As far as I can see, direct military rule will not work. That was what Mubarak had, and it broke when officers on the ground did not agree to crush the people at Tahrir.

Can't really see a civil war looming either, that takes at least two sides with guns.

My best guess would be a series of short lived governments until either an Egyptian government finds a patron with big enough pockets, international economy turns around or a coalition is formed between different elements that can pull of at least a partial redistribtuion (which includes a scale from Putin to Lenin).

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

Egypt's 2nd people's revolution was a necessary adjustment to President Morsi's doing his MB party's bidding and alienated large masses of the population. Funds dried up ...

Read some of my diaries @BooMan Tribune ...

Egypt to receive $4bn in aid from Kuwait

CAIRO, Egypt (DailyNewsEgypt) - Kuwait, the oil-rich US ally, has announced an aid package of $4bn to Egypt, a day after neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia pledged a total of $8bn in aid, one week after the ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi.

According Kuwait's official news agency, KUNA, $2bn of the package will be in the form of deposit to the Central Bank of Egypt, while $1bn will be offered as a non-refundable grant. The Gulf state will also provide cash-strapped Egypt with fuel and petroleum products worth $1bn, KUNA's report said.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia announced that Egypt will receive an $8bn aid package; the KSA will contribute with $5bn and UAE will offer $3bn. Saudi's aid will be divided to $1bn cash, $2bn for petroleum products and another $2bn deposit. The UAE will contribute a $1bn grant and $2bn interest-free deposit with the central bank.

Several businesses have launched the 306306 "Support Egypt" campaign, announced in a statement issued by the central bank on 7 July. Contributions to these bank accounts were not limited to businessmen; several syndicates have also showcased their support by providing donations.

McCain calls Morsi ouster a coup d'etat, would block the U.S. sending $1.5bn annual aid

Arrest warrants for MB Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie and nine others for incitement deadly clashes

See my recent diaries:


• Obama Administration Backed Muslim Brotherhood
  
• The MB Axis Egypt - Turkey - Qatar Faces Defeat

First off was the attempt by Al-Jazeera to push an interesting narrative, that this was a coup sponsored by the US.  However, their efforts have been pretty widely panned due to the fact that their evidence is based on a logical fallacy.  The US government had sent money to some pro-democracy, anti-Mubarak activists before the uprising.  Those same people are now in the new, post-Morsi government.  So, obviously, the US sponsored it.

By several accounts, the credibility of Al-Jazeera in Arabic has been seriously damaged as a result, though it has been suffering pretty consistently since the old new director was forced out and replaced with a member of the Qatari royal family.

I read another rather interesting article on Morsi and his flaws by an Egyptian activist, whose main point was really about the hardening us vs. them attitude in the pro- and anti- camps, and how neither side is willing to talk, or even acknowledge the existence of evidence that goes against their preferred narrative.  Nothing new in the history of world events, I suppose, but it was an interesting discussion.

Finally, I also read a piece by another Egyptian, this time an academic I think, whose basic argument was that Morsi was not simply incompetent and tone deaf, but that the Muslim Brotherhood was sufficiently insular at the top (especially after purging the majority of its youth leaders 5 or 6 years ago, many of whom are involved in the anti-Morsi protests now - according to yet another article I can't source) that a move towards proper authoritarianism, if not fascism, was quite plausible given his moves towards the end.  

In the Grenadian case, the majority of New Jewel supporters at the time of the putsch led by Bernard Coard were supporters of Bishop and wanted his killers thrown out; those who had supported the New Jewel overthrow of the Gairy regime but wanted a transition to Democracy wanted Coard clique gone as the worst of the New Jewel leader, and of course the old Gairy supporters had been praying to the heavens to be rescued from the New Jewel government for five years. And that was in rough terms a third of the adult population each.

Cobbling some working majority together between the secularist minority, the progressive wing of the Islamic Youth movement, the continuing supporters of the Islamic Brotherhood, those who fell away from the Islamic Brotherhood over incompetence and corruption, and those who never supporters or who fell away from the Islamic Brotherhood for being insufficiently hardline may well prove an impossible task for years to come.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

After discussing current Brotherhood tactics which include continuing an occupation of Rabaa Square, gradually escalating Brotherhood rhetoric and "to adjust the PR message and the sit-in from being "pro-Morsi" to being "anti-military coup" and "pro-democracy" Bassem Sabry moves to the more important question:

Is the reinstatement of Morsi still a possibility or even desirable for the Brotherhood?

 Theoretically, two broad scenarios exist for Morsi's return. The first is through massive international pressure, which is growing less likely as more and more of the international community seem to have accepted the new reality (even Doha) and are keen to move pragmatically forward. US Deputy Secretary Of State William Burns visited in Egypt (where, notably, the Salafi Nour Party and Tamarod declined to meet him). But even if that did work, there would be resistance from the military, which has wide public support, especially since the public  is also quite increasingly distrustful of the international community and the United States, and amid local portrayals of the Brotherhood being an ally of an unpopular US administration.

This would lead, in turn, to Egypt growing more isolated internationally but generously supported by the Gulf, and even rendering extraordinary measures by the authorities against the Brotherhood and Morsi easier to undertake. The second way is through massive, overwhelming popular protests that dwarf June 30, coupled by a split or internal pressure in the military, or both. Both seem unlikely. A split in the military could lead to widespread civil upheaval that could end up further reinforcing a military grip on power or push Egypt off the cliff. The best scenario would be a referendum on Morsi's return to power or immediate presidential elections, both of which Morsi would almost definitely lose, further stripping him and the Brotherhood of clout and claims to broad support. It would generally be wiser for Morsi not to stand for elections again, not only because of the slim chance of victory but also to allow the Brotherhood and Islamists in general a fuller chance at better rehabilitating their image.

But even if Morsi did forcibly return to power, there would also almost be no chance of him going on without neutralizing all pockets of resistance. That would mean most of the leadership in the military and the police, much of the judiciary (those three being of substantial current popularity), virtually all predominant private media, the state bureaucracy, an even more fierce opposition, all potentially coupled with a volcanic public uprising likely larger than June 30, and more. It would seem impossible to confront it all without effectively bringing down the Egyptian state in a Samson-like manner, likely ending in either a second ousting of Morsi or Egypt descending into chaos.