The LMU eventually failed for a number of reasons. Some members, notably the Papal State's treasurer, Giacomo Cardinal Antonelli, began to debase their currency. This meant he minted coins with an inadequate amount of silver and then exchanged them for coins from other countries that had been minted correctly. More importantly, because new discoveries and better refining techniques increased the supply of silver, the fixed LMU exchange rate eventually overvalued silver relative to gold. German traders, in particular, were known to bring silver to LMU countries, have it minted into coinage then exchanged those for gold coins at the discounted exchange rate. These destabilizing tactics eventually forced the LMU to convert to a pure gold standard for its currency (in 1878).

According to Financial Times, another major problem of the LMU was that it failed to outlaw the printing of paper money based on the bimetallic currency. A weakness which was exploited by France and Italy that printed banknotes to fund their own endeavours, effectively "forcing other members of the union to bear some of the cost of its fiscal extravagance by issuing notes backed by their currency". Greece also caused problems. According to the BBC, "its chronically weak economy meant successive Greek governments responded by decreasing the amount of gold in their coins, thereby debasing their currency in relation to those of other nations in the union and in violation of the original agreement". Greece was formally expelled from the Latin Monetary Union in 1908. It was readmitted in 1910, however.

Even though the minting of new silver coinage ceased, the existing silver coins continued in circulation, and the fluctuations in the values of gold and silver were somewhat of a nuisance. The political turbulence of the early twentieth century which culminated in the First World War, brought the Latin Monetary Union to its final end in practice, even though it continued 'de jure' until 1927, when it came to a formal end.

The Southern Euro approach I have suggested would do just that. Start with the most abused - Greece, Ireland, Portugal + ?

Impossible.

The well has been poisoned. Two years have gone by since the beginning of this fake crisis and NOT ONCE did the leaders of these countries meet.

Few expressed the view that Portugal is too close to Spain to cauterise effectively while others went against the grain of majority opinion suggesting that Ireland ought to be liberated too.

...

My Frankfurt interlocutors, upon being challenged on the realism of containment following the traumatic events which will undoubtedly follow the severing of `gangrenous limbs', admitted that cauterisation would cost trillions and would involve unremitting money-printing by the ECB. In their view, the ECB would have to attempt: (a) to keep afloat the banks of Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, Germany and Holland, and (b) to smooth the severed countries' tortuous path to oblivion (by keeping at least some banks functional during the tumult that will surely follow).

When will this Plan come out of the shadows and be discussed in public? After Mr Sarkozy, on whom Mrs Merkel has invested much, wins the French Presidential election, was the answer I was given. Then, Germany will `suddenly' realise that the impossible conditions the Greek government pretended to accept have not been met. And then the ball will start rolling. Tragically, it will keep rolling well past the point willed by Berlin and Frankfurt. Even if contagion is initially arrested by Super Mario, the deeper causes of the eurozone's current troubles will continue to work unimpeded and, before too long, Germany will realise that the amputations must go on until all is left attached to its economy are the rest of the surplus countries. Then, just like it has now accepted inflation as the price to pay for implementing this New Plan A, Germany will accept the need for deep deflation, following the loss of export markets, that will come as part and parcel of the next-next Plan: of ditching France.