The problems with Turkey's candidacy are multiple and bilateral : racism/islamophobia on the part of certain EU governments ("these people aren't Europeans"); and then Erdogan's voluntary divergence from the convergence criteria, which rendered the candidacy moot, until such time as Turkish electors decide otherwise.

Ukraine doesn't have either of those obstacles; they are pretty much universally seen as European by other Europeans; and current and future Ukrainian governments will be pretty determined in meeting the criteria (that is, in becoming better-aligned with EU practices and values than Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria etc).

_{It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II}

EU member nations need to have settled borders (the still-unsettled[?] border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia notwithstanding; their adhesion in those conditions represents an uncomfortable precedent).

However, Ukraine's borders are not under dispute; certain parts of its internationally-recognised territory are under occupation (the same is true of fellow candidate Moldavia). That is an entirely different proposition.

Yes, one imagines that there will be a border revision after some far-off international conference. This will need to take place before Ukraine can actually join the EU; it's not reasonable to make it a precondition to candidature.

_{It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II}

I'm also not entirely on board with your assessment of Ukraine's inability to regain territory.

The unequal artillery battle is the main obstacle, because in other respects they seem to be frankly better than the Russians. It's tiresome to hear Zelenskiy endlessly repeating "we need more long-range artillery", but it's the military reality.

And as they are currently running out of Soviet era ordnance for the artillery they have (this will eventually become a problem for the Russians too, given the volume they are sending over), things could evolve quite quickly either way.

Overall, the Russians are so desperate to capture the last square centimetres of Luhansk oblast that the Ukrainians are able to make small gains elsewhere. And it's clear that they are never going to achieve their Novorossiya project (of which Odessa is an important part) unless there is a major game changer.

_{It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II}

Military expert:

And I will also tell you, Richard, there's no way that the Ukrainians will ever have enough combat power to kick the Russians out of Ukraine as well, and so what does that look like in the end game.

Is it the same kind of experts who predicted that Kiev/Kyiv would be taken in less than a week and that Russia would occupy the whole Eastern half of Ukraine?
(Asking for a friend)

Joke apart, wars are extremely difficult to predict (especially when it's about the future); also, things don't always move in a linear fashion: unexpected can happen.

Russia denies Ukrainian claims that they were pushed off Snake Island

The message that the ministry has forwarded says that Russia withdrew from the island because "the object is indeed of strategic importance, but at the moment it has fulfilled its role of controlling the airspace."

The message goes on to say that "given the constant attacks of the armed forces of Ukraine, large resources were spent on its retention. It is an island of a volcanic type, on which there is practically no vegetation and shelters, and it is difficult to keep it in conditions of open confrontation. At the same time, the Russian garrison successfully withstood several attacks."

It then says "the decision was made to remove the garrison from the island in order to avoid losses."

Nuance...

_{It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II}