what resources you use as input and output - including man-hours. Whether it is meaningful to attempt to optimise the productivity w.r.t. any given (input,output) pair is another question entirely. But this does not detract from the fact that productivity in terms of some output w.r.t. some input is an interesting number to know.

You can then put these productivities into Leontief matrices, and you could define an absolute productivity increase as one in which every element of the matrix increased (resp. decreased, for those in the rows that have some form of pollution as output). But that takes us rather far afield from the original topic under discussion.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jun 10th, 2009 at 06:49:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]
yas, suh. Total factor productivity (TFP), it was a popular tool for a while among, ironically, ICT ANALYSTS selling in hardware investment.

Technology Growth and Efficiency are regarded as two of the biggest sub-sections of Total Factor Productivity, the former possessing "special" inherent features such as positive externalities [i.e. profit margin; see MFP] and non-rivalness [sic! s/b monopoly conditions] which enhance its position as a driver of economic growth.

I wonder, why? Could it beeeeeeeeeeee, diminishing marginal cost of labor (L), where HUMAN substitute MECHANICAL input, so accelerating rate of profit captured per unit ouput per hour? I think so. Typical Forrester sell-sheet circa 2001:

Benchmarking Technical Productivity

Business process change contributes to prodctivity growth, but efficiency gains for US firms varied widely over the past decade. Execs should benchmark their recent performance --and turn to eBusiness for the next wave of productivity growth. [BWAH!] ...

  • Process change. ...ERP systems, for example, have helped firms like Saab coordinate orders across business units ...
  • Resource allocation. ...Technologies for better logistics administration ...By contrast, primary goods industries like steel have been slower to adopt these technologies...
  • Knowledge sharing. As firms globalize, they are using techlogies like corporate portals to share critical information across the enterprise. CAD software and product-development databases, for example, helped contribute to electronics manufacturers' 10.6% average annual TFP growth...

Such peculiar strategy of capital formation has paid off both corporatists and entrepreneurs for centuries, explaining in part a historical tendency in political speeches to understate the ever expanding universe of fungible "labor" components (enjoying tax credit allowances).

TFP is also dependent on estimates of the other components [of LABOR]. A 2005 study[1] on human capital attempted to correct for weaknesses in estimations of the labour component of the equation, by refining estimates of the quality of labour.

"Quality-adjusted labor": An interesting topic covered by numerous economists at NBER and OECD. Consider Oliner and Sichel, Cummins and Volante.

See also Multifactor productivity which expresses more explicitly correspondence of terms of production to terms of price structure. Which is helpful to the curious, when the ol' S-D fails to predict dislocations of effective demand and producer output, in aggregate.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 02:33:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
that do not use significant amounts of physical resources and to which there are, arguably, no limits.  It can probably be shown, especially since you lump investment and consumption together, that the richer you get the ratio of your consumption of physical resources to non-physical resources tends to drop.  You consume more art, intellectual and other higher quality goods, as well as spend resources on community activities, including, but not limited to, social and commercial participation, disputes for power, and other activities that increase "social capital." Conceivably this should also allow for eternal growth within your specification of the neoliberal framework, no?  That is, you can increase incomes and consumption of the rich, indifinitely.
by santiago on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 07:07:48 PM EST
En principe, oui.

But you will note that much of that exercise is actually about reducing productivity w.r.t. man-hours (or at most keeping it constant). A symphony orchestra has the same number of musicians today as it did a century ago, and a concert takes the same amount of time it did a century ago. So musicians have not, in the ordinary sense of the term, become so terribly much more productive.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 07:17:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But I think they HAVE become more productive because they earn more real income today than they did before with the same amount of their lives exchanged.  (This is the case for most service labor, incidentally.)

As a sordid, non-intellectual example, anyone can consume, for a few dollars or euros, the temporal, if illicit, pleasures of a common prostitute for a couple of hours in just about any part of the world today. However, because of his higher level of income, the ex-Governor of the Empire State infamously paid a few thousand dollars for the equivalent pleasures provided by a higher quality, and much more productive in terms of man-hours, courtesan. The total difference in physical resources consumed in each case is insignificant and has little relationship to the difference in price, but the wealthy man's sexual preferences can be just as satisfied by his higher quality adventure as the common man's preference for cheaper flesh.

As the income of the rich rise, so can their preference for the time of more productive servants, without consuming any more physical resources.  I fear there that there is not a systemic contradiction to exploitation -- it can go on forever.

by santiago on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 07:48:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The total difference in physical resources consumed in each case is insignificant and has little relationship to the difference in price

This is an interesting departure from conventional consumer choice theory. You argue, producers bear no costs; therefore, ceteris paribus, buyer 'wealth'  determines amount of premium demanded per unit 'output'?

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 08:26:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Inflation adjusted input pricing, please: Note the purchase power of USD 39.29 (1776) is equivalent to USD 1,000.00 (2008) with a Qualification 1

Another problem is the difference in buying power between then and now. A loaf of bread was available at about one pence, a standard "fair price" according to a concept left over from the middle ages. With a change in the price of raw materials, the price didn't rise or fall as it would today; the size of the loaf changed.

and a Qualification 2, i.e.

In 1776 only 22% of the American population participated in the monetary economy, but that number had reached 66% by 2000. ... The numbers 22% and 66% refer to the number of people who work for money, not the number, obivously, that participate in the monetary economy.

making the marginal utility of money a somewhat problematic basis of comparing preference.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 09:43:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Human capital and other costs are real and are the attributable source of service quality improvements over and above wealth inflation, but they do not necessarily involve more use of physical resourcers.
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 09:56:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They are more productive, in addition to being better paid.  Much of highly paid escort's renumeration is due to human capital improvements that make her time worth more than the street prostitute's services.  Same with doctors and other service sector work. The introduction of the concept of quality greatly complicates any model of the world which tries to connect physical resources with historical productivity measures.  It turns out that physical resource production and use are just proxy's for the unobservable concept of productivity. (This is similar to the way income is just a proxy wfor well being.) That's why measuring inflation in terms of consumer price indices is so problematic, for example.

You would measure productivity, in terms of service, by the number of people a service worker can serve. But it is entirely possible to measure it in the quality of service provided too. But since quality is a largely subjective concept, how do you really know what part of income increases are due to quality improvements and what part are due to productivity improvements in the non-service part of the economy?

by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 10:12:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
For most service functions, it is relatively straightforward to define a meaningful productivity measure. A doctor gets more productive if his treatment improves the prognosis of his patients more than it did yesterday. A mailman gets more productive if he can deliver more letters. A scientist gets more productive if he generates more new knowledge per work hour (note that "easy to define" is not quite the same thing as "easy to measure").

You can probably find a few professions where it is not easy to define the "output," and therefore is not easy to define "productivity." But they are not going to form a major component of any sustainable economic structure.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 12:00:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
This feels like you're changing your units. I'm close to 2,000,000 micrometers tall, which is pretty good compared with yesterday, when I was just shy of 2 metres.

Shouldn't you discount the time value of money, and perhaps also normalize by the number of people alive today?

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 09:54:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But I think they HAVE become more productive because they earn more real income today than they did before with the same amount of their lives exchanged.

That does not make them more productive. That makes them better paid. Productivity and remuneration are not causally connected outside certain economic fantasy worlds.

How you want to count higher quality products in terms of productivity is less trivial, though.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 05:43:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They are more productive, in addition to being better paid, and, as you say, it is hard to separate the two.  Much of highly paid escort's renumeration is due to human capital improvements that make her time worth more than the street prostitute's services.  Same with doctors and other service sector work. (In addition, part of the musician's increased income is due to innovations in recordinig and music distribution that allow more people to enjoy the musician's work than before -- productivity in terms of more people served.)
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 10:17:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm sorry, but to me that just makes no sense at all, now I may  be an economic illiterate so may just be missing something obvious, so can you explain slowly why that is the case? are you arguing that because the modern economy is larger, then the rich can afford Courtesans? havent the rich always been able to afford similar women?

Surely the only way that the highly paid escort would be more productive, is if she had more customers, charging £10 rather than £5 for the same service has little or nothing to do with productivity as far as I can see.

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.

by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 10:26:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
One big reason a highly paid courtesan can charge more than a street prostitute is because of her higher human capital investments -- education, networking, beauty enhancement, physical training, milk baths, whatever.  She invests in herself and expects, and usually gets, a higher price for the effort.  Same with doctors, teachers, entertainers, and other service industry workers.

There is, however, a part of the increased income earned by service workers that is not based on their increase in productivity through quality improvements, but rather through the increased income of workers who make things through their own productivity increases. That is distinct, however, from getting paid for better quality work although it is almost impossible to distinguish the two if trying to observe it.

by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 11:42:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
"human capital investments": They call it "value-added", pilgrim. That inelectable sumpin-sumpin that is the difference, R-C.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
by Cat on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 02:53:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Value added is different.  Human capital is an unobservable characteristic representing something foregone in the present in expectation of a return later.  Value added is merely the present additional production attached to a commodity for the purpose of sale.  Total annual value-added, for example, is another term for GDP, while human capital, like all capital, labor, and land are not part of any income accounting because they are not really commodities until they, or part of them, are actually exchanged for something.
by santiago on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 07:02:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Value added is different.

No. You remind me of the Dkos dude who claimed he could plot "opportunity cost," although that is clearly unreasonable. What he actually could record was change in an interest rate over time --"time value of money" -- profit. Value-added is a synonymn of profit.

Human capital is an unobservable characteristic representing something foregone in the present in expectation of a return later.

Aha. "Something foregone in the present in expectation of a return later": Opportunity cost is an event that has not occurred, ergo unobservable; and the universe of alternative transactions of equivalent value to the transaction which has occurred are innumerable.

Profit is an event that occurs and is measurable; it is the mathematical difference between transaction price and total production cost. Explanations of value-added calculation are legion, like satan, precisely because "profit" is an expression of human preference and ignorance.

"Human capital" is one means, skills and abilities, in particular or combination. One's means are observable in everything one does and in comparison to the performance of another. So, no, human capital is not unobservable. Ubiquitous though the phrase is today, I would argue, the urge to objectify idiosyncratic traits is antisocial behavior, predicated by intense competition among people for a limited number of wage labor opportunities.  But the greater difficulty for capitalists is assigning a monetary value to an activity per se --sex, for example-- that is easily replicated and transferable between people.

Value added is merely the present additional production attached to a commodity for the purpose of sale.

No. "Value-added" is an expression of "quality" --which is a characteristic of the perceived value of every good and service available for sale. I thought you had recognized that microeconomic SAW in your comments above.

education, networking, beauty enhancement, physical training, milk baths, whatever

Your hypothetical value chain (in your words, "quality improvements" or  CapEx capital improvements "capital investments) of prostitution is an apt expression of cost structure underlying a fee-for-service business model. You just refuse to demonstrate productivity as a function of profitability. To do that, you'd have to postulate cost of a prostitute's capital apart from "physical" characteristics and rudimentary skill.

"Present additional production" is a peculiar turn of phrase. I take it to represent either surplus inventory or excess capacity (unrealized inventory), an estimate of which purportedly discounts "fair market" valuation of quantity available for sale at a given point in time ("attached to a commodity for the purpose of sale"). One cannot deduce from aggregate data nor is such expectation of market behavior given as a rule of theoretical economics.

See, surplus is a macroeconomic bug bear. It's the recurring terror of price equilibrium and "efficiency" that disproves the so-called Law of Supply and Demand,  where price (P) ∩ Q = S ∩ D = R = P x Q, the invidious value assumption is P = C, a nonprofit condition that no self-respecting capitalist will either pursue or tolerate.

Profit (p) is of course surplus value component of P at every point on the supply chain (S) that guarantees p > R - C prevails, irrespective of Q. If p = 0, P = C. If p < 0, R <  C -- price paid for production inputs is unrecoverable. As many have noticed recently, producers will continue operating anyway.

The epic intellectual failure to reconcile reality and symbol has given rise to exercises such as decomposition, econometric computing, and behavioral economic modeling to construct some multivariate expresion of D or "what the market will bear"  in terms of preference, incentive, skill, knowledge, --asymetric and perishable  information, etc) to justify stochastic output volume (sometimes price, sometimes unit "level").

Productivity measures profit, or profitability, which is the objective of a capitalist enterprise. Q is not the object of the productivity evaluation, it's one term of the production function which is to generate profit.

Total annual value-added, for example, is another term for GDP,

GDP is price of all transactions --total revenue (R).  Profit (synonyms are "mark-up" or "opportunity cost" or "interest" or "premium" or "risk"), and cumulative costs, including but not limited to cumulative cost of money  are components of total revenue. Last I heard. C, I, G are fundamentally the same activity, transaction. X-M is a gross approximation of Inflation (money supply in circulation), a rate describing net present value of so-called national current account cash flow. I guess.

while human capital, like all capital,

Human capital engrosses classes of labor attributable to homo sapiens. The other class of labor is mechanical, a/k/a "plant and equipment," or real capital including "energy". At firm level, "value-added" and "quality" are yoked to price and brand differentiation among competitors within an industry sector selling similar commodities, substitutes.  See wiki primer.

labor, and land are not part of any income accounting

Absolutely incorrect. Firstly, cost of labor (salary and wages, or "general administration") is a component of OPERATING COST in every P&L statement. In so-called knowledge-intensive sectors, employee compensation approximates employee "capital" expropriated for exclusive employer use and resale. That is mark-up fee-for-service or premium "attached to" stock produced.

Second, P&E (plant and equipment) is a component of ASSETS in every Balance Sheet statement. GAAP requires DEPRECIATION, AMORTIZATION applicable to such assets be reported in the P&L statement. More interesting is GAAP recognition and reporting of GOODWILL, an entirely intangible asset valuation attributed to profit (loss) and premium paid on transaction and, ultimately, to cumulative "human capital" of the ongoing concern. Further, some companies have developed elaborate "intellectual asset management" accounting techniques to quantify, cultivate, and appropriate "know-how" of internal business activities.

because they are not really commodities until they, or part of them, are actually exchanged for something.

You're grasping.

And I gotta go to soccer.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 12:15:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If you do the math all the way through (which is done in general equilibrium and social accounting matrix models of economies) net value added = GDP in any time frame.  

value added is only equal to human capital if all of the expenditures and efforts by the person to increase personal income-producing productivity is captured within the same time frame, say her life.  But if you take any shorter time frame, value added is just that additional amount she gains during that period due to a capital improvement to her productivity.  It isn't the same as human capital -- it's much less. That is because an expenditure of lost opportunity in a previous period can continue to provide benefits for many future periods.

But you're getting way off the point.  The issue is that it is possible for people to increase their incomes and enjoyments without expending more physical resources and energy, so applying a physical limits framework, as some here are doing, is problematic.

by santiago on Sat Jun 13th, 2009 at 03:46:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If you've ever wondered how prissy I can be, wonder no more.

"opportunity cost" isn't even in the index of my last edition of palapu, healy & bernard Business Analysis & Valuation. i checked. what does obtain extensive reference in that text is "cost of capital." i must return to that financial metric momentarily, and very briefly, to note this: i found definitions in an ancient economic and cost accounting textbooks.

    * the lost benefit that the best alternative course of action would provide.
    * the amount of other products which must be foregone or sacrificed to produce a unit of a product.

these two distinct definitions are similar in that they specify a transaction that has not occurred. "opportunity cost" is any hypothetical statement, a rhetorical device, employed for the purpose of comparing two or more values such as "lost benefit" and "a unit" quantity. as we see, these values need not even be temporally related to a transaction event in order to posit what is essentially an ethical question. for example, a reduction in funding a federal project is frequently described as "savings" over a period projected 5, 10, 40 years in the future in order to justify the "lost benefit" of the expenditure itself, i.e. cost avoidance.

as you know, in practice, the peculiar meaning of "opportunity cost" to the financial industry and institutional bank economy is expressed as the "cost of capital" specifically the value of currency and the premium paid to acquire a unit or increase the value of a unit. the premium paid, commonly understood as "interest," is a component metric of transaction costs as well as expected profit to lend (or to rent) money for a specified period for a specific project (opportunity) relative to other projects.



Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
by Cat on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 09:36:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Not quite. Because it's possible to record and sell a concert or performance, which means that it's possible to leverage many mutiples of a single performance for cash.

It's also possible to synchronise the recording to a film or advert, play it on the radio, and/or create a new derivative work.

As it happens, orchestral musicians don't usually get a slice of this extra income. So while they have become far more profitable and productive, they're not necessarily getting any benefit from that.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 07:56:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
orchestra has the same number of musicians today as it did a century ago, and a concert takes the same amount of time it did a century ago ...

Have the number of concerts played per orchestra per annum declined?

Have the number of subscribers per concert or per season  season increased or decreased?

Begging the question: in what sense do grants and subsidies of an orchestra's performance distort estimates of its 'productivity'?

If a muscian rarely performs is s/he productive?

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Thu Jun 11th, 2009 at 08:35:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm pretty sure the length of concerts has decreased, to judge by the number of pieces in famous (typical?) concerts in the past. For a given hall, the number of subscribers has probably decreased, since people have got bigger, and seating has been modified accordingly (try La Scala or Carnegie Hall to see what it used to be like...)
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 02:11:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Congratulations. I have nominated you to my Hall of Fiends, persons who provoke me to open the closet of evidence... which may or may not validate their intuition of the way of the world.

The London Symphony Orchestra (A) HBS case 9-494-034, 2000

A good concert it was. Not one of their best, LSO players reported afterwards, but a creditable performance. It was one of 109 public concerts which, along with some 230 rehearsals and 180 recording sessions, made up that year's work at the London Symphoney Orchestra. ...

The oldest of the four self-governing symphony orchestras in London (see Exhibit 1) the London Symphony Orchestra has a long-standing tradition of self-governance. The players who founded the orchestra were, at the turn of the century, members of the Queen's Hall Orchestra which was managed by Sir Henry Wood. The pay was not good, and players regularly sent substitutes (or deputies) to rehearsals and concerts whenever they could get higher-paid outside work. To elicit greater commitment from his players, Wood offered them a guaranteed wage in exchange for elimination of the deputy system. Forty-six orchestra members, objecting to what they viewed as a restriction on their freedom of choice, resigned and created a new, self-governing orchestra --the London Symphony Orchestra. ...

In 1993 the competitive stakes were raised for the [four] London orchestras (as well as for the nine other professional symphony orchestras in England) when the British government, suffering its worst recession in years, devolved considerable authority for support of the arts to regional and local levels. It became unclear whether the national government would continue to be the principal benefactor of British orchestras --and, if not, where new support could be found and whether it would be sufficient to sustain all four of London's self-governing orchestras...

Although the LSO regularly filled 85% of the seats for its Barbican Centre concerts, revenues from those concerts accounted for less than a third of the orchestra's annual budget. Of a total income fo GBP 7.7 million in 1992-1993, 63% came from ticke sales (including UK and overseas tours); 29% from government grants; 7% from corporate sponsorship; and less than 1% from its endowment. By comparison, a representative major symphony orchestra in the United States earned 51% of its income from ticket sales and received only  9% from governement grants; the remaining 40% was made up from the orchestra's trust and endowment income and from the contributions of individuals, corporations, and foundations. Like other British orchestra's, the London Symphony Orchestra was highly dependent on public subsidy for its survival. ...

Compensation at the LSO, like that at the other self-governing orchestras in London had always been on a fee-for-service basis. A player's total compensation depended upon the amount of work the orchestra did and the amount of income generated by that work. In recent years, the LSO had establed a base level of compensation for its players to provide them with a modicum of financial security. Under the development plan, players were required to play in 85% of the orchestra's scheduled concerts and, in return, their base compensation was raised 15%.

und so weiter with the widget per hour counts...

The London Symphony Orchestra (B)

One of the most important parts of the LSO's bid for Stabilisation Funding was the desire to conduct and in-depth investigation of its audience. A survey was distributed to 35,000 people who had attended an LSO performance within the previous year. The survey revealed that the primary constituency of the LSO audience was not the faithful, music-knowledgeable subscriber, but infrequent visitors who only attended, on average, one performance per year. These infrequent attendees, who comprised 86% of the audience, ...accounted for 28% of the tickets sold.

I surely welcome any updates to this information.


Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Fri Jun 12th, 2009 at 12:32:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Nothing from recordings? What were thouse 180 recording sessions for?  The figures you give add up to 99%, and presumably the missing 1% is due to rounding error, and doesn't represent income from recordings.
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 03:23:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Or recording companies are just really, really good at screwing over the people who play the music. Unless you sell something like ten thousand discs, you get basically nothing in royalties.

There's a rant from an indie musician floating around on the 'net, where he describes the BS he had to put up with from recording companies before he stopped bothering. YMMV on orchestra music, as presumably the orchestra has a better lawyer than your average Spice Girls wannabe. But 0 % does not sound far fetched.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 06:08:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
do you mean the Courtney Love speech?

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 06:26:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yep. That's the one.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 14th, 2009 at 06:37:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Then why does the LSO spend so much time recording? Do they get a better deal than usual, sell more discs, or are they just incredibly slow at figuring out that they are getting screwed?
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Mon Jun 15th, 2009 at 04:01:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Because to a jobbing performer there's no difference between a recording session, a live rehearsal or a concert.

Conductors get most of the cash for both.

This feature explains how the system works.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Jun 15th, 2009 at 04:16:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I honestly don't know. But I can make a couple of WAGs.

The recording revenues might show up in "ticket sales" or in "corporate sponsorship." With the level of detail given, it's hard to tell.

Or they may use the recording to fund other parts of the business in a direct quid-pro-quo that for some reason (tax rules, if I had to wager a guess) bypasses the budget. It could be that the recording company pulls some strings with their contacts in advertisement, or something like that.

But I really don't know - you're right that the numbers given don't seem to make sense at face value.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Jun 15th, 2009 at 04:30:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]


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