Address to the Commission's 2010 Consultation on Energy
Luís Moreira de Sousa
luis.a.de.sousa@gmail.com
July 3, 2010

1 Introduction

This document is an attempt to address the Energy Consultation launched by the European Commission in the first half of 2010. This consultation is part of a process that shall take the Commission to a new Energy Policy Programme a few years from now.

After 6 years with energy prices much above the ground flat figures that made the norm during the previous two decades, the European Union is finally taking into due consideration this crucial sector. It is now contemplating an Economy highly dependent on foreign energy, together with meagre and dwindling traditional sources of indigenous energy. As it stands now, the Socio-Economic model the European Union is built on simply doesn't seem able to perdure on traditional sources of energy, especially fossil fuels. This has lead to the Programme know as 20-20-20, that among other things, aims at increasing energy production from renewable energy sources and efficiency. This Programme is rather shy in many areas and in others it contradicts itself or is contradicted by other Communitarian policies.

It is more that time for a new, serious and all-encompassing Energy Policy for Europe. Otherwise the survival of Europe itself is at stake; and not only the European Construction project, but states themselves may disintegrate if they are not willing or capable of tackling the transition due ahead. Simply put, there's no Economy without accessible and secure Energy, and without an Economy there's no Social State.

This document is divided into two sections, one outlining the Background, where Europe is squared in today's world energy market, and a second presenting a possible Policy, congruent with the given panorama, establishing goals and pointing possible means.

Some deeper issues that are either closely related to, or at the root of, today's energy problems are not address in this document; two obvious cases are Population and the Monetary System. Essentially, the Policy presented assumes implicitly that Economic Growth is viable in the future. The aim of this document is to present practical options that can be easily grasped by lawmakers and stakeholders in general, leaving outside more complex concerns, that though important, should be discussed in a different context.

This section tries to explain why energy come back to be a public concern in recent years and why stakeholders have been dedicated to it more than usual. Each fossil fuel is briefly analysed separately, with a few observations on the expected evolution of its availability. Finally, some reflections are made on the consequences to Europe's Economy.

Oil prices began in 2004 a cavalcade that would last for almost 4 years, slowly breaking all previous records. Even in the wake of the hardest Economic recession of the last 30 years, oil prices are today about four times what they where a decade ago. These incessant high prices have lent the due credibility to those that for some time had warned against impeding difficulties in continuing the breathless world Oil production growth of the past two decades. Among these can be highlighted Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrére [1], Richard Duncan and Walter Youngquist [2] or Kenneth Deffeyes [3] for their oil production forecasts or Ali Bakhtiari [4] for his price predictions.

The constraints to oil production growth have today been acknowledge by most, even by the Industry itself [5], as show by Figure 1. Also notable have been the implicit warnings issued by the IEA, that despite continuously publishing production scenarios perpetually matching demand, have been vocal in other contexts explaining how unlikely that is to happen, especially in the figure of it's Chief-Economist, Fatih Birol [6].

Figure 1: Future World Oil production and Demand forecasts according to Petrobras.

Peak Oil, as was baptised by Colin Campbell, is a pretty palpable reality at this stage, but for Europe reality is bit more intricate. Only one of its states is a net oil exporter, with most meeting their needs fully with imports. Figure 2 presents the volumes of oil made available at the international market every year by all the relevant exporters and a forecast of its evolution into the future. International oil trade peaked in 2005 and has entered a permanent decline; moreover, this decline will likely accelerate during the next decade, by 2020 taking away between 1/3 or 1/4 of the volume of oil available in the market in 2005. This has been the main reason behind the high price environment of the past 6 years.

Figure 2: World Oil Exports, past and projected.

But Europe's woes deepen further, its most important suppliers, Norway and Russia, that supply Europe almost exclusively, are themselves entering terminal production decline. Within a decade Norway's oil exports shall be no more that a small fraction of what they are today; as for Russia an halving of exports in the same period must be seen as likely.

It is hard to envision how Europe will square in this race for the dwindling international oil market. One thing is for certain, with its heavy foreign dependence and now diminutive internal production it is the Economic block with most to lose.

A Peak of world Natural Gas production is not something to expect in the short term. Though some have pointed to such possibility, even independent researchers usually position it some decades away. Today, with the development of unconventional reserves in North America, terminal decline in that region at least has been postponed for some years.

But Gas is not a fungible commodity like Oil, its trade is mostly regional, reliant on pipeline deliveries. Europe's access to this energy source must be observed at a geographically restricted scope. Imports equate to about 60% of consumption, supplied by three neighbouring blocks: Russia, Norway and the Magreb. Norway is reaching its production zenith by now, with a visible reduction in exports unfolding in the next decade. Russia is still away from such decline, likely maintaining present production levels during the next fifteen to twenty years; the question on Russia is its internal demand, which has been slowly eating away export capacity. A maintenance of present Russian gas exports to Europe can be seen as a best case scenario. The only export capacity growth to expect is from the Magreb, though not in sufficient volumes to make the gap opened by the other two neighbouring suppliers.

Compounding on this imports scenario is a declining internal production. Peaking in 2001 during the golden days of the North Sea, gas production in Europe has been slowly declining up to now and should accelerate into the future. A huge gap will open between production and a relentless demand that up to 2008 had been growing 2% annually. Euan Mearns [8] produced an analysis of the European Gas Market in 2007 that detailed these issues, a digest is presented in Figure 3. The only way to match an annual demand growth of 2% would be importing all the Natural Gas traded in the world by ship in liquid state. The likelihood of that is very slim, especially in face of competition from emerging economies.

Figure 3: Gas scenarios for OECD Europe summarising the indigenous supply forecasts and demand forecasts.

In Europe, but especially in the United States, Natural Gas has been used as a campaigning flag by some politicians, promoting it as a benign or beneficial energy source, in some cases even casting the idea of a non-fossil origin [9]. This has created the wrong impression that Gas may be the answer to most, if not all, of the world's energy problems. The United Kingdom, for instance, is expecting to be generating two thirds of its electricity from Natural Gas a few years from now; how that will be possible is beyond anyone.

Like Gas, a peak of world Coal production is not to be expected in the short term. And unlike the two previous fossil fuels, reserves and future production profiles estimates are yet to converge. Predictions exist for a world Coal Peak between 2025 and 2060, remaining open the question of whether it can ever surpass today's energy flow from Oil.

In the short term Coal presents different challenges, stemming from the relatively small size of its international market; most of the Coal mined in the world is consumed within borders. Coal consumption in the EU has decreased dramatically in the wake of the economic crisis (down 17% since 2008) but it still is the main source of baseload electricity in most states, with 45% of it being imported. On the other side of the table are the emerging economies, India alone should in 2010 consume more Coal than the EU for the first time in History; as for China, it consumes almost half of all the Coal mined in the world, almost six times what the EU consumes and growing close to 10% per annum.

So far China remained Coal self-sufficient, despite some sporadic periods when it had to temporarily recur to the international market. One of these episodes took place in the Spring of 2007, at a time when prices in Europe where around 45 $/tonne. China became a net importer of Coal for a few months and even after closing the gap later that year, faced a harsh Winter in the early weeks of 2008, that compromised mining and transport, prompting shortages in most of the country. By this time Coal was being traded at the Amsterdam port for more than 140 $/tonne [10]. It took less than 12 months for Coal prices to produce the same move Oil prices made in four years.

Coal Consumption in Asia is growing so fast that episodes like the 2007/2008 crunch can become permanent. The IEA expects China and India together to be demanding over 110 Mtoe on the international market already by 2015 [6]; this figure is very close to what the EU imported together in 2009. Can the international market cope with such demand surge? Of all international fossil fuel markets, Coal may well be the one yielding the greatest surprises for the next decade.

High energy prices had been the omens of Economic Recession during the XX century, once it became clear in 2004 that OPEC was impotent to rein in oil prices, many where those announcing an imminent crisis. The shock came only in 2008, when high energy prices coupled with rising interest rates dried up household spending and triggered credit defaults throughout much of the OECD. This crisis revealed serious fragilities in the financial system with over indebtedness by households, companies and states.

In Europe this recession had different impacts on different states, but immediately threatened liquidity all across the bloc. This was dealt at the time with state guarantees on private bank credit, but with economic activity nearly stalled, it evolved into a confidence crisis on state solvability. This confidence crisis affected only some states, particularly those in the Eurogroup with large budget deficits, though they are indebted mostly to other EU states. But it is paramount to note that those states that are today in bigger trouble to finance themselves are exactly those more reliant on Oil as primary energy source [11], as Figure 4 shows.

Figure 4: Oil dependence by state in the EU.

There may be several reasons for this coincidence, but it clearly shows that fossil fuel dependence is having a determining role in the present crisis. Moreover, it also indicates that a Pan-European scope is indispensable for an effective Energy Policy.

The Economic Crisis is now going on for almost 2 years. GDP numbers may have grown occasionally, but Unemployment figures are still high and in some cases still growing. At the same time oil prices remain about 2.5 times what they where back in 2004. An Economy based on fossil fuels will always have little roam to grow while supplies of these energy sources remain constrained. This low growth, high unemployment environment can perdure for as long as Europe keeps its dependence on foreign supplies of fossil fuels.

In fact this crisis is facilitating an important shift of fossil fuel usage from the OECD to emerging economies [12] as Figure 5 portraits. These economies function on much lower energy per capita requirements, proving to be more resilient to the present constraints in the international market. An unsustainable economic paradigm is coming to an end, and if economic recession is the only way for Europe and the OECD to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels, then economic recession is what it will be.

Figure 5: OECD and Non-OECD shares of the world total liquids consumption (EIA data).

Already under strain, the socio-economic model under which Europe is built on will eventually became unviable under this fossil fuel paradigm, the Europe Project being likewise at stake. The European goals of Concordia, Solidarity, Equality and Freedom cannot be defended on the present, defunct, energy paradigm.

The Energy Policy elements presented are here outlined using the Business Motivation Model (BMM) framework [13]. This framework intends to organize business plans in order to make them easy to understand, follow and maintain¹. It is composed by three essential types of elements:

• Ends - the future state the business pretends to reach;
• Means - the methods employ to reach those ends;
• Influences - things that impact or constrain the business;

For the present purpose only Ends and Means are considered, an assessment of Influences being outside the scope of this document. Ends breakdown into three types of ever more detailed categories:

• Vision - a single sentence wrapping up the pretended business state;
• Goals - conditions that must be satisfied on a continuing basis for the business to attain the Vision;
• Objectives - specific, measurable and time-framed targets that the business must achieve to fulfil its Goals;

Means breakdown in a similar hierarchy:

• Mission - a single sentence defining the business operation that can make the Vision a reality;
• Strategy - macroscopic course of action that takes the business to its Goals;
• Tactic - specific activity that implements a strategy;

Translating this framework to an Economic or Policy Programme, Vision and Mission can be seen as the digest of its grand objective, a direct way to make its purpose explicit. Goals and Strategies define the next level, Ends that are either collectively perceived as relevant or imposed by circumstances; they stem from, and exist, mostly in a technical plane, largely disconnected from political philosophies. Objectives and Tactics comprise the bottom level of Policy application, corresponding to executive targets and initiatives. It is at this level of implementation that political orientation has the larger role.

This document shall focus mainly on the higher-level of Goals and Strategies; no Targets are presented and only a limited number of Tactics are discussed. The intention is to simply show stereotyped courses of action, without diving into political or philosophical considerations.

At the Tactical level considerations on taxes may be made, such as "reflect the consumer electronics labelling framework into the taxing scheme". These references are always made in abstract, leaving open implementation options; for the example above, labelling could translate into a VAT rebate, a VAT increase or both. The taxing scheme can as well comprise individual or collective income taxes, all depending on each Executive's philosophy.

The proposed Policy is presented in the following subsections: firstly Vision, Mission and Goals are presented as a first macro-view with introducing texts outlining the overall aims. Then a number of Strategies are put forward and discussed for each Goal, with some tactics put forward in an informal way.

Each policy element is index with a character reflecting its type and a sequential number reflecting hierarchy, e.g. the first goal is indexed as G1 and is supported by strategies S1.1 and S1.2.

A United, Solidarian and Egalitarian Europe beyond fossil fuels.

Move Europe and its Socio-Economic model to a non fossil fuel reliant paradigm.

Former Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs once wrote that his favourite energy source was Efficiency, that could as well be turned into an Energy Policy motto. Efficiency measures are those that have greater impacts on the shorter time-frame, they dispense technological development and usually are not politically sensitive. Measures in this field must always have an important role in Energy Policy for an Economy like Europe's, given it's reliance abroad. Unfortunately, some of the present policies included in the 20-20-20 package aim at exactly the opposite direction.

Electricity will become an even more important energy vector, as Europe shifts away from fossil fuels. Especially as Transport trades liquid vectors for electricity, generation needs shall increase by important amounts. If electricity continues to be generated with fossil fuels (mainly Gas and Coal) the effect of this shift could even be negative. It is thus essential for Europe to move towards a fully renewable electricity market or at least fully reliant on indigenous energy sources.

Well over half of the oil consumed in the EU is used for Transport. During the few months of 2008, when oil prices remained over 100 $/barrel, it became apparent that the road infrastructure isn't viable in such environment, with strikes erupting all across the continent. Changing the transport of goods and commodities can represent an important reduction of Europe's oil dependence while having little impact on every day life. It is seamless to either the manufacturer or the client if some merchandise moves on rail or by ship, instead of the road. Moreover, much of the infrastructure to make such shift already exists, perhaps simply needing maintenance. Implementation could be made progressively, first on inter-state transport, then on inter-city and so on.

Today individual travel is performed mainly on two modes of transport: by road car (inter-city) or by air-plane (inter-state). Both of them are now highly reliant on oil, with aviation being 100% reliant on jet-fuel and no serious prospects for an alternative. Substituting these two modes present two different challenges: the air-plane's speed (travelling at 900 Km/h) and the individual car's flexibility (being simultaneously a commuter, a small freighter and a mid-range vehicle). Overcoming these two challenges shall require a new concepts of what travelling to another state or to another city may mean, but it is imperative that it takes place.

Humans cherish the concept of the individual vehicle for the perception of control it provides them, ready to travel large distances, to take relevant loads to wherever, whenever it may be opportune. This versatility is a produce of the low volumetric density of oil products. But in reality cars are confined to roads, constrained by its driver availability and being repetitively used as a simple commuters. Travellers shall have to make similar concessions to those they do when travelling by air-plane: being subject to a pre-determined schedule and route, travelling with strangers and using other modes closer to destination, but at closer ranges that the traditional inter-state flight.

Like modern cars, air-planes are a bi-product of oil's volumetric density, allowing an heavy chunk of metal to rapidly cross the skies. Aviation does not seem to have any substitute for jet-fuel, such is its specificity. In time, flying will likely become unaffordable to the larger share of population, something which, without mitigation, can have profound social and cultural impacts for Europe. Travellers shall have to concede longer hours of inter-state travel, but if these coincide with regular leisure or resting periods, their impact on daily life can be reduced close to null.

Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) has no place in a fossil fuel constrained world, where the extra 30% to 40% extra primary energy needed to run such systems isn't available. The implementation of the existing CCS programme shall have tragic consequences for Europe. Any targets on this matter must be scrapped immediately.

One of the 20-20-20 targets is a replacement of 10% of the transportation fuels used today in Europe with agro-fuels. To achieve that an area at least the size of Germany would have to be covered with dedicated crops [14]. This target will likely have to be met with imports, though of a more expensive and in much lower supply commodity than oil. There is no logic to justify such target, immediate scrapping is imperative.

In recent years a number of fossil-fuel based energy vectors have been promoted accross the EU, including Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and jet-fuel. These vectors have benefited from tax breaks when used as transport fuels, something that makes little sense from a Energy Policy perspective. Fuel duties have played an important role avoiding the higher energy per capita figures of other OECD members (e.g. USA, Canada), hence avoiding over-reliance on foreign energy. Moreover, these market biases have prompted owners to spend thousands of euros retrofitting their vehicles to use these vectors, a relevant investment that brings no efficiency improvement. There's no reason to differentiate between fossil fuel based vectors, all must be brought into the same tax framework.

Fossil fuels are primary energy sources that are transformed into motion or electricity by means of combustion. This is a rather inefficient process, where between 50% and 70% of the input energy is lost as heat. Though, recently combined cycle power plants have became the norm, targets must be set for an all round efficiency increase in electrical generation, including older power plants. Other tactics may combine to boost this strategy, such as the spreading of district heating systems, especially in northern states.

A process already in motion in some parts of the EU, that should also be turned into an European wide practice. Waste contains many different forms of matter that can be used as energy source, either by outright combustion or by processing to useful vectors such as bio-diesel. This strategy can be seen as part of a larger Environmental goal of closing Society's matter cycle.

Part of the Commission's present Energy Policy implementation is already a much wider Labelling framework now extending to a great number of consumer goods. This initiative should be progressively extended to all goods that use energy or otherwise have a relevant impact on energy efficiency (e.g. car tyres). More than that, the Labelling scheme should also be reflected in the taxing scheme of these products, thus providing a market bias in favour of efficiency. To work, a Labelling Framework will likely need a supporting institution responsible for testing goods and keeping efficiency ranks up-to-date.

Some states have already shifted a relevant fraction of its electricity generation to indigenous renewable energies that go beyond the traditional hydro-electric. This has been achieved in great measure due to the introduction of feed-in tariffs, fixed rates by which grid operators must buy the generated electricity. Though more expensive than fossil fuels, feed-in tariffs are nonetheless considerably below present final prices at the consumer (e.g. in Portugal and Spain Wind feed-in tariffs are circa 0.075 euro/kWh, whereas consumers pay 0.12 euro/kWh).

This approach seems sharp in two ways: it facilitates investment (which for renewables is mostly before start-up) and can impose a benchmark to separate between lower and higher EROEI ² energy sources. In the current market, where many different forms of renewable energy are promoted by different agents, a single fixed feed-in tariff for every one will stave off immature or low EROEI sources from entering the market. Additionally, a higher tariff limited to a certain generation capacity (say 10 Mw) could be employed for development projects.

Feed-in tariffs for electricity generation as just part of a larger process to shift from fossil fuels to renewable. Being mostly intermittent in nature, renewables pose some challenges to grid management, many times not matching the instantaneous demand on the grid. So far this has been mitigated with the use of the hydro-electric park for storage, augmenting the hydrological potential for load-balance generation. In time, with an increased intermittent supply to the grid, hidro-electric storage may not be enough; new forms of energy storage must be promoted side by side with renewable energies.

This strategy can also be implemented with special tariffs for energy storage. It can take many forms, simply as fixed figures for intake and feed-in, or more complex schemes contemplating the daily variations of the demand/supply balance.

Now patent from the experience by the states with higher penetration rates, renewable energies are having impact chiefly on load balance generation (in great measure due to its coupling with hydro-electric as explained above). Base-load generation will feel the impact later and likely only after larger scale storage systems are in place. Objectively, the only ready, scalable, indigenous alternative to fossil-fuels for base-load is Nuclear energy. It is thus time for the EU to assume this fact and take this energy source seriously.

A real European Nuclear Programme should not be seen simply as an expansion project but rather as a maintenance, assessment and long term road-map for this energy source. An important part of this programme would have to be information, explaining to the EU citizen what Nuclear energy is, why is it needed, what are the potential hazards, how they are mitigated, what is the EU planning for it long term. After that a thorough assessment of each state' base-load needs should take place, especially for those that do not have relevant Coal resources and do not use Nuclear. And on this assessment the Nuclear Park could be properly dimensioned and its hypothetical decommissioning planned for the long term.

Tackling freight transport should start by the long distance, where empty haulage has the worst impact (finding back-trip loads is harder). This can be implemented in several ways, with special tolls on inter-state highways for hauliers, creating an inter-state circulation tax scheme for trucks, adjusting the taxing scheme on goods transported by road, etc.

The lion share of implementing this strategy would be recycling the jobs lost in the hauling industry. Workers in this sector would primarily be lead to the alternative industries: rail-roads, water-ways and maritime shipping; other options may exist in the logistic sector aggregated to these industries.

Similar to the previous strategy, this one would came at a later phase, with inter-state road transport already greatly reduced. The tactics discussed above largely apply here and would translate into an European-wide cost hike for road hauling. Only for short distances, where rail or waterways are impracticable, road freight could be left as is.

In parallel to the phase-out of road hauling a programme to create an European-wide standard freight rail network would be necessary. A first stage could correspond to a network connecting every state capital, composed by slow lines (maximum speeds circa 100 Km/h). In time this would expand to all cities above a certain threshold size.

Underpinning this network an information system would be needed to allow a hauling operator to easily contract its container trip between any two nodes of the network.

Also part of the alternative to road freight, maritime shipping, though reliant on fossil fuels, presents several advantages, a much reduced fuel usage per tonne-kilometre and relatively low infrastructure requirements. A programme would be needed to facilitate navigation all around the EU's coasts, to provide proper logistic infrastructure at ports and facilitate the movement of goods through customs (scrapping any barriers of this sort to inter-state shipping).

As before, a proper information system is indispensable for the management and tracking of freight ships, plus the useful instruments for easy contracting.

Somewhere after the Second World War the car industry simply forgot about Aerodynamics (or may have passed it to the back seat). Charismatic cars like the Volkswagen (later christened as beetle) or the Citröen DS, where built with much higher concerns on this field than those available today. Air is the largest obstacle to the movement of a car on a tarmac road, and the only one in flat road at constant speeds. The other obstacle is mass, entering the equation whenever there is acceleration. The car industry seems to be slowly tackling the mass component with energy recovery systems on breaking (something associated with the popular concept of "hybrid-car"). Though indirectly penalized by fuel duties, movement through Air has so far been left unmitigated.

Implementation could be achieved with progressive industry standards for minimum frontal area / shape ratios or by adjustments to the taxing scheme. Aerodynamic vehicles will likely steal away some of the flexibility embodied in today's cars. Vehicles to transport large loads or large numbers of passengers would become less attractive. Overcoming this difficulty is something the industry can possibly deal with by itself, e.g. by recurring to concepts such as modularity.

An Aerodynamic bias on the car market may also have another important function by facilitating the penetration of alternative vector vehicles. These vectors are invariably less denser than oil products, thus providing less travel distance for the same tank size; better Aerodynamics shall increase these vehicle's range, improving their usefulness.

Using quasi-straight lines passing over major cities, a path between Athens and Brussels is about 2000 Km long; between Tallinn and Brussless it is about 1900 Km and between Lisbon and Brussels a little less. At an average speed of 200 Km/h these distances are covered in 10 hours or less. At face value, such a long time inside a train may not be that appealing. But instead of idealizing it as a regular plane trip with the passenger stranded in a seat, it can imagined in a different way. A passenger takes the Trans-Europa-Express at 8 pm in Athens and moves to the restaurant car for dinner. Somewhat later the passenger enters a small, but comfortable, cabin where some hours are spent reading, watching a picture or blogging, before going to bed. At 7 am the next day the passenger is up, goes for breakfast and at 8 am leaves the train at the destination city, where a cab or bus shall complete the journey to a starting business or vacation day.

There is certainly more to it than this simple story, children, luggage, etc, but for many occasions this could become a reality. A programme to substitute inter-state air travel by rail would not only require an high-speed network connecting at least every state capital, it would also need to make night travel affordable. Taking advantage of economies of scale, architecting new train cars, improving modal integration, a new long-distance passenger travel system must become a reality in Europe.

Complementing the introduction of an European high speed rail network is the simple measure of introducing fuel duties on jet-fuel. Though referenced before, it is important to stress that jet-fuel is subject to no duty at all throughout the EU. It's introduction is sensitive, since without a proper alternative long distance passenger travel could become unaffordable; on the other hand it would work as an important incentive to the introduction of a high speed rail network. It could be implemented progressively, firstly impacting only domestic flights below a certain distance, then spreading to all internal flights and later to all jet-fuel marketed in the EU.

Europe faces enormous challenges in the years, and possibly decades, ahead due to its reliance on foreign imports of fossil energy. By different factors, outright scarcity, geographic constraints or demand growth from competing importers, Oil, Gas and Coal are all set to become harder to afford for Europe. If no other way is provided for the reduction of their usage, then economic hardship shall take care of such task.

An Energy Policy directed at fossil fuel scarcity is today paramount for Europe, and may rest on it the survival of its Socio-Economic paradigm. Even the EU's cohesion itself may come at stake without a path to an Economy based on indigenous energy.

This document proposes an Energy Policy from a macroscopic stance, founded on four pillars: Efficiency - continuously improve the way Europe uses energy; Electricity generation - substitute foreign fossil fuel imports for indigenous renewables and Nuclear if needed; Freight Transport - substituting road hauling for rail, water-ways and maritime shipping; Passenger Transport - changing the way Europeans think of passenger transport, with new concepts of individual/family vehicles and long distance travel.

May our leaders have the courage and science to tackle this challenge.

(1)

A more detailed and direct description of BMM can be found at this webpage: http://www.selectbs.com/adt/analysis-and-design/what-is-business-motivation-modeling-bmm

(2)

EROEI - Energy Return On Energy Invested; it is a measure of how much useful energy is delivered to society by an energy source, after excluding build-up, operation and other energy inputs.

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[14]

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