by Oui
Tue Feb 18th, 2025 at 10:49:28 AM EST
My diary a long time ago ...
Lt. Col. Syrsky to Further UA War Debacle | 10 Feb. 2024 |
Aggression by the Pentagon and DARPA to integrate Ukraine into NATO
I don't agree with b @MoA ... the battle stalemate is more like two beaten dizzy boxers hanging in the ropes, just clobbering one another. War is damn stupid where diplomacy would have prevented this war with two sides would have been willing to listen to one another ... read the UN Charter about the quest for peace between neighbours. NATO is not a neighbour, but an asset of US military aggression.
What is DARPA doing in Ukraine?
DARPA, the Pentagon's high-tech office, is working with the government of Ukraine to develop capabilities to help Kiev in its hybrid warfare challenge.
- Killer robots have seen action in Ukraine since at least 2016. Here's a description of one such use in May 2017, from the Minsk Monitor.
Minsk Monitor.
DARPA director Steven Walker, who recently took over that job after five years as the agency's deputy, told reporters that he had personally visited the country in 2016 for talks with Ukrainian military, intel and industry leaders.
The NATO led proxy war in Ukraine against Russia to test their new weapons in a live ammo experiment ... bloodshed to prove UA is worthy to join the alliance.
Minsk Agreement used to strengthen NATO's hold on, and train UA's armed forces ... betrayal ‼️
EuroTrib diary archive key word | Angela Merkel |
Shooting holes into the narrative by Eastern European warmongers ... always.
What is DARPA doing in Ukraine?
DARPA, the Pentagon's high-tech office, is working with the government of Ukraine to develop capabilities to help Kiev in its hybrid warfare challenge.
- Killer robots have seen action in Ukraine since at least 2016. Here's a description of one such use in May 2017, from the Minsk Monitor.
Minsk Monitor.
DARPA director Steven Walker, who recently took over that job after five years as the agency's deputy, told reporters that he had personally visited the country in 2016 for talks with Ukrainian military, intel and industry leaders.
The NATO led proxy war in Ukraine against Russia to test their new weapons in a live ammo experiment ... bloodshed to prove UA is worthy to join the alliance.
Minsk Agreement used to strengthen NATO's hold on, and train UA's armed forces ... betrayal ‼️
EuroTrib diary archive key word | Angela Merkel |
Shooting holes into the narrative by Eastern European warmongers ... always.
🔻🔻🔻2
The folly of politicians will only lead to more bloodshed of an unwinnable war ...
The Russo-Ukrainian War: A Strategic Assessment Two Years Into the Conflict | AUSA |
The Russo-Ukrainian War is passing into its third year. In the period leading up to this point in the conflict, the defense and security studies community has been awash with arguments stating that the war is a stalemate. Perhaps the most compelling argument comes from General Valery Zaluzhny former commander-in-chief of Ukraine's armed forces, who stated as much in an interview with the Economist in November 2023.
Nonetheless, two years in, it is useful to objectively examine the conflict's strategic balance. Some basic questions guide the examination, such as: is Ukraine winning, or is Russia winning? What does Ukraine need to defeat Russia, and conversely, what does Russia need to win in Ukraine? Moreover, aside from identifying who is winning or losing the conflict, it is important to identify salient trends that are germane not just within the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, but that are applicable throughout the defense and security studies communities.
This article addresses these questions through the use of the ends-ways-means-risk heuristic. In doing so, it examines Russia and Ukraine's current strategic dispositions, and not what they were in February 2022, nor what we might want them to be. Viewing the conflict through the lens of preference and aspiration causes any analyst to misread the strategic situation.
The overall conclusion is that Russia is winning the conflict. Russia is winning because it possesses its minimally acceptable outcome: the possession of the Donbas, of the land bridge to Crimea, and of Crimea itself. This victory condition, however, is dependent upon Ukraine's inability to generate a force sufficient to
a) defeat Russia's forces in each of those discrete pieces of territory;
b) retake control of that territory; and
c) hold that territory against subsequent Russian counterattacks.
No amount of precision strike, long-range fires or drone attacks can compensate for the lack of land forces Ukraine needs to defeat Russia's army and then take and hold all that terrain. Thus, without an influx of resources for the Ukrainian armed forces--to include a significant increase in land forces--Russia will likely prevail in the conflict. If U.S. support to Ukraine remains frozen, as it is at the time of this writing, then Russian victory in 2024 is a real possibility.
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: SITUATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Moreover, several other important implications emerge for the defense and security studies community. First, land wars fought for control of territory possess inherently different military end states than irregular wars, counterinsurgencies and civil wars. Therefore, militaries must have the right army for the conflict in which they are engaged. A counterinsurgency army or constabulary force, for instance, will not win a war for territory against an industrialized army built to fight and win wars of attrition. This is something policymakers, senior military leaders and force designers must appreciate and carefully consider as they look to build the armies of the future.
Second, land wars fought for control of territory require military strategies properly aligned to those ends. Therefore, militaries must have the right strategy for the conflict, or phase of the conflict, in which they are engaged. A strategy built on the centrality of precision strike but lacking sufficient land forces to exploit the success of precision strike, for instance, will not win a war for territory--especially against an industrialized army built to fight and win wars of attrition.
[...]
Fourth, a prepared, layered and protected defense, like that of Russia's along the contact line with Ukraine's armed forces, is challenging to overcome. This challenge grows exponentially if the attacker lacks sufficiently resilient and resourced land forces that are capable of a three-fold mission: (1) defeating the occupying army; (2) moving into the liberated territory; and (3) controlling that land. Armies that are designed to deliver a punch but lack the depth of force structure to continue advancing into vacated or liberated territory after a successful attack, and subsequently are unable to stave off counterattacks, are of little use beyond defensive duty. This finding is at odds with conventional wisdom regarding future force structure that posits that future forces should be small and light and should fight dispersed.
Fifth, Carl von Clausewitz warns that, "So long as I have not overthrown my opponent, I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him."3 The Russo-Ukrainian War has reiterated Clausewitz's caution: as neither army is able to outright defeat the other, Russia and Ukraine are locked in a long war of attrition, which is fueling the stalemate to which Zaluzhny refers and Watling rejects. The writing between the lines thus suggests that, when confronted with war, a state must unleash a military force that is capable of both defeating its adversary's army and simultaneously accomplishing its supplemental conditions of end state, to include taking and holding large swaths of physical terrain. Without defeating an adversary's army--regardless of its composition--one must then always contend with the possibility that tactical military gains are fleeting. Moreover, by first defeating an adversary's army, one might turn what would otherwise be a long war of attrition into a short war of attrition.
In states with many factions vying for power, the center of gravity lies mainly in the capital; in small states supported by a more powerful one, it lies in the army of the stronger state; in alliances, it lies in the unity formed by common interests; in popular uprisings, it lies in the persons of the principal leaders and in public opinion.
-- Carl von Clausewitz
Today the warmongers are out in force to increase "defense" spending to be capable to win the next war against Russia or the next imaginary enemy ... As the World Turns. Planet Earth continues to suffer from the crazies in politics and rightwing think tanks.
A Clausewitzian View of NATO | The Diplomat - 2014 |
Allies won't help defend nations that refuse to defend themselves.
The Naval Diplomat is not from Missouri, America's Show-Me State [this blogger admits he too is from this state - Oui]. But I'm in a show-me state of mind following last week's NATO summit in another Newport -- Newport, Wales. Lofty words were said. The summit communiqué pledges, for instance, to restore some sanity to defense spending.
NATO long ago fixed the standard for defense spending at 2 percent of GDP. Few meet the standard, but at Newport the NATO-European powers put everyone on notice that they're really, truly serious about it.
Zelensky offers Europe its war hardened armed forces as an asset in a new European Army
Continuing its historic war against Russia to protect all of Europe ... the comedian stated.
A M.A.D. high-tech race to oblivion.
With Trump, my scenario has become redundant 😅
Crimea As Endgame Before Going M.A.D.
Obama's single, best advice: "Don't do stupid wars!"
