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German Uprising? [Update]

by afew Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 05:04:53 AM EST

Angela Merkel has come under attack for her anti-European attitudes - by Steinmeier and Steinbrück in the FT, and in the Bundestag:

FT.com / Europe - German MPs clash on future of eurozone

German unwillingness to bolster the size of the €440bn eurozone stabilisation fund, or contemplate the issue of jointly-guaranteed eurozone bonds, was in danger of turning the European Central Bank into a “bad bank”, said Frank-Walter Steinmeier, parliamentary leader of the Social Democratic party, and former vice-chancellor.

Jürgen Trittin, co-leader of the Green party in the German Bundestag, said the chancellor was regarded throughout the eurozone as a “Teutonic savings-monster” whose actions had aggravated the crisis. He accused her of “disorientation”, and being driven by fear of the popular press.

According to (German site) Eurointelligence this morning:

Germany is rising up against Merkel’s euroscepticism

For the opposition to break with the chancellor on a European issue so massively, and so loudly, has potentially important implications for Merkel’s negotiating position in the European Council today and tomorrow. It is now clear that Merkel represents the German government, but that broader German opinion is more diverse than it seemed previously.

Update [2010-12-17 5:4:53 by afew]:

Well, no. Merkel remained as unmoving as ever. The European Council did next to nothing, see EUObserver and Euractiv.com reports.

Says Eurointelligence:

Merkel wins – slow motion train wreck can now proceed unhindered

Complacency about the nature of this crisis was apparent again at last night’s press conference by Herman van Rompuy and Jose Manual Barroso. The European recipe against this crisis is structural reform, deficit reduction and low inflation, with a minimalist crisis resolution framework. They will pursue this strategy for as long as it takes.  Anyone who hoped that the EU summit would do more than implement Angela Merkel’s bail-in mechanism would have been disappointed. Von Rompuy said the question of an extension of the EFSF’s ceiling and remit did not even come up during last night’s dinner.


Germany is rising up against Merkel’s euroscepticism

After the extraordinary Steinmeier/Steinbrück article in the FT, Germany’s opposition yesterday launched an unprecedented political attack on the German chancellor, accusing her of being un-European. Jürgen Trittin, the leader of the Greens, called her a “Teutonic savings-monster”. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the leader of the opposition in the Bundestag, put his fingers on the issue. If Merkel continues to favour crisis-solution via the ECB, then the ECB ends up as a bad bank. The Left Party’s spokeswoman said Merkel’s position did not reflect the national interest but those of the banks (a position with which we would agree. Merkel is extraordinarily lazy in the definition of what constitutes the national interest.)

FT.com / Europe - German MPs clash on future of eurozone

Mr Trittin, whose Green party is probably the most pro-European of all in Germany, said that in rejecting the idea of eurozone bonds, Ms Merkel had “swept a sensible idea off the table”.

“That is why you are making Germany so unpopular in the eurozone,” he said. “We need a real economic union.”

But it was left to Gesine Lötzsch, co-leader of the Linke party, to warn that all the efforts at “saving the euro” were really about “saving our banks from their bad debts.”

Accusing the government of failing to take action to regulate the financial markets, she challenged Ms Merkel: “It is time for you to admit: are you negotiating on behalf of German citizens, or are you negotiating on behalf of German banks?”

Display:
FT Alphaville » Buiter: `European sovereign debt kerfuffle'

Buiter reckons that bank recapitalisation still has a way to go, and that Europe needs to stop kidding itself that senior bondholders can go much longer without a 'short back and sides'.

But the process of bank restructuring can't continue piecemeal as this will lead to the `mother of all contagions' as bondholders dodge countries where they think haircuts are imminent.

H/t Eurointelligence, which has a round-up that's worth looking at.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 03:27:21 AM EST
In "the mother of all contagions" the ECB can purchase Euro sovereign bonds at 10 cents on the Euro. So, where is the problem?

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 04:52:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Germany is rising up against Merkel's euroscepticism
Willem Buiter calls for a big bang approach solution, according to FT Alphaville, which describes his prescriptions thus: "1. Get out their `big bazooka': Expand the EFSF to €1.7trn to cover potential demands from Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Belgium.... 2. Initiate a coordinated process of bank restructuring in the distressed periphery.  Buiter reckons that bank recapitalisation still has a way to go, and that Europe needs to stop kidding itself that senior bondholders can go much longer without a 'short back and sides'. But the process of bank restructuring can't continue piecemeal as this will lead to the `mother of all contagions' as bondholders dodge countries where they think haircuts are imminent."
How about restructuring of the 'core' banks? Hasn't the EU been bailing out core banks' exposures to peripheral economies?

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:04:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
When he speaks of (severe) haircuts for "senior bondholders", isn't he talking about core banks (mostly)?
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:17:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Which would then have to be restructured, presumably? Hence
the process of bank restructuring can't continue piecemeal


Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:21:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If they're going to get a tonsure, they can retire to a monastery.

At least, that can be inferred (though it's Buiter being summarily reported).

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:38:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]
FT Alphaville » Buiter: `European sovereign debt kerfuffle'
Buiter believes its `overwhelmingly likely' that the current eurozone members will be part of the single currency in 2015. That is unless `collective madness' takes hold amongst populist politicians of course. And unless Germany et al get fed up with doling out de facto transfer payments.


Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:48:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
EU opts for new bailout system | EurActiv

IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who has been critical of EU leaders' disjointed response to the rolling crisis, said he was concerned about slow growth and the threat of contagion in Europe.

"I'm worried and that's why I'm urging the Europeans to provide for a comprehensive solution, because this piecemeal approach obviously doesn't work," Strauss-Kahn told a Thomson Reuters Newsmaker event in Washington. "And the markets are just waiting for what's next."

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 04:23:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
See also, for something of course totally unconnected, this item (also in today's ET Salon):

Germany tops world for shrinking wages - The Local

Worker's pay packets over the past decade have shrunk more in Germany than any other industrialised country, a report released Wednesday has found.

The Global Wage Report by the International Labor Organization - a United Nations agency in which workers, employers and governments are represented - found that gross wages fell 4.5 percent when adjusted for inflation, according to news magazine Der Spiegel.

Low wage growth has been widely credited for the competitiveness that has allowed Europe's biggest economy to recover swiftly from the global downturn.

But the ILO challenged this idea, pointing out that the slump results from the increasing number of part-time jobs in Germany.

No other industrialised country experienced such a backslide, the report said. Of all the industrialised nations, Norway, Cyprus and Finland enjoyed the strongest wage growth, with Norway posting an increase of 25.1 percent.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 03:29:35 AM EST
This already looks to be the best Christmas present I'll get this year.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 03:49:26 AM EST
In addition to what afew has already posted,

The Left Party's spokeswoman said Merkel's position did not reflect the national interest but those of the banks (a position with which we would agree. Merkel is extraordinarily lazy in the definition of what constitutes the national interest.)

i've been at two meetings yesterday where this topic was brought up for discussion. My sense is this position is the discussion frame which underscores the "we don't know what's really going on" (direct quote) confusion among world bankers. Since i am not a world banker, i can't comment, other than to say "wrong, you know exactly what's going on and don't wish to admit it."

In any case it's positive to see the opposition with a strong counter-proposal, though i can't predict where it will lead. Apparent is that amurkan bankers are watching closely.

For sure this issue is where we can first evaluate the newfound Green economic chops. I'm skeptical, but encouraged.

"Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin

by Crazy Horse on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 03:59:42 AM EST
See also Nomad:
Waning Influence in Brussels: Euro Crisis Leaves Germany Increasingly Isolated - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is coming under growing criticism ahead of this week's EU summit. Her preferred approach to fighting the euro crisis has failed to receive support in Europe. She is also at odds with Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, whose loyalty to France has become a subject of ridicule in Berlin. By SPIEGEL Staff
which Jérôme described as
a hit-piece against Schaüble for being too conciliatory towards EU partners and France in particular
The article does put Schäuble squarely on the Europhilic camp, even if one may disagree with his macroeconomics and makes an interesting read also for what it shows about Spiegel's stance, and Merkel's.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 04:51:36 AM EST
European Tribune - German Uprising?
After the extraordinary Steinmeier/Steinbrück article in the FT
So, what is that extraordinary article?

First, the title itself: Germany must lead fightback. Fightback against whom? The markets?

The time for stumbling through the euro crisis is over. Piecemeal approaches and wait-and-see attitudes are endangering European integration. We now need a more radical, targeted effort to end the current uncertainty, and provide stronger support for the future of Europe's common institutions. This must also protect the European Central Bank from becoming Europe's "bad bank", and ensuring its credibility and independence in guarding a strong euro.

The required solution is a combination of a haircut for debt holders, debt guarantees for stable countries and the limited introduction of European-wide bonds in the medium term, accompanied by more aligned fiscal policies. These measures would only work together; none alone would restore stability.

...

Germany should support this idea, but only on the basis of more aligned policies in other fields. In the 1990s Europe moved forward with economic integration, but left political integration to follow later. Looking back, we can now see this approach has only increased the difficulties we must deal with today. This means that eurobonds will succeed only if complemented by new, far-reaching political reforms. This means empowering European institutions to establish tighter controls over fiscal and economic stability, alongside common minimum standards on wage and welfare policies, as well as capital and corporate taxation. In short: we need European government bonds, but we must put an end to beggar-thy-neighbour policies and harmful tax competition within the eurozone too.



Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:12:51 AM EST
In short: we need European government bonds, but we must put an end to beggar-thy-neighbour policies and harmful tax competition within the eurozone too.

Does "beggar-thy-neighbour policies" include wage suppression and chronic current accounts surpluses?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:19:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Apparently
alongside common minimum standards on wage and welfare policies


Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:37:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
What else? ;)
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 05:39:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This is all well and good, but it may all be unconstitutional.

Eurointelligence: The nightmare of a balanced budget (Walter Münchau)

A decision was taken recently in Berlin to introduce a balanced-budget law in the German constitution. It was a hugely important decision. It may not have received due attention outside Germany given the flood of other economic and financial news. From 2016, it will be illegal for the federal government to run a deficit of more than 0.35 per cent of gross domestic product. From 2020, the federal states will not be allowed to run any deficit at all. Unlike Europe's stability and growth pact, which was first circumvented, later softened and then ignored, this unilateral constitutional law will stick. I would expect that for the next 20 or 30 years, deficit reduction will be the first, second and third priority of German economic policy.
Have Steinbrück and Steinmeier how their rhetoric would translate into policy that is compatible with the Constitutional Amendment they presumably supported last year?
I can foresee two outcomes. First, Germany might end up in a procyclical downward spiral of debt reduction and low growth. In that case, the constitutionally prescribed pursuit of a balanced budget would require ever greater budgetary cuts to compensate for a loss of tax revenues.

...

One could also construct a virtuous cycle - the second outcome. If Germany were to return to a pre-crisis level of growth in 2011, and all is well after that, the consolidation phase would then start in a cyclical upturn.

Either of those scenarios, even the positive one, is going to be hugely damaging to the eurozone. In the first case, the German economy would become a structural basket case, and would drag down the rest of Europe for a generation. In the second case, economic and political tensions inside the eurozone are going to become unbearable. Over the past 25 years, France has more or less followed Germany's lead at every turn, but I suspect this may be a turn too far. Deficit reduction has not been, nor will it be, a priority for Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president. On the contrary: he has listened to bad advice from French economists who told him that budget deficits are irrelevant, and that he should focus only on structural reforms. Budget deficits and debt levels matter in a monetary union. But a zero level of debt is neither necessary nor desirable.



Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 11:50:59 AM EST
Constitutions are not engraved in holy marble. Amending them may be difficult, but if they can be amended one way they can be amended back another.
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 03:15:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Furthermore, there are exceptions
für Bund und Länder in Fällen von Naturkatastrophen oder außergewöhnlichen Notsituationen, wozu auch die Finanzkrise ab 2007 zählen soll[4], mit gleichzeitiger Festlegung entsprechender Tilgungsregelungen.
for natural disasters and extraordinary emergencies (such as the financial crisis).
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 03:21:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I am well aware of that, but the Eurozone doesn't have time for the German polity to figure out that debt isn't a sin.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 04:23:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Question: suppose Germany is by then locked into a virtual cycle or at least is in a relatively neutral low growth zone.  One problem (for Germany) will be its inflexibility and inability to respond to external shocks in a counter cyclical way - imposing a greater burden of adjustment on other Eurozone members.  

But suppose Germany's sovereign debt gradually reduces to zero or is even in positive territory.  Would that not lead to a "credit glut" and reduce the price of borrowing for others?  What would happen if all the major powers decided that debt was a bad way to fund growth - leaving aside the massively deflationary phase as they reduced their deficits - what happens to all that money that is now being borrowed by states?

Does it becomes available for private sector borrowing - presumably at a cheaper price?

But suppose even that was tightly regulated to avoid a repeat of Ireland's private debt running to 400% of GDP.  What happens to global debt markets when no one wants to borrow?  Does the value of capital not gradually reduce - and result in a net welath transfer from rich to poor?

Why are progressives almost always in favour of massive borrowing - to fund laudable programmes, no doubt - but which end up making people and states ever more indebted, at increasingly higher interest rates, and which ultimate result in furthr transfers of wealth from poor to rich.

What's progressive about any policy based on borrowing - other than strictly short term counter-cyclical measures or investments which will generate more wealth than the cost of funds?

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 03:37:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But suppose Germany's sovereign debt gradually reduces to zero or is even in positive territory.  Would that not lead to a "credit glut" and reduce the price of borrowing for others?

No.

There are no loanable funds in a credit economy. The central bank sets an interbank overnight interest rate (which it can do through the discount window even in the absence of government bonds), and any creditworthy borrower is supplied with funds through bank loans. The exit of one creditworthy borrower from the market does not in any way affect the ability of other creditworthy borrowers to obtain funds.

If the government refuses to spend money, it may make private projects more creditworthy because it reduces the demand for real resources. Or it may make private projects less creditworthy, because it reduces the supply of those real resources that the government produces more efficiently than the private sector. Or it may make private projects less creditworthy because it reduces the amount of money available to the private sector, and private sector loans are denominated in money, not in real resources. The relative size of these effects depends on the concrete details of how the economy in question works.

What would happen if all the major powers decided that debt was a bad way to fund growth

De-industrialisation and a return to 1 % pr. decade growth. Credit economies work better than barter economies. Eliminating debt also eliminates credit.

Or, if you're only talking about eliminating government debt, then serious business depressions will again become the norm rather than the exception, as the government relinquishes the tools it needs to counteract the boom-and-bust nature of private credit creation. Oh, and a collapse of industrial technology to 19th century levels, because Fordist and post-Fordist mass production requires macroeconomic stability to be viable.

leaving aside the massively deflationary phase as they reduced their deficits

But you can't leave that aside, because it'll give your industrial plant a really severe case of being dead.

But suppose even that was tightly regulated to avoid a repeat of Ireland's private debt running to 400% of GDP. What happens to global debt markets when no one wants to borrow?  Does the value of capital not gradually reduce - and result in a net wealth transfer from rich to poor?

That depends on how you regulate it.

A 400 % private debt to GDP ratio isn't necessarily a bad thing, if that debt is caused by people borrowing in order to invest in productive capacity. If capital income is 1/3 of GDP, the private sector is ½ of GDP and the real return on capital is 5 % pr. year (corresponding to a capital intensity of production of approximately 6½:1), then the aggregate private sector gearing is only around 2:1. As balance sheets go, that's not particularly aggressive.

It becomes a problem if the credit is created to support a financial bubble. So if you regulate credit creation in order to avoid having credit granted for unproductive purposes, such as real estate speculation, then limiting credit creation is A Good Thing. But if you just slap an arbitrary cap on total credit creation - good or bad - then you're depriving yourself of a useful economic tool.

Similarly, public debt isn't a problem if it is caused by government deficit spending in order to accommodate the private sector's desire to hold legal tender or government bonds. Suppose that the public wants to hold two months' salary in cash, bank deposits or bonds, and banks want to hold a quarter of their balance sheets in bonds and central bank reserves. With a 400 % private debt to GDP ratio, that would require total sovereign liabilities (cash plus guaranteed deposits plus bonds) of just under 150 % of GDP, of which just under 25 percentage points would be bank deposits (and so not appear on the government's balance sheet, even though the government is on the hook for them if push comes to shove). Now, banks typically don't want to hold that many bonds, but if they did it wouldn't be a problem.

If you spend in excess of the private sector's desire to accumulate legal tender, you have to either tax away the excess (thus increasing the desire to hold legal tender), or start competing with the private sector for real resources, which carries a risk of causing inflation. Government deficit equals private savings plus current accounts deficit. If the government spends more (assuming constant external balance), then the private sector is forced to save more. Assuming constant private propensity to save, this means that nominal GDP must increase. Nominal GDP can increase either by increasing output (this is what the private sector will prefer to do if there is spare capacity), or it can do it by increasing prices.

Of course it does matter how the public debt is accumulated - it is more gainful to accumulate it by building railroads and shipyards than by bailing out insolvent property developers. But that's a separate issue from the question of absolute debt levels.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 10:44:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Frank Schnittger:

But suppose Germany's sovereign debt gradually reduces to zero or is even in positive territory.  Would that not lead to a "credit glut" and reduce the price of borrowing for others?  What would happen if all the major powers decided that debt was a bad way to fund growth - leaving aside the massively deflationary phase as they reduced their deficits - what happens to all that money that is now being borrowed by states?

Does it becomes available for private sector borrowing - presumably at a cheaper price?

Take the level of national income as a given, and look at how it is distributed.

A government deficit translates into excess private income compared to what that income would be if there were no deficit. Of course, this excess private income is taxed to service the debt resulting from past deficits, and it is also used to buy newly issued debt to fund the deficit.

So the public deficit is a mechanism for recycling the surplus generated by the economy.

If you reduce the public deficit you reduce the amount of income of the private sector. You also reduce the availability of debt to place excess income.

So the size of the pie available to distribute in the zero-sum game that is the private sector shrinks, and that leads to inequality and hardship.

And, in addition, the (now smaller) excess income of your private sector gets recycled into buying foreign debt rather than your own debt.

So, as Jake points out, you cannot leave aside the deflationary effect. That is the major first-order impact of deficit reduction, not only in the deficit reduction phase but after the deficit has been stabilised around zero.


Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 08:56:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I still think we are missing something in both your and Jakes excellent responses (and thanks to you both for the free economics seminar!).  But I am having difficulty putting my finger on it.  

We can see some of the things you are saying happening as a result of Germany's deflationary policies (and yet German GDP or national income is growing rapidly perhaps partially despite the deflationary effects and largely because of the increased international competitiveness the price deflation generates.

I think the bit we are missing has to do with the fact that all nations (and particularly small ones like Ireland) are operating in an increasingly global environment and policies which may be apparently deflationary and damaging domestically actually help the in the longer term as they improve our competitive position relative to others.

The three issues may be:

  1. the quality/productivity of the use to which the borrowings are put and whether the returns are greater than the cost of funds - and thus whether the project results in a net increase of wealth

  2. The effect on the global system - does international competition lead to a race to the bottom or to a net increase in global wealth generally through the optimisation of resources and improvements in technology/productivity etc.

  3. the effect on income distribution and social welfare of the policies employed and projects developed

As a citizen, I want my Government to do all those things that I cannot do for myself and which it can better do because of its size, scale, expertise, bargaining power, and ability to cooperatively marshal huge resources. I recognise those activities have to be funded through borrowing, taxes or service fees.  I may get annoyed when I believe the Government is choosing the wrong projects or executing them badly resulting in reduced use value or excessive costs, but that is a separate management/accountability/oversight issue.

Most things which require large scale, infrastructural, development or use many commons resources fall into that category - architypically public transport, utilities, eduction, health, social welfare etc. - but also many manufacturing or service industries where private investment is lacking, or where I would rather the public rather than private shareholders benefited

Intuitively it is obvious that if such enterprises cannot borrow (or raise external funds in some other way) their ability to expand will be much constrained - if all they have is current cash flow to fund investment projects with a long pay-back. But that presumes there are good projects available to serve unmet needs or markets and which can recover the cost of funds.

I am concerned that the borrowing obsession may be part to the growth obsession, and that neither are sustainable -economically as well as environmentally.  The issue then becomes the distribution of existing wealth and the quality of the new wealth generation projects selected and executed. Borrowing for bad projects leads to bubbles and bursts, and the number of sustainable good projects is limited.  If the supply of money/credit exceeds the good projects available bad things happen!

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:06:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Frank Schnittger:
As a citizen, I want my Government to do all those things that I cannot do for myself and which it can better do because of its size, scale, expertise, bargaining power, and ability to cooperatively marshal huge resources.
While the European economic policy apparatus wants your Government to wither and die.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:11:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Frank Schnittger:
I am concerned that the borrowing obsession may be part to the growth obsession, and that neither are sustainable -economically as well as environmentally.  The issue then becomes the distribution of existing wealth and the quality of the new wealth generation projects selected and executed.
No, the issue is not growth. The issue is financial stability. The size of the government (its tax take, its expenditures and its ability to run a deficit) act as a stabilizing buffer for the private economy. Remove that, shrink it until you can drown it in the bathtub (or, as is the case in the EU, it drowns in its own puke) and your economy gets locked in an endless cycle of financial instability.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:19:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have no difficulty with counter-cyclical Government borrowing and activity to buffer shocks in the private economy but the corollary of that is deflationary polices at times of  growth.  Irish policies were too pro-cyclical and didn't deflate the property bubble through increased property taxes etc.  Related to that was a public sector cost explosion almost unrelated to to any value generation.  Keynesian pump priming is necessary when the economy is tanking and the worst thing you can do when it is booming at an unsustainable level.

Index of Frank's Diaries
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:38:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So, if the government can have no deficit, isn't that a pro-cyclical policy?

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:41:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have no difficulty with counter-cyclical Government borrowing and activity to buffer shocks in the private economy but the corollary of that is deflationary polices at times of  growth.

Yes and no.

Yes, during booms the government should be a deflationary actor. But the deflationary pressure exerted by the government during the boom does not need to match the inflationary pressure created to prevent deflation during the bust. It is perfectly acceptable (indeed desirable) for modern industrial states to run modest inflation when averaged over the whole business cycle.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 05:38:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
We can see some of the things you are saying happening as a result of Germany's deflationary policies (and yet German GDP or national income is growing rapidly perhaps partially despite the deflationary effects and largely because of the increased international competitiveness the price deflation generates.

Well yeah. But that result does not generalise trivially, for the same reason that the government budget is not simply a scaled-up version of the individual household budget: A naive generalisation runs face-first into the fallacy of composition.

I think the bit we are missing has to do with the fact that all nations (and particularly small ones like Ireland) are operating in an increasingly global environment and policies which may be apparently deflationary and damaging domestically actually help the in the longer term as they improve our competitive position relative to others.

Deflation does nothing for your economy that you can't accomplish with considerably less pain by devaluing your currency. Or, in the case of economies in a currency union, by having the surplus countries in the union accept higher inflation. Of course opponents of an activist currency policy are swift to point out that not everybody can run an undervalued currency. Well guess what; that applies equally whether said undervaluation comes about as a result of devaluation or deflation. And devaluation is still the less painful way to do it.

Intuitively it is obvious that if such enterprises cannot borrow (or raise external funds in some other way) their ability to expand will be much constrained - if all they have is current cash flow to fund investment projects with a long pay-back. But that presumes there are good projects available to serve unmet needs or markets and which can recover the cost of funds.

But here's the thing: The sovereign is the only issuer of fiat currency. If people for some reason (such as decreased confidence in the private financial system) want to hold more cash, the government has the choice between running a deficit or watching the economy shrink until the savings desire has shrunk sufficiently for it to be served out of then-current cash flows. And you have no guarantee that the savings desire will shrink faster than the national income.

Obviously, the optimal way to accommodate the private sector's savings desire is to set in motion gainful public projects. But suppose that the legwork for such projects has not been done. Then it is preferably to pay people to dig holes in the ground and fill them up again over doing nothing, because doing nothing means that the private sector will shrink. In other words, paying people to dig holes and fill them up again makes society richer, because it prevents the private sector from cannibalising itself through the paradox of thrift.

I am concerned that the borrowing obsession may be part to the growth obsession,

This is a valid criticism. But you have to distinguish between nominal and real growth. Sovereign deficits are required as long as you have nominal growth and saving desire increases monotonously with the nominal size of the economy. But nominal growth does not mean real growth. A credit economy needs nominal growth, because debtors have to be able to pay off their creditors. But it does not need real growth. Because neither debtors nor creditors can know the real growth rate until several months after the fact (and they aren't much good at predicting it either). And ecologically, real growth is what matters (actually, real growth in excess of efficiency gains - but I digress).

If the supply of money/credit exceeds the good projects available bad things happen!

But this has the relationship backwards. Money is created in the instant a project is judged "good," or creditworthy. So the reason that money availability exceeds the availability of good projects is that the standards for judging the soundness of a project are inadequate.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 05:33:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
So the reason that money availability exceeds the availability of good projects is that the standards for judging the soundness of a project are inadequate.
So the sovereign creates as much fiat money as the neo-libs want and "adjusts" the standard for judging projects until such time as all the money being created can be spent?  Is that not a perpetual motion machine forever digging holes and filling them in again?

Index of Frank's Diaries
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 06:25:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No. The private sector first decides what projects are creditworthy. They then create low-powered money. The government can then decide whether to accommodate this creation of low-powered money, or refuse to accommodate it.

It can refuse to accommodate it in two ways: Either it can tell the banks that their lending standards are insufficiently rigorous. That's the smart way, but requires the financial regulator to be awake and have both enough teeth to make his regulations stick and enough spine to use those teeth. Or the sovereign can simply refuse to provide high-powered money to accommodate private sector desire to create low-powered money. That's the dumb way to do it, because it hits good and bad projects alike with higher interest rates - and Ponzi scams can, while they're running, always outbid honest projects.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 05:14:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In addition to what Jake and Migeru has written, I believe there is a matter of accounting standards to be considered. As I understand it government debt is always presented without taking government assets into account. A standard by which every larger company in the world has serious problems.

So if the GDP is 1 something, government has 3 somethings in debt but own assets valued to 4 somethings, it has a 300% debt to GDP ratio! Debt crisis! Then it must sell its 4 somethings, even if it (due to crisis and dumping som much assets on the market at the same time) can only get 2,5 somethings to pay down the debt. Now it has no assets, but only a half something in debt. If GDP was not killed in process the government now has 50% debt to GDP ratio. And all assets is in the hands of private companies and individuals. Much better!

As long as this standard is the dominant one, any one that wants to expand the public economy is by definition for a larger public debt.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 09:32:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Presumably neo-liberals impose this standard on Governments because they don't want Governments to hold assets and regard Government activities as non-productive almost by definition because they don't generate returns for their shareholders.

Has anyone ever tried to produce national balance sheets?

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:14:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Frank Schnittger:
Has anyone ever tried to produce national balance sheets?
Stop reasoning in their frame.

Daily Kos: Untellable Truths (George Lakoff)

Don't use conservative language, since it will activate their moral system in the brains of listeners. Don't try to negate their arguments. That will only make their arguments more prominent. Use your own language and your own arguments. Truth squads and wonk rooms are insufficient.


Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:28:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
What's your problem with Governments getting credit for the investments in infrastructure or fixed assets they make?  Otherwise the asset strippers - typically neo-libs - get credit for "prudent fiscal management" when all they are doing is off-loading valuable state assets for a song and the nation builders - often socialists - get no credit for what they have built up by way of public assets.

(I accept that balance sheets - of private entities as well - are usually of limited value and don't necessarily give an accurate reflection of underlying value/asset creation.  However trying to measure Government performance on purely current income and expenditure without any attempt to measure enduring value creation is just crazy and gives the advantage to the asset stripping crazies.)

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 12:30:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
My problem is with putting a monetary value on everything.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 12:46:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I would share that problem, but you could at least ascribe an embedded cost to existing assets and allow the public project management system system to decide which future projects offer the best value potential or social return on investment.

Index of Frank's Diaries
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 01:10:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Can you put a "value potential or social return on investment" on one million people added to those in poverty by the UK Coalition Government's budget cuts?

Even if you could, should you operate in that frame?

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 03:29:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I believe Sweden had the budget separated in investment budget (infrastructure and such) and the rest (salaries to government officials, services, transfers etc) until around 1980 when the rightwing government reformed it.

I would suspect that the investment budget included discounting of existing assets, but I am not sure.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 12:31:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There are two problems with producing national balance sheets.

First, government liabilities have social value as an asset with a guaranteed value. And second, governments do not have anything that corresponds to conventional equity. And that's on top of the already formidable problems with accurately valuing public infrastructure (do you value it according to the liquidation value, the revenue that could be extracted from it in private hands, the value that society obtains from it, or something else entirely).

Government balance sheets just don't work the same way private balance sheets do, because governments fill a different social role than firms do.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 05:05:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Similarly, you can't compose a meaningful Central Bank balance sheet without including the potential future income from seigniorage, and the fact that it can be recapitalised by the Treasury from tax revenues. (see Can Central Banks Go Broke? by Buiter)

<sigh>The Sovereign should not be analysed like a private entity. It is not one.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 05:09:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
EUobserver / EU leaders agree to tweak treaty, keep bail-out fund unchanged
European Union premiers and presidents have agreed to a surgical change to the bloc's treaty to enable the creation of a permanent bail-out fund from 2013 but have left the size of the existing fund unchanged.
And that is all they have done.

What is this 2013 thing about? The crisis is now! What good is it to create a facility that can only be tapped 2 years from now? In the meantime,

The European recipe against this crisis is structural reform, deficit reduction and low inflation, with a minimalist crisis resolution framework. They will pursue this strategy for as long as it takes.
which pretty much guarantees there will be a severe crisis in 2013, just in time for Germany to veto it
The language used was that the new mechanism would be activated "if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole". That means it is a last-resort measure. The construction of the ESM will now proceed as outlined by Merkel.  There is a veto right by each member. And bondholders will bleed. Just how the European periphery is going to finance itself under such a framework is not clear.
At least
The declaration said the European Council would do whatever necessary to safeguard the stability of the eurozone. But there is no agreement on what that constitutes.
You know, a graveyard is stable, too. (quotes from EuroIntelligence's Merkel wins - slow motion train wreck can now proceed unhindered)

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 09:03:57 AM EST
In line with the Statesmanship they have been displaying lately, the Spanish government sprung into decisive shock-and-awe action:

Economía prepara una página web en inglés para calmar a los mercados en Cincodias.com[Spain's Ministry for the] Econoomy prepares a website in English to calm down the markets - CincoDias.com
La web, que se pondrá en marcha en los próximos días, tiene como objetivo que tanto los "inversores" como los "observadores" de la economía española tengan una información más cabal de cuál es la situación real de España, y se configura, según fuentes de Economía, con un vehículo de comunicación más ágil y más cercano entre el Gobierno y estos agentes.The site, which will be rolled out in the news few days, has as its goal that both "investors" and "observers" of Spain's economy have a more balanced information about the real situation of Spain, and is configured, according to sources in the Ministry, as a more agile and close form of communication between the Government and these agents.
La página aportará tanto los datos macroeconómicos de la economía española como las actuaciones que está adoptando el Gobierno para superar la crisis económica. Esta iniciativa del departamento de Elena Salgado se suma a las medidas que está llevando a cabo el Gobierno para convencer a los mercados de que la situación de la economía española dista mucho de la griega o la irlandesa, que han necesitado el apoyo financiero de la UE y del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI).The page will contribute both macroeconomic data on Spain's economy and the actions the Government is adopted to overcome the economic crisis. This initiative by the department of Elena Salgado is added to the measures the Government is carrying out to convince the markets that the situation of the Spanish economy is very far from the Irish or Greek ones, which have needed the financial support of the EU and IMF.
Así, el Ejecutivo está acelerando algunas actuaciones ya anunciadas, como la aprobación de la reforma de pensiones para el 28 de enero, la publicación la próxima semana del déficit de las comunidades autónomas o los nuevos test de estrés de la banca con más información sobre su exposición a los activos inmobiliarios.Thus, the Government is accelerating some of the already announced actions, such as the approval of pension reform next January 28, the publication next week of the deficit of Autonomous Communities [Spain's Regions] or the new banking stress tests with more information about their exposure to real estate assets.

No, this is not The Onion, it's economic newspaper Cinco Días.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 09:07:53 AM EST
In the Central Bankers, Central Wankers department:

FT.com: Europe cannot default its way back to health by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi

Europeans have not forgotten the devastating effects that the expropriation of wealth, such as that carried out during the two world wars by way of inflation or defaults, may have on the economic and social fabric. There is awareness that, in the end, it may be less costly to tackle excessive public debt with the traditional remedies - that is, achieving an adequate level of primary surplus - rather than looking for quick fixes. There is also awareness that, without restoring economic growth, the debt burden cannot be reduced over time. This requires major structural reforms aimed at improving the functioning of the labour, capital and goods markets.

...

To understand what is happening in Europe, economics textbooks are useful but the history ones even more so.

The writer is a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank

(h/t Eurointelligence)

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 09:27:56 AM EST
Of course the German solution is der korrekt vun.

Wages too high makes your workers uncompetitive! Lower wages, more sales, more work, more jobs.

At the same time, restrict cream-skimming by the profiteers. That's the haircut.

The wider the income disparity, the less competitive.

Simple, if you ignore greedsters.

Align culture with our nature. Ot else!

by ormondotvos (ormond.otvosnospamgmialcon) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 12:59:28 PM EST


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