Welcome to European Tribune. It's gone a bit quiet around here these days, but it's still going.

An ill wind in Budapest

by DoDo Wed Mar 20th, 2013 at 05:37:28 AM EST

15 March is the day of the 1848 Revolution in Hungary, and (along with 23 October, day of the 1956 Revolution) a day of political rallies in recent years. On 15 March this year, however, a brutal cold spell with strong winds led to the cancellation of all protests. Only the main opposition event was then held two days later (yesterday on Sunday), with at most 20% of the attendance in October.

The topic du jour was the latest modification of the constitution, which made even Barroso's European Commission and fellow EPP national governments (whose only true bother a year ago was the threat to central bank independence) realise that Hungary's right-populist government's aim is to eliminate all checks & balances (now done) and cement its power permanently. The situation aint' rosy on other fronts, either: austerity measures spread misery while recession is deepening, and the democratic opposition is a mess. But I wonder how long it will take for government propaganda to produce blowback, especially considering the latest gaffes in connection with the cold spell.

[editor's note, by Migeru] Bumped ahead of Cyprus 3


What happened in the past five months? Here is a situation overview.

Hungary was in international news in the past week over the latest modifications of the constitution to eliminate further checks & balances. This begun already with the new constitution as adopted by ruling party Fidesz's two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2011 (inciting the biggest anti-government protests), so what were the latest about? The original strategy was to secure power beyond the current election cycle by taking over all levers of state power. This has now been achieved 100%, with the change at the helm of the central bank two weeks ago as the closing act. But for prime minister Viktor Orbán, the problem arose that some sidelined party members whom he put in these positions suddenly grew a spine (in particular over the issue of voter registration which was to be introduced as a voter suppression measure). So now the Constitutional Court can no longer stop laws, and the President of the (officially no more existing) Republic was sufficiently 'impressed' to sign the constitutional modification in spite of his publicly declared(!) belief that it contradicts the rest of the constitution.

The Orbán government also attracted international attention with its 'unorthodox' economic policies, including nationalisation, move towards active monetary policy, begging for credits in East Europe and Asia, and public works. Unfortunately, each of these is a twisted version of the original idea with a very different motivation (like 'public works' = forcing long-term unemployed to do the meanest and most pointless jobs), and the main theme is still brutal austerity with social cutbacks (producing poverty which led to unprecedented lines of hundreds of metres when the Hare Krishna movement began its charity winter warm food distribution in Budapest). The entirety of economic policy is a horrible mix of left- and right-wing ideas that cancel each other out (like the combination of Latin American-style extra taxes on multinationals and the ultra-neo-liberal flat tax), so it's unsurprising that last year recession kicked in and then accelerated (seasonally adjusted quarterly GDPs compared to the same period a year earlier, up to Q4/2012: -1.1%, -1.5%, -1.8%, -2.8%).

The sad thing is that the Orbán government's mess is a welcome occasion for neo-liberal economists, politicians and journalists to diss 'unorthodox' economic policy in general (for example, it was much reported recently that a university professor termed Orbán's system "the return of state socialism", heh). There is the (as yet unlikely) possibility of the Polish scenario, that is, a force advocating neo-liberalism openly winning low-turnout elections against a thoroughly discredited populist Right (the way Donald Tusk's PO defeated Jarosław Kaczyński's PiS in 2011).

GDP numbers don't determine poll numbers, however. While Fidesz is taking over formal institutions, what they view as the key tool to rule over people is communication, that is, pervasive and aggressive propaganda. This propaganda is becoming absurd on a Stalinist level: for example, throughout the now two years of austerity measures, the spin doctors and media sycopants looked for ways to call every new measure something other than "austerity" and explicitly claim that there is no austerity. Some other recent campaigns of note:

  • After the protests last October, the government started its 2014 election campaign early – with posters proclaiming that they "won't yield to the IMF!" Never mind that at the same time, they were negotiating with the IMF, and implemented social cutbacks and labour market 'reforms' familiar from the worst IMF 'cures'.
  • The austerity measures are also counter-balanced with measures meant to appear social, like a law that reduces energy costs by forcing utilities to cut prices. But what they did makes neither economic sense (utilities cut back on investment & maintenance) nor environmental sense (what about support for house insulation instead), and certainly isn't social: everyone gets a uniform small reduction (the same idea as flat tax), thus big consumers benefit most in absolute terms. Most people aren't stupid enough to buy this: a poll shows that two-thirds of the population realises that the costs will just hit them in other ways; however, for Fidesz, it's enough if the minority of remaining own voters buy it.
    But all of this was only intro; the actual piece of hair-raising propaganda I want to showcase is the signature collection Fidesz launched last week: it's for a petition calling on parliament (which they already control) to keep to this measure against foreign attacks. A petition to themselves!
    I think this particular operation can be explained in the terms of a recently leaked internal motivational video for Fidesz's campaign staff, which documented the (in theory illegal) get-out-the-vote drive prior to Fidesz's takeover of a former Socialist stronghold in local elections. In the video, a campaign manager explained that the real goal of door-to-door campaigning is to gather political orientation and commitment level data on all voters for the GOTV drive, and added that a failed referendum campaign a few years earlier had the same primary goal.
  • The cold spell on 14-15 March was predicted a week ahead and we could see on TV news what it did in Germany or Poland before arriving here. Yet, there were no active warnings by the government in the media and no advance preparation of men and machinery. But when total chaos arrived (thousands of cars stuck on the roads, 160 villages without electricity etc.), the government switched into top gear – in its proclamations that "we will rescue everyone". This peaked in a text message from the interior ministry to every single cell phone which read: "We help! Don't leave your motor vehicle! If your fuel ran out, sit into another motor vehicle!" This made no practical sense because in the end, for many people whose car got stuck, help took so long to arrive that they were better off walking away. Of course, the real aim was to tell the majority who was not stuck on the roads that Something Is Being Done, but it was a bit too transparent (leading to jokes on-line about people waiting for the arrival of that promised help in their garages).

For its part, the Socialist Party also began campaigning with posters contrasting Fidesz's 2010 election slogans with their actual policies. But the loudest opposition to government policies in the past few months came from students protesting plans for radical cutbacks in education, especially tertiary education, where the government broke Fidesz's election promise by introducing a tuition fee (voided only if the student signs a declaration that s/he won't seek a job abroad), and wants to reduce the number of publicly funded fellowships to a fraction. The government first tried to ignore the student protesters, then to demonise them, then to divide them.

It was also a group of mostly young people who staged the occupation of Fidesz's party headquarters on 7 March, in protest of the modification of the constitution. This ended in a tussle with pro-Fidesz "civilians" who later turned out to be members of a radical football fan club called upon by Fidesz's human resources man (the guy from the leaked video mentioned above). A week later, two dozen highschool students staged a flash protest on the steps of Parliament. Police slapped fines of about €200 on each of them.

As for the party landscape, the big picture remained the same as five months ago: Fidesz lost half of its 2010 voters but can still lead the race (which virtually guarantees a wide majority in parliament) with the support of just 20-25% of the voting-age population, while 40-50% won't choose a party (which by pollster experience effectively means that they won't vote). In October, the two main organisers of anti-government protests, Facebook group Milla (formed to defend press freedom) and union umbrella group Solidarity, allied with the think-tank of Orbán's predecessor as PM, Gordon Bajnai (a yuppie from the financial industry who led an IMF-faithful "expert" government...) in a call for democratic opposition parties to form a common platform. But the end result was only more splintering:

  • MSzP, the Hungarian Socialists (supported by 12-14% of the voting-age population and still the party with the best-organised foot soldiers) would rather aim for a 2018 victory than cede their primacy on the left, and thus let talks run nowhere. But, although they dared to make poverty a campaign theme and got rid of the pro-austerity former PM, the current leadership is uninspiring and unconvincing and indeed they picked up few voters since the 2010 election loss.
  • LMP, the Hungarian greens, split over the issue of opposition alliance. Differences between the younger urbanite liberal greens and the older rural social-conservative conservationists festered for some time, then the charismatic leader of the latter (who just hates Socialists and long championed a totally unrealistic strategy of pulling away Fidesz's current voters) engineered a party leadership vote to exclude any alliance a priori. The defeated party wing left to form its own party.
  • After the failure of the opposition alliance drive, in February, Gordon Bajnai announced the establishment of a new party using the name of his alliance with the civic groups. Milla then announced that they are organisationally no part of it and will continue as NGO. (It's still a question how much influence Solidarity, greens, Milla members and smaller groups will have on Bajnai's future line on the economy, but sadly my impression is that Solidarity leaders are naive suckers when it comes to macro-economics.) But the momentum was already lost; the alliance-to-be-party (which started at the Socialists' level and temporarily reduced inactivism) dropped towards the 5% margin.

Meanwhile, right behind the Socialists, far-right youth party Jobbik still gets around 10% of the voting-age population. This party won't hold back in criticising austerity, alongside causing further scandals with impunity by inciting hatred against Roma, Jews, gays, or just about anyone. A recent major scandal associated with the party concerned the leaked Excel lists of new students kept by the official student organisation at the main university for the humanities in Budapest. This student organisation was known to serve as incubator for Jobbik functionaries. As I reported, the confidential lists had a column characterising each student in terms of suspected political persuasion, race/religion and (in case of girls) sexual morals, in the ugliest racist–male chauvinist tone possible. The new development on this front is that stickers appeared on the doors of several professors, proclaiming: "Jews! The university belongs to us Hungarians, not to you!" Meanwhile, Fidesz is still in competition with Jobbik for its voters, and the latest episode in this was a government cultural award for a Fidesz-faithful anti-Semitic 'journalist'. The minister who handed over the award claimed that he regretted it when learning more about the guy afterwards, but supposedly he had no means to retract the award...

As mentioned above, some half of the electorate is a potential non-voter, and from personal experience I think almost all of them are disillusioned of politicians (or wary of ugly disputes with fanatic colleagues, friends & relatives) to the extent that they don't want to deal with politics at all (except cursing "all of them"). But even most of those who'd vote are inactive in all other ways, not even willing to go to a protest or sign a petition (in fact I think I'm the only one in my circle of acquaintances, ecepting some far-right colleagues...), much less join an NGO or launch a solidarity strike. I think much of it is down to a lower level of civic consciousness than in older democracies (and a surviving subject consciousness from dictatorships), an attitude that only bothers with issues directly affecting one and seeks to get by by avoiding conflicts with the powers-that-be.

Above I only spoke about voters in Hungary. However, the picture isn't complete without considering ethnic Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, who have been offered double citizenship and thus the right to vote. Although most of these people were offended enough by the Orbán government's attitude to treat them as mere pawns and vote for their original autonomous parties rather than Orbán's faithful vassals and puppets (in particular in Romania), there are still hundreds of thousands of votes to win. Fidesz's campaign for that new electorate is in full swing.

The double citizenship led to mayor conflict with Slovakia over the past three years, but fortunately there have been no major tussles on that front in recent months.However, there is now conflict with Romania, where the situation is complicated by Romania's domestic politics: the stand-off between the centre-left–centre-right coalition government of PM Victor Ponta (which won the parliamentary elections in December) and right-populist President Traian Băsescu (back in office after the Ponta camp's failed attempt to remove him from office and up for re-election in 2014). Although Băsescu is no stranger to chauvinism himself, Orbán formed a strategic relationship with him, thus for Ponta's side, attacks on the Orbán government offer an opportunity to woo nationalist voters and undermine the President.

Things came to head over the issue of the flag of the Székely people (a Hungarian-speaking minority now almost universally considered a sub-group of ethnic Hungarians). A Romanian prefect defied court rulings by ordering local governments to not fly the flag. This conflict was ultimately resolved by the removal of the prefect, but that didn't keep a Fidesz leader from upping the campaign for the Transylvanian vote in early March by calling on local authorities in Hungary proper to fly the Székely flag in solidarity. This led to strong diplomatic protests from the Ponta government. Unlike some earlier conflicts with Slovakia, this conflict appears to me to be more smoke than fire (with both sides doing election campaign), but such situations can escalate beyond control.


All in all, the current situation with lots of inactives and a divided opposition would imply that Orbán could continue the construction of his democratorship/dictacy after 2014, save for the potential effects of continued economic misery. However, if recession does eventually change the political picture, there is no guarantee that it will be the democratic opposition parties who'll gain.

Display:
Here are some photos I made yesterday.

As told in the diary, only Milla staged a delayed protest, none of the parties tried to hold a substitute rally. Thus this time, there was no far-right 'counter-protest', either. But on my way, I saw a sticker of one of the right-of-Jobbik slinters, the 'Hungarian National Front' (the red/whitr striped flag is based on the far-right's Árbád-stripes flag, the outline is a guy holding a Kalashnikov, the slogan is: "Order, Power, Honour!" – as of now they represent none.)

One of the main university complexes in Budapest is a few hundred metres from the protest site. In front of it, there was this switchbox with a graffiti of independent student organisation HaHa:

Due to construction works, the Milla protest was at a different location than usual. But this location is symbolic of something, too: the shield-like roof on the right of the stage belongs to Budapest's still unfinished Metro Line 4, which was already scandalously long delayed and over budget under the previous government, but Fidesz's revenge on Budapest (even after the Fidesz candidate became major) included causing a work stoppage. The crowd was maybe 5,000 people.

The first 'speaker' was a Pinochet impersonator.

This set the frame for the sober mood during the next speakers who described the spreading misery in their sectors (there was a social worker, a feminist, a teacher, a student, and a Roma activist), a mood that wasn't lifted by the failure of the opposition alliance idea (although this time the Socialists came with prominently displayed flags) and the weather (the wind became strong again at the time of sunset and I shivered in a thick winter coat). Most speakers mentioned the modification of the constitution. One new idea that came up was parliament and election boycott, but the same parties who were more bothered about each other than the government power grab are unlikely to go that route.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Mon Mar 18th, 2013 at 04:53:33 PM EST
I realise there are few details in the diary about the austerity measures that spread misery. So here is one example, based on an article in Népszabadság: going after the disabled.

The Orbán government's main method of selling austerity measures is to vilify their victims. In this case, the disablement benefits scheme had to be overhauled because of supposedly rampant cheating by fake disabled people. But the real government intent of cost reductions on the back of the needy was made clear by setting a target for reductions: 190 billion Forints (€620 million) from mid-2011 until the end of this year. However, so far only 17 billion Ft was saved, because most people reviewed kept their benefits, 'only' about one in seventy lost his or her. But many of those aren't fakers, either, but victims of arbitrary new rules. For example, receiving disablement benefit is linked to a certain number of days worked in the five years prior to turning disabled – long-term unemployed or young people who just found a new job are left out in the cold. Now, what is the government's reaction? They are displeased about the failure to achieve the envisioned savings – and now want to turn the screw again.

According neo-liberal conventional wisdom, those receiving disablement benefits, unemployment benefits or pensions are all classes of dependable people whose numbers have to be reduced or else the economy dies due to shrinking workforce. But where are those jobs for people kicked off benefits or not allowed to retire supposed to come from? In Hungary's example, while the Orbán government went after everyone on benefits and continued to implement the previous government's plan to raise retirement ages, even official unemployment is growing. In February, about 20% more people were looking for a job than 12 months earlier.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Fri Mar 22nd, 2013 at 03:57:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Why is the Hungarian opposition so useless? Do they feel that what Fidesz is doing isn't that bad really, or are they just incompetent?

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Mon Mar 18th, 2013 at 07:44:50 PM EST
Incompetent, divided, still under the shadow of the failure of pre-2010 governments, and delusional.

The last bit could be counted as part of incompetence, but I separate it out to cover views of Fidesz, by which I mean both an over-estimation of chances for electoral gain from the Orbán government's mess and an under-estimation of what further steps the Orbán government is ready for (for example, the latest constitutional changes took them completely by surprise). Which shouldn't be the case, especially for the Socialists, who regularly face threats of legal disruption and under-the-belt attacks in parliament (for example, in the parliamentary debate about the total government failure to prepare for and deal with the cold spell, Fidesz MPs told Socialist MPs to shut up if there are no blisters on their hands from shovelling snow).

Divisions over personal, tactical and ideological issues are significant. In a normal democracy, it would be natural for the constituents of the current opposition to fight each other. In Romania, where President Traian Băsescu conducted another, though less wide power grab and constitutional re-arrangement, it took years for two main parties (the traditional centre-right of the National Liberals and the post-reformed-communist Social Democrats) to build a unified front that could then beat Băsescu's minions.

(The above reminded me to add two paragraphs at the end of the diary about the complex relationship with Romania.)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 05:04:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm so sorry for what you and your countrymen are going through.

Are you able to leave if things get too hairy ? Would DB give you a job ?

keep to the Fen Causeway

by Helen (lareinagal at yahoo dot co dot uk) on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 04:50:39 AM EST
I'm among the fortunate few who'd be able to leave but didn't yet, but by my terms of when "things get too hairy", I'd rather join some partisans.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 05:07:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Thanks for an informative, if understandably downbeat update.

One thing that strikes me, especially, is how Hungary's crisis from 2006 onwards was almost harbinger of things to come. It was already at a social/economic/political impasse from - I would say - about 2003, with the first Draskovics package, and which subsequent international factors have only served to exacerbate. It's almost as if the welfare state economy offered by Medgyessy before the 2002 election posed some kind of massive existential threat. In the lobotomised world of Hungarian politics, any future in which the populace aren't forced into all sorts of mild corruption, cadging or wheeler-dealing simply to stay afloat, represents the most awful dystopia.

I'm a little bit hopeful about PM (Dialogue for Hungary) as I believe these are some of the more capable figures in the opposition... the funny thing is, I often feel there is a Scandinavian-style social democracy struggling to emerge from all of this, with all the convulsions and pains of giving birth to something to which most people would welcome. Such an unpromising global situation, such a depleted Hungarian talent base... and the economy simply doesn't provide any life support for this.

"Fascism is not in itself a new order of society. It is the future refusing to be born." Nye Bevan

by car05 on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 03:01:48 PM EST
Welcome to EuroTrib, and thanks for the interesting comment!
by Zwackus on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 06:50:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Welcome back: he is not a newbie, he posted on my earlier Hungary-themed diaries and had diaries of his own :-)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 07:14:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The EU is supposed to be a Union of democracies and an attempt to prevent a recurrence of fascism or communism. However has the EU set down any minimum standards for what constitutes a democracy and has there been any attempt by the EU or EP, at any level, to influence what is happening to civil and political rights in Hungary?

In other words, is the EU ultimately irrelevant in all of this or is it playing a significant role for good or ill?

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 04:58:48 PM EST
The EU plays multiple ambiguous roles in this.
  • The Commission did strongly criticise some key legal changes 15 months ago, and threatened to launch infringement proceedings. This did force Fidesz into significant concessions, in particular regarding the central bank, which seemed to be the priority of the Commission. But then that was it. It may start again, though, after this (also here).
  • The EP is louder on the issue, but powerless. Still, their calls for getting serious with infringement proceedings, ultimately leading to the suspension of EU payouts to Hungary, may be heeded. In the EP, previously, the EPP tried to sabotage a wider criticism of Orbán's policies. However, now that conservative governments are miffed, too, EPP MEPs may change tune, too.
  • In Fidesz's propaganda, while general Euroscepticism and cursing at 'commands from Brussels' did appear, up until now, every effort was made to paint all criticism from the EU as an ideologically motivated leftist campaign, ignoring that some of the harshest critics, namely Commissioners Neelie Kroes and Viviane Reding, weren't leftist. But now even Merkel voiced (muted) criticism and Reding is louder than Martin Schulz, thus this fantasy can't be maintained for much longer.
  • On the other hand, whatever the EU will do will be too late too little and no substitute for active domestic opposition. Among supporters of the current democratic opposition, I sense a widespread illusory hope that 'the EU' will eventually step in and put an end to this. But you just have to look at Greece to measure Commission and Council commitment to democracy.


*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 07:12:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Thanks. I suspect it would take "tanks in the streets" before the EU got serious about this. In the meantime any threats to EU Treaties/policies may result in warning noises. I suspect and regret that real change will depend on democratic opposition forces acting almost without any support - until prominent people start getting killed...

I wouldn't underestimate the power of opposition figures lobbying EP parliamentarians directly via email/social media about what is happening and keeping a daily newsflow coming out of Hungary. Many EP members will be quite supportive on human rights issues regardless of their economic ideological leanings.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Tue Mar 19th, 2013 at 07:23:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's not like that's not being done. For the previous round of EU attention to Hungary, read EP vs. Fidesz-Hungary: Not Lost in Translation, and the comment with the naming and shaming of EPP MEPs in the 18 January 2012 EP debate.

I also forgot to link to this; but a better summary of early March EU reactions is below:

Hungary throws down gauntlet to EU | European Voice

...Thorbjørn Jagland, the secretary-general of the Council of Europe, has said that some of the amendments introduced today reintroduce legal provisions annulled by the constitutional court.

He said last Wednesday (6 March) that the return of these clauses endangered "the fundamental principle of checks and balances in a democracy".

His declaration prompted José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, to call and write to Orbán on Friday. The United States also said on Friday that the amendments - now approved - could threaten "the principles of institutional independence".

...No leading EU politician or official has explicitly called for EU to be stripped of its voting rights in the EU's institutions, though Swoboda said that the EU might need "to make use of all measures available".

Four foreign ministers - from Germany, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands - on Wednesday (7 March) said that the European Union needed a "a new and more effective mechanism to safeguard fundamental values in member states is needed".



*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Wed Mar 20th, 2013 at 06:39:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Western democracies (on both sides of the Atlantic) have traditionally backed any tinpot, fascist dictator as long as the banks stayed open for investors and the borders stayed open for trade.
by rifek on Tue Apr 9th, 2013 at 08:47:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Great diary...and so scary...

Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind...Albert Einstein
by vbo on Wed Mar 20th, 2013 at 09:33:43 AM EST
I wonder about the winds from Budapest and how they may be sweeping down the streets in Romania, Greece, and Japan.  All of these countries seem to be picking up threads the Fascists and militarists had to drop since their defeat in WWII.  The "legal" hollowing out of Hungary's democratic institutions may be a blueprint for other ambitious power grabbers all around the world.

Glad that Krugthullu has been keeping an eye on the Hungarian situation because I haven't seen anyone else in the US media pay any attention.

Solar IS Civil Defense

by gmoke on Wed Mar 20th, 2013 at 07:48:54 PM EST
How wretched is Hungary economy? Is forint holding up?

A combination of amateurism and pandering to a small oligarchy has created a homegrown economic, political, and social crisis in Hungary, Gordon Bajnai, a former prime minister who leads the Together 2014 party, said on Sunday.

EU statistics show a poverty rate of 13% in Hungary, but the figure falls far short of revealing the depths of desperation plaguing some communities.

In a 2012 report Hungary's National Health Institute revealed that over 14% of Hungarian children suffer from malnutrition.

The situation is most alarming in the northeast, where for many families, going hungry is the norm.

Nationally, unemployment runs at around 11%, but in the northeast it is over 30%, and reaches 80 or even 100% in the most remote villages, such as Gemzse.


 
by das monde on Mon Mar 25th, 2013 at 01:00:38 PM EST
The poverty in the north-east is mostly not Orbán's doing but the long-term effect of the collapse of heavy industry after 1990. Of course, the Orbán government did nothing to alleviate the situation, and aggravated poverty with his war on social benefits, especially in that region. The Hunger March I reported on last year (which BTW was repeated this year, meeting similar government counter-measures) originated there.

As for the Forint, check for example here. As you can see, the Forint is taking another dive.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Mon Mar 25th, 2013 at 02:56:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]


Display:
Go to: [ European Tribune Homepage : Top of page : Top of comments ]

Top Diaries