by Oui
Sat Jan 18th, 2025 at 06:18:46 PM EST
Sure why not ... the crazies are roaming in Western capitals ...
The North Sea Flood in 1953 was the worst environmental disaster in The Netherlands in the 20th century, but it had an unexpected side effect. This event led to an unprecedented rate of development in the region which positively benefitted the region, and led to one of the modern wonders of the world: the Delta Works.
I do have memories of that particular storm as we lived on the coast behind the dunes and got the full force of the hurricane strength storm.
Read an article today that the screening will need to be expanded to everyone ... not a specific group of students and researchers from foreign countries. The intended law may be seen by the EU as "discriminatory". Can't make this up ... beyond 1984.
NATO colludes with Israeli intelligence NSO Pegasus
Blacklisted: Israeli spyware firm NSO faces sanctions, lawsuits | The Listening Post - Al Jazeera |
Counter-productive, the new coalition with leadership of PVV leader Geert Wilders will cut in the budget of higher education and research ...
'New knowledge security screening is counterproductive' | TU Delft - 30 May 2023 |
After two years of research, science journalist Saar Slegers is concerned about a knowledge security law that will take effect in 2025. "There are huge practical obstacles."
In the five-part 'Vriend of Vijand' (Friend or Foe, Human/VPRO broadcasting corporation, in Dutch) podcast series, science journalist and former Delta editor Saar Slegers is examining the predicaments behind the Dutch knowledge security policy and the impact that the policy will have on individual scientists. Among the people she talks to are Dutch and Iranian scientists, policy officers, people from the intelligence services, and Minister Dijkgraaf of the Ministry of Education. He is working on a new bill for the screening of knowledge security that will take effect in January 2025. It targets researchers from outside the European Union who want to work with sensitive knowledge. Delta spoke to Slegers about her new podcast and TU Delft's knowledge security policy.
Why did you want to make this podcast?
"The seed was planted after a conversation with a researcher of Iranian heritage in the Netherlands. He - or better said, his subject group - were suddenly subjected to screening in relation to links with Iran's rocket programme. He did not have any links, but was shocked by having to undergo the screening. While he had lived in the Netherlands for 10 years and had a Dutch passport, it came across as threatening enough that he did not feel welcome here anymore. He now works as an academic in the United States. I wanted to know about the policy that lay behind this."
You have worked on this podcast for about two years. What is the most important issue that you unearthed in this time?
"There are actually two issues. The first is how confrontational it is for an academic if he/she is suddenly seen as a security risk because of his/her nationality and must undergo a screening. Knowledge security affects people very directly.
'I had to earn the trust of people along the way'
Academics sometimes live in stress for months wondering if they can keep their jobs, they feel that are being looked at strangely at universities, and are unsure about what they are being evaluated on. A minor detail can work against them. At the same time, I came to understand that the academic values with which I developed as an academic journalist, such as the open sharing of knowledge and freedom of education, are not as universal as I had always assumed. Countries such as China have different types of policy values. You need to understand this as an academic."
Minister Plasterk: I Had No Snooping Idea We Did It by Oui Wed Feb 5th, 2014
[In the same month the United States would force a coup d'état during the Maidan Revolution and massacre - making Russia a pariah state]
Dutch government, not NSA involved in snooping De Volkskrant | Feb. 5, 2014 |
Minister of the Interior Plasterk hasn't got a notion which intelligence agency is collecting 1.8 million metadata of Dutch citizens' phone calls each month. In October on TV news broadcast [video], he got a wire from NSA directly, confirming they had collected this data. Today, Plasterk had to backtrack and made a statement, the Dutch military intelligence MIVD and AIVD were responsible through their unit called National Sigint Organisation (NSO).
Defense Minister Hennis (Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert) seems to concur, stating it was not against Dutch law for this data gathering and sharing it with the US super intelligence agency NSA. Dutch telephone subscribers are not part of this exchange. Similar to role of GCHQ and NSA.
AIVD warned the Dutch government about the risks of outsourcing wiretapping operations to Israel's Elbit Systems | 30 March 2022 |
In 2019 Cyber Intelligence, the Elbit Systems subsidiary, won the contract to replace Verint. Amid suggestions that The Netherlands was sold a system that didn't exist because it has in 2022 yet to be installed, this has not been the focus of criticism of the deal. focused on the willingness of the Dutch government to employ a company that manufactures prohibited armaments such as cluster bombs, and concerns that Elbit may conduct additional surveillance and eavesdropping activities on behalf of Israel.
It is a fact that Israeli security companies such as Elbit and NSO work together with the Israeli state. They always have. Any time such a company is able to sell its wares abroad it represents a win for Israel on multiple levels. On the one hand, it bolsters Israel's image as a global leader in the security field. More practically, as we have seen with NSO, the Israeli state knows where the software goes to and who uses it.
My own view is that it's probably easier for the Israeli government to gather information through the international activities of private companies like Elbit and NSO than through staging its own operations in foreign countries. In the Netherlands, Israel could be interested in monitoring activists involved in campaigns against Israeli and its policies, as well as lawyers participating in cases against Israeli officials in Dutch courts or the International Criminal Court in The Hague. I should add that this is a hypothesis rather than substantiated conclusion because it remains unproven and given the nature of such activities will probably remain so.
From my diary ...
Neocon wars and Trump's Abraham Accords ... EU states and NATO united with Israeli intelligence and defense community | 8 Jan 2024 |
My diary ...
Israel's Pegasus: The Secret Arm of Dutch Intelligence | 2 June 2022 |
Was not much of a secret to me looking at some remarkable achievements of both the "civil" AIVD and military MIVD ...
A single news item this evening grew into a diary ... talking human rights in the Western alliance ...
Karolinska Institutet - China research collaboration
How National Governments and Research Institutions Safequard Knowledge Development in Science and Technology | Leiden Asia Center |
This study provides an overview and comparative analysis of nine national approaches to strengthening knowledge security and the forces that drive them. The national approaches are those of Australia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States. They all have developed different approaches, depending on the national political context, geographical location, experiences with foreign interference and the level of internationalization of the higher education and research sector. The approaches vary in comprehensiveness, practicality, and the roles played by government actors and representatives of the higher education and research sector.
The study finds that coherence and practicality of measures, good coordination between the stakeholders involved, and government support for bottom-up activities by universities, are among the major factors that impact the effectiveness of an approach. The report concludes with best practices that the case studies offer; they include the promotion of international collaboration and coordination with regard to developing standards for research security, an approach that avoids securitization of international research collaboration, and the establishment of organizations that facilitate direct communication and coordination between the government and the higher education sector.
New Book: China's Public Diplomacy | Clingendael - 23 Jan 2015 |
Ingrid d'Hooghe
This book contributes to our understanding of China's rise and the country's place in the world by exploring how China seeks to improve its international image and advance its domestic and international agenda by conducting public diplomacy and engaging with audiences around the globe. Based on in-depth case studies, it provides a thorough analysis of the Chinese approach to public diplomacy, which is characterized by a long-term vision, a dominant role for the government, an inseparable and complementary domestic dimension, and a high level of interconnectedness with China's overall foreign policy and diplomacy.
Dutch Domestic Intelligence AIVD Early Warning - Year 2021
Year 2021 Annual Report Dutch National Intelligence (AIVD)
This annual report describes the threats to the national security of the Netherlands in 2021. But before we can talk about this, we have to take a moment to reflect upon what has happened since the start of 2022. The Russian invasion in Ukraine has brought war into Europe on a scale that is unprecedented for many people. Other threats might pale in comparison.
At the same time, the war sometimes throws already existing threats into sharp relief. For years, the AIVD, MIVD, and intelligence and security services of other countries have warned against cyber-attacks, espionage, the steady
development of weapons of mass destructions, and the intentions of state-sponsored actors with aggressive goals.
[Amazing: an event of 24 February 2022 prominently part of the AIVD report]
All of these points now coalesced into an armed conflict in Ukraine which has shaken Europe to its foundation and has enormous humanitarian and economic consequences. It is a sad reality that underscores the necessity of the work of the AIVD and MIVD.
In the Netherlands many of 2021's threats were linked to increasing disagreement and a hardening of society. Last year, the AIVD gained better insight into 'accelerationists': a new generation of young, right-wing extremists that glorify terrorist violence in online groups with the goal of unleashing chaos and race war in the Netherlands.
The AIVD also saw how some anti-government protest escalated to violent extremism. This was demonstrated by acts of sometimes public intimidation and people taking the law into their own hands, as well as (death) threats made against prominent politicians and others.
In 2021 Dutch citizens, companies, and authorities were continuously exposed to the threat of cyber-attacks by other countries. China and Russia are the forerunners in this. They have offensive cyber-programmes using large numbers of hackers to spy, steal knowledge, or prepare or carry out acts of sabotage.
Many threats in 2021 were a combination of national and international, digital and physical, and state-sponsored and non-state actors. This, carried by technology and digitalisation, raises new questions for society and for the AIVD. Such as the question whether the AIVD could play a role when crime has a harmful effect on the democratic legal order; in 2021 the AIVD started an exploratory investigation into this topic. Or the question when and how the AIVD could help combat the issue of large-scale ransomware cyber-attacks.
The current times require extensive cooperation with partners, on both a national and an international level. A good example of this is the close cooperation with the MIVD, including on the topic of Russia. It also requires the (technical) means to maintain a good intelligence position. Virtual agents, hacking operations, and cable interception played a large role in 2021.
A new, temporary law should enable the AIVD and MIVD to respond more effectively to cyber-threats, paired with adequate oversight and on a level with the dynamic nature of cyber-investigation. This law is currently in preparation. The Dutch people can rest assured that in this way the AIVD keeps guard over the national security of the Netherlands.
This also involves publicly reporting what we investigated for that purpose. In particular when war casts a shadow over free countries, it is important that within the democratic legal order a secret service is, wherever possible, an
open service.
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