El conductor del accidente de Santiago: "¡Somos humanos, somos humanos!" | Política | EL PAÍS

Uno de los maquinistas del tren Alvia que descarriló ayer en Santiago de Compostela quedó atrapado tras el accidente en la cabina del convoy. A través de la radio con la que se comunica con la estación, cuando aún no sabía siquiera si había fallecidos, hizo un relato de lo que acababa de suceder. Expresó que le dolía la espalda y las costillas y que no podía salir. "¡Somos humanos! ¡Somos humanos!", repetía. "Espero que no haya muertos porque caerán sobre mi conciencia". El conductor dijo que el tren había tomado la curva a 190 kilómetros por hora; después habló de 200, pero luego volvió a decir que, al entrar en la curva, el tren iba a 190 kilómetros por hora, según explicaron ayer a EL PAÍS fuentes de la investigación.

Las señales ferroviarias de la zona del siniestro no permiten sobrepasar los 80 kilómetros por hora, pero el conductor no precisó por qué el tren circulaba al doble de esa velocidad. Si se trató de un fallo técnico o de un fallo humano es algo que tendrá aún que determinarse en la investigación de las causas del siniestro. Pero, a tenor de lo expuesto por el conductor, el tren, que venía de circular a una gran velocidad --superando los 200 kilómetros por hora--, no frenó lo suficiente y duplicó la velocidad permitida en una curva muy complicada y muy cerrada. Fue justo en ese lugar y en ese momento cuando el tren acabó descarrilando y provocando decenas de muertos.

One of the drivers, stuck in the cabin after the accident, said on the radio connection with the station that the train was going at 190 km/h, when the normal speed limit is 80 km/h.

Video should be online after the programme is over.

This and the ongoing Barcenas mess.... certainly looks like Rajoy could easily be replaced by his deputy Saez Santamaria.  The present looks a lot the scandals that brought down PSOE for a decade in the 1990s.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

Estas fuentes indicaron que no existe en toda la red española otro tramo en el que se obligue a los trenes a bajar de 200 a 80 kilómetros por hora de velocidad. Esta drástica reducción de la velocidad se ve además agravada por el hecho de que la operación está "desastrosamente mal señalizada" con dos señales de Asfa Analógico, un cartel indicador y un libro de abordo, lo que deja en las exclusivas manos del maquinista la realización de un frenado muy drástico sin ofrecer ningún soporte tecnológico alternativo para evitar las fatales consecuencias de un error humano.

...

El presidente de Adif, Gonzalo Ferre, en declaraciones a la Agencia Efe ha mantenido una postura completamente diferente, que coincide con la de su portavoz oficial. Señala que en los cuatro kilómetros fatídicos no se puede contar con una señalización distinta del Asfa Analógio, y que además, esta es más que adecuada.

...

Pese a la información oficial ofrecida por Adif de que las balizas de vía del Asfa Digital están todavía en desarrollo, todas las fuentes consultadas han corroborado que este sistema está plenamente operativo como sistema de apoyo en todas las líneas de alta velocidad, en el Corredor Mediterráneo y en muchos tramos de la propia línea entre Madrid y A Coruña, donde se produjo el siniestro.

[Engineering] sources pointed out that in the Spanish network there is no other point requiring trains to slow down from 200 to 80km/h. This drastic speed reduction is made worse by the fact that the operation is "disastrously badly signalled" by two analog ASFA signals, an indication sign, and the driver's handbook, which leaves in the hands of the driver the execution of a drastic braking without offering any alternate technological support to avoid the fatal consequences of a human error.

...

The CEO of ADIF, Gonzalo Ferre, speaking to Agencia Efe has kept a contrary position, consistent with that of his official spokesperson. He claims int he fatal 4km no signalling different from analog ASFA is available and, moreover, this is more than adequate.

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Despite the information given by ADIF that digital ASFA beacons are in development, all sources consulted comfirmed that this system is fully operational as a support system in all high-speed lines, on the Mediterranean Corridor, and in many segments to the line between Madrid and A Coruña itself, where the accident took place.

"What a blast it would be to go parallel with the Guardia Civil [Spanish police] and go past them triggering the radar. Haha what a fine for Renfe [Spanish rail operator] haha," he allegedly wrote.

speed junkie?

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

The short news I caught later invariably blamed the locomotive driver only, as if a proper train control system shouldn't have prevented it. However, neither the line nor the train were normal, and I think I can add/correct details in the diary with these:

• The Ourense–Santiago line is an isolated section of the Madrid–Galicia high-speed line (with the parts in-between in construction) which was temporarily opened with reduced-spec infrastructure: broad-gauge tracks (prepared for fast re-gauging), lower top speed and consequently scaled-down train control systems. (Also see my recent overview of the state of Spain's high-speed network.)
  
• The train is not a conventional train upgraded to run on high-speed track, but a version of an existing gauge-changing semi-high-speed train which got an additional car housing a diesel motor, so that it can travel on the non-electrified old line between Olmedo and Ourense. It was a quick fix solution built and put into operation very fast, pointing to a less than thorough certification, which made me think of the possibility of multiple brake failure, but lack of ERTMS/ETCS certification is a much simpler consequence.

Better late than never. Now we'll see what the outcome of the court case is. The driver shouldn't be assigned full responsibility for the crash.

Indeed.

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

There is an 80km stretch between Ourense and Santiago where ERTMS is deployed. However, RENFE has not certified the system for the Alvia in that section, as confirmed by ADIF desite the fact that Avant middle-distance trains on the sameline do use it. RENFE, asked by this paper, did not clarify why 13 months after hybrid Alvia started rolling there they still don't have that safety.

I found they gave an explanation later:

RENFE elaborates on ERTMS L1 problems with Alvia between Ourense and Santiago | ERTMS News

President of RENFE, Julio Gómez-Pomar, elaborated on the ERTMS problems of Alvia. He says that "on the hybrid trains S730 (formerly S130) we started to install the more advanced version of ERTMS. On the Madrid-Galicia line there are two sections that have ERTMS: Madrid-Olmedo (Valladolid) and Ourense-Santiago. When we started testing we saw that there were problems on both sections which we call transition failures: ERTMS ordered a brake intervention when the system was not supposed to do so. On the section Madrid-Olmedo the problem was eventually solved and the trains work fine with ERTMS now. But on the Ourense-Santiago section the problem persisted. We talked to the suppliers Bombardier to fix the problem. In the mean time, Adif authorized to disconnected ERTMS on that section and use ASFA to a maximum speed of 200 km/h. This is normal procedure.

Gah, so it was not strictly a problem of the hybrid train, but teething problems of [the software of?] the ETCS equipment programmed for the latest upgrade of the standard. (At any rate, it doesn't look like running on ETCS would have prevented the disaster on the non-ETCS section.)

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}