The assertion that the US is waging war in eastern Congo, through proxies which are controlled by Rwanda and Uganda, which are supposed to be under US control apparently, is an interesting one, but requires some references. As for the 35 "occupied" countries, I want to see a list, with the number of US military personnel present in each, and then we could discuss how this affects their sovereignty, case by case.

_{It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II}

And in a presentation by Vice Admiral Moeller at an Africom conference held at Fort McNair on February 18, 2008 and subsequently posted on the web by the Pentagon, he declared that protecting "the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market" was one of Africom's "guiding principles" and specifically cited "oil disruption," "terrorism," and the "growing influence" of China as major "challenges" to U.S. interests in Africa.

A new cold war is underway in Africa, and AFRICOM will be at the dark heart of it.

A new Risk board!

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

http://atimes.com/atimes/China/OB01Ad01.html

Pilger's frame has become worryingly paranoid. Looks to me he has forgotten the realities of realpolitics, which trump (and apparently offend) his ideological vision.

In reality, it would be foolish to think the conflict in Mali is not about economical interests, be them French, American, Chinese or European. Colonialism for resources was never dead in Africa - it's only the form that changes shape.

But it would also be foolish to think this conflict would not be about Islamism, so say plenty of conflict analysts. It is equally foolish to underestimate the havoc Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb can wreak in the region and resulting in effects that can potentially ripple across Europe, Africa or the Middle East.

And furthermore it is foolish to conflate the military training missions of the US Army, which are often welcomed by African nations, as an "invasion".

Having said that, this diary, and the two sources quoted, do a very poor job of exposing or challenging US motives or policy with respect to Africa, and the effect of hyperbole is to discredit the thesis.

Pilger spends much of his article rattling on about how the US created jihadism (presumably he is talking about the 1980s, when the CIA aided those who were weakening the Soviet Union), as if that had some relevance or explicative power with respect to current US policy in Africa. But I can't make out whether his thesis is

• the US must be presumed to be still promoting the jihadists, for some murky motive Pilger doesn't explain; or
  
• ha ha, it's the US's own fault if there are jihadists running around Africa, or
  
• something else.

For centuries, violent tribes have roamed Africa, but today some of these tribes, especially on the eastern side, have converted to Islam. Representing no serious threat to the United States, they have only sought self-government by driving foreign influences from their countries.

I don't know where to start. It's an insult to the intelligence of anyone who knows anything about Africa, and especially insulting to African Muslims.

If there is a case to me made about dangerous US interventionism in Africa, then it needs to be made from scratch with more serious sources and arguments.
 

_{It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II}

US Vice President Joe Biden on Monday held talks with French President François Hollande on what he called a "global agenda" of issues, including France's military intervention in Mali, economic matters, conflict in Syria, and Iran's nuclear ambitions.

At a press conference following their lunch, the two hailed the strength of the French-American alliance and expressed broad agreement on the spectrum of complex questions they discussed.

... With France carrying out a military intervention against Islamists in northern Mali, Hollande took the opportunity to "express to Barack Obama and the Americans our gratitude" for what he described as "political, material and logistical support".

Biden reciprocated the sentiment, telling Hollande that he and Obama "applaud your decisiveness and the incredible competence and capability of your military forces".

At the beginning of the French operation, analysts and pundits speculated about trans-Atlantic tension over an alleged US reluctance to get involved in any way with another foreign intervention. But according to Herbert, Biden and Hollande were genuine in their mutual acknowledgement and there is no evidence of France feeling miffed by the US refusal to put "boots on the ground" in Mali.

"This was not just a diplomatic thank-you," Herbert assessed. "In the end, the US has thrown a lot of support behind France, in terms of intelligence and logistical aid. And Hollande has a sincere appreciation of the limitations of the possibilities of US intervention right now."

Biden pats Hollande on the head and says, "You did great, kiddo." If you're not convinced now that the US is behind the whole thing, you never will be.

Connect the dots, people, connect the dots...

The New York Times describes the "defining policy quandary of the Arab spring as how to square contradictory US impulses, including support for democratic change, a desire for stability, and wariness of Islamists who have become a potent political force". The Times identifies three US goals. What do you make of them?

Two of them are accurate. The United States is in favour of stability. But you have to remember what stability means. Stability means conformity to US orders. So, for example, one of the charges against Iran, the big foreign policy threat, is that it is destabilising Iraq and Afghanistan. How? By trying to expand its influence into neighbouring countries. On the other hand, we "stabilise" countries when we invade them and destroy them.

(...) Concern about political Islam is just like concern about any independent development. Anything that's independent you have to have concern about, because it may undermine you. In fact, it's a little paradoxical, because traditionally the United States and Britain have by and large strongly supported radical Islamic fundamentalism, not political Islam, as a force to block secular nationalism, the real concern. So, for example, Saudi Arabia is the most extreme fundamentalist state in the world, a radical Islamic state. It has missionary zeal, is spreading radical Islam to Pakistan and funding terror. But it's the bastion of US and British policy. They've consistently supported it against the threat of secular nationalism from Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt and Abd al-Karim Qasim's Iraq, among many others. But they don't like political Islam because it may become independent.

The first of the three points, our yearning for democracy, that's about on the level of Joseph Stalin talking about the Russian commitment to freedom, democracy and liberty for the world. It's the kind of statement you laugh about when you hear it from commissars or Iranian clerics, but you nod politely, and maybe even with awe, when you hear it from their western counterparts.

As one Malian told me, the entire war in Mali can be explained by the battle between the Malian state, Tuareg separatists, and Algeria to wrest control of what some believe is one of the most geostrategically important locations on earth.

"There are only three points on earth with this geostrategic importance," said Hamadoun Dicko, a tour guide in northern Mali. "Tessalit is one of them. Whoever controls Tessalit controls the Sahara."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/04/tessalit-geostrategic-sahara-mali-tuareg