I don't think that's really CT territory, it's fairly well documented.

a lot of them actually.  it was when the German firms in Germany started lacking manpower that the forced labour began.  and the unemployment numbers were given in the documentary.  I did not invent them.

salaries were quite good for labourers working for the Germans

however, the rations for people not doing manual labour were quite below recommended for maintaining your weight.

But, unfortunately, as France was hopelessly split between the right and left political extremes before the war, this was not the finest hour for many who found the Occupation an economic opportunity.

Gamelin was old, his knowledge of 1939 era military technology was lacking, his knowledge of 1939 era military tactics was non-existent, his great idea, Dyle-Breda plan, was from Cloud-Cuckoo Land.

The Allies Command and Control systems were inadequate from the top, Gamelin didn't even have a radio at his GHQ, to the bottom, French tanks weren't equipped with radios either.  The high command was completely snarled.  The corp and division officers thought they were fighting World War One, and deployed accordingly.  Huntziger, in command of the French Second Army and tasked with the defense of Seden, shouldn't have been in command of a platoon of Boy Scouts.  

Only 42 bunkers protected the Sedan bridgeheads on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and an additional 61 were built by 10 May. However, by the 10 May, most of the bunkers were incomplete, lacking gun port shutters for the artillery casemates. Some of the bunkers lacked rear doors, making them vulnerable to infiltration by infantry. To the north of Sedan, on the northern bend of the Meuse, the town of Glaire overlooked the crossing points on the river, which was to be where the German armour would deliver its heaviest blow. There was a gap of 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) between Bunker 305 at Glaire and Bunker 211 next to the Pont Neuf bridge. This allowed an attacker coming from the north to use the good road routes through the Fleigneux-Saint Menges-Glaire axis to enter Sedan from the north.

The defences at Sedan also lacked any mines. The French Second Army was guarding a front of 70 kilometres (43 mi), and was given only 16,000 mines. Of that number 7,000 were given to the cavalry divisions that were to delay a German advance through southern Belgium as well as blockhouse points along the Franco-Belgian border. That left 2,000 for the defence of the river Meuse. Of those, the 55th Infantry Division got 422. Not all of these were laid, and some barriers were moved during the bunker construction in the Sedan sector.

If Huntziger was incompetent, General Lafontaine, commander of the 55th Infantry Division, was criminally negligent.

The organisation of the French 55th Infantry Division was chaotic. Most units had been involved in construction work and were constantly moved to different tactical positions. Of the nine companies in position by 10 May, only a few had been holding their respective positions for even a few days and were not familiar with them. One of the premier infantry regiments, the 213th Infantry Regiment, was removed from the line altogether and was replaced with the 331st Regiment. In some cases Infantry regiments were made up of several different companies from several different battalions from different regiments. For example, the 295th Infantry Regiment's 6th Company, 2nd battalion, was made up of four different companies which were drawn from three different battalions belonging to three different regiments.

Against these completely inadequate defensive positions, manned by two untrained, ill-equipped, disorganized Class B infantry divisions the Germans threw three crack Panzer divisions as part of a total force of 60,000 men, 22,000 vehicles, 771 tanks, 141 artillery pieces and 1,470 aircraft.  

German military doctrine was based on Fire and Movement.  French military doctrine at Seden was, essentially, Sit There and Get Shot.

Even so the forward units of the 55th gave a damn good account of themselves, even the Germans noted it at the time, until Idiot (Lafontaine) told his artillery to halt their interdiction fire "to save ammunition to repeal the assault" allowing the German assault units to assemble and cross the river.  The 55th continued to fight until they basically fell-over exhausted, out of ammunition, out of supplies, no air cover, and without artillery support -- those units heroically ran away during the night.

The German bridgeheads at Sedan could, and should, have been counter-attacked on May 14 and May 15.  With the Germans having one foot on one side and one foot on the other their force was divided, inviting defeat in detail.  No combined arms attack was ever made at Sedan (command failure) and most of the mobile forces needed instead of where they were needed (command failure.)

The main and proximate cause of the French defeat in 1940 was their High Command.  Sloughing the blame off on the "poor fighting ability" of the front-line soldier is what generals and politicians do to "save their reputation."

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

Would have barely counted as a day of ordinary attrition, nevermind serious fighting, on the Eastern Front.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.