by Oui
Tue Jun 10th, 2025 at 04:51:54 PM EST
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Iran claims to have sensitive Israeli documents of nuclear sites | i24 News |
While pressure mounts on Iran over its nuclear program, Tehran has claimed that it has obtained sensitive documents of Israeli nuclear sites
Israeli target list on the table; regime's secret nuclear facilities to be targeted if Iran attacked: SNSC
A partial view of Israel's Dimona nuclear power plant in the southern Negev desert (AFP)
The SNSC said the complete Israeli target list is on the table of the Armed Forces, and that the regime's clandestine nuclear facilities will be targeted if it carries out any act of aggression.
Pointing to the trove of secret Israeli documents Iran has recently obtained, the SNSC said access to such information and the completion of the intelligence and operational cycle have boosted the capabilities of the Iranian forces.
Today, the statement said, the Iranian forces are able to "respond immediately to any potential aggression by the Zionist regime against the country's nuclear facilities by attacking its hidden nuclear facilities."
They can also counter any malicious act against Iran's economic and military infrastructure proportional to the type of aggression, the statement said.
..agreement with Russia to build eight nuclear power plants.
Damn ... are the Shahed drones that expensive? Drone Saturation: Russia's Shahed Campaign | CSIS |
Shahed Saegheh is one of two Iranian flying wing UAVs based on the RQ-170 Sentinel [espionage flight early December 2011], along with the Shahed 171 Simorgh, a larger version.
IAEA Grossi JCPOA Agreement and Iran
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Head of UN nuclear watchdog says he believes both US and Iran want to reach an agreement | AP Archive |
Rafael Mariano Grossi, director-general of International Atomic Energy Agency:
"When the previous agreement of the 2015 JCPOA was concluded the then inventory of enriched uranium was shipped out, and it ended up in Russia. I don't know whether a similar model could be applied in this case. The big difference here is that we are talking about 400, more or less 400kgs of 60% uranium. It's a very high level of enrichment. So it is a delicate matter but I think that if that was the issue upon which the agreement depended, I'm sure that there will be more than one country which would be willing to assist in this case."
2015 JCPOA Agreement US - P5+1 and Iran
From the Iran Nuclear Deal to a Middle East WMD Free Zone?
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, is an important milestone in the efforts to address the international community's concerns about the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the ultimate fate of the JCPOA is unknown at the time of writing, it is a reference point for future nuclear agreements - as a model to emulate, a poster child for what to avoid, or (more likely) a mixture of both. While the agreement includes a provision stating it "should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law", learning from the JCPOA experience could prove invaluable. This is especially the case for the broader approach needed to address proliferation in the region such as through the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (ME WMDFZ, also known hereafter as the Zone)
The idea to establish an ME WMDFZ has been discussed in international forums since 1974. There have been two attempts at region-wide talks: The Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group in the 1990s and Glion/Geneva informal consultations in the 2010s. Meanwhile, international concern about Iran's nuclear programme first arose in 2003. A negotiated solution was first pursued by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3) together with the European Union (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
The JCPOA and Zone processes moved forward in parallel from around the time of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After nearly 12 years of negotiations, the E3/EU together with China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America (E3/EU+3) reached the JCPOA with Iran by July 2015. Meanwhile, the 2015 NPT Review Conference failed to reach consensus on a final document in part due to the ME WMDFZ issue. More recently, the United Nations General Assembly mandated in 2018 an annual conferences process to negotiate a treaty. However, an agreement has been elusive.
Trump 1.0 Cancels JCPOA at the request of friendly state Israel
Iran Readies Natanz for Enrichment within Limits JCPOA | Oui @BooMan - 5 June 2018 |
Killing the Iran nuclear deal was one of Trump's biggest failures | Responsible Statecraft - 8 May 2024 |
Six years after former President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the disastrous consequences of this decision are still adding up.
In addition to Iran being closer than ever to a nuclear weapons capability, now we must consider how the declining security situation in the Middle East has raised the stakes significantly. Trump promised a "better deal" but instead we got an increasingly costly blunder that may be impossible to fix.
To fully understand the enormity of Trump's decision to leave the Iran deal, consider this: When the U.S. and Iran were complying with the deal, it was estimated that it would take Iran about one year to produce enough fissile material (in this case, weapons grade uranium) for a nuclear bomb (known as the "breakout" time).
The states negotiating with Iran (the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany) assessed that this would be enough time to respond to possible violations and prevent Iran from producing a bomb. Even if Iran were to acquire sufficient fissile material, it could still take another year for Iran to make a deliverable nuclear weapon. As of May, 2018, the deal was working and considered (by most) to be a great success.
Repeat performance this week as the Trump - Iran negotiations are going nowhere ... imposing the unrealistic demands of the rogue ally, the Jewish State of Israel
IAEA Governor's meeting in Austria on Iran
IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors | 10 June 2025 |
The Agency's comprehensive assessment of what took place - based on our technical evaluation of all available safeguards-relevant information - has led us to conclude that these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material.
Arising from this, the Agency also concludes that Iran did not declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at these three undeclared locations in Iran. As a consequence of this, the Agency is not in a position to determine whether the related nuclear material is still outside of safeguards.
In addition, Iran's unilateral decision to stop implementation of modified Code 3.1 has led to a significant reduction in the Agency's ability to verify whether Iran's nuclear programme is entirely peaceful and is also contrary to its legal obligations set out in Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
The rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium - as detailed in my other report before you: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) - is of serious concern and adds to the complexity of the issues I have described. Given the potential proliferation implications, the Agency cannot ignore the stockpiling of over 400 kg of highly enriched uranium.
I call upon Iran urgently to cooperate fully and effectively with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Unless and until Iran assists the Agency in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. I am convinced that the only way forward goes through a diplomatic solution, strongly backed by an IAEA verification arrangement. I will continue to support and encourage the US and Iran to spare no effort and exercise wisdom and political courage to bring this to a successful conclusion. The effect of a stabilized situation in Iran with regards to its nuclear programme will be immediate and bring the Middle East one big step closer to peace and prosperity.
On May 31, 2025, the two Iranian institutions responded to Rafael Grossi's comprehensive report, prepared for the June 2025 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, parts of which were prematurely leaked by Western media outlets.
Joint Statement by Iran's Foreign Ministry and Atomic Energy Organization on Grossi's Report | 31 May 2025 |
Lack of Integrity by the U.S. and Three European Countries
The statement asserts:
With reference to the recent IAEA Director General's report (document GOV/2025/25 dated May 31, 2025), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Atomic Energy Organization highlight the following points:
The governments of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States have repeatedly violated their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, while simultaneously imposing unlawful unilateral sanctions and exerting pressure contrary to international law against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
During the IAEA Board of Governors' November 2024 session, these countries, ignoring the constructive outcome of the Director General's visit to Iran, politically and unjustifiably pushed for a resolution against Iran. This move, however, failed to garner wide support among IAEA member states and exposed the divisive and destructive intent of the resolution's sponsors.
This approach once again underscores the insincerity of the three European states and the U.S. in claiming to uphold the IAEA's credibility or to pursue a genuine agreement. They have persistently weaponized the IAEA to advance their own political agendas.
The Garden and the Jungle in 1973
Iran, Radioisotopes, & the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action | FPRI John Haines – 27 July 2015 |
The JCPA explicitly seeks to shift radioisotope production from one mode—nuclear research reactors—to another—particle accelerators. The reason is simple: to reduce or eliminate Iran’s use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets and nuclear research reactors to produce radioisotopes. Research reactors have been integral to covert nuclear weapons programs in many countries: for example, India, Iraq, North Korea, Romania, and Yugoslavia all used them to produce plutonium for their domestic nuclear weapons programs. If un-, or under noticed, the JCPA’s effort to shift radioisotope production from research reactors to particle accelerators is a nonetheless foundational article of the agreement.
This is no small task: research reactors produce four-fifths of man-made radioisotopes worldwide. The remainder is produced by devices called particle accelerators—either circular ones called cyclotrons, or less commonly, straight or “linear” accelerators known as LINACS. The nuclear reactor method uses uranium-235 fission to produce neutrons in large numbers, called neutron flux. When certain target materials are exposed to neutron flux inside a nuclear reactor, radioisotopes are formed. The process involves irradiating the target material, which is encapsulated in a specially designed container and loaded into a predetermined location in the reactor core or reflector. The target may be a stable material, which captures neutrons when the bombarding particles interact with the target material to form radioisotopes. Alternately, it can be uranium-235 that neutron flux causes to fission and form short- and long-lived fission products, some of which may undergo successive decays to form decay products.
Particle accelerators utilize magnets and alternating electrical fields to accelerate charged particles to very high speed and collide them into a stable target material. This collision causes nuclei in the target material to take up high-energy protons, then to de-excite by emitting subatomic particles and radiation to form radioisotopes. Another approach is to bombard a primary target to produce neutrons or photons, which collide with a production target to form radioisotopes of interest. Particle accelerators have several advantages: first, they produce far less (<10 percent) and far less hazardous radioactive waste than nuclear reactors; second, they tend to be less centralized, i.e., isotope production is spread over a greater number of facilities, meaning radioisotopes are produced locally or regionally rather than transported over long distances; and third, there is zero risk of a nuclear accident since they are powered by electricity rather than uranium fission. In the context of the JCPA, their perceived overriding advantage is that particle accelerators do not pose a proliferation risk[20] since they utilize neither highly enriched uranium targets nor controlled chain reactions that produce weapons-grade nuclear material.
Iran’s IR-40 Is A Heavy Water Nuclear Research Reactor. It is a “fundamental principle” of the JCPA that “Iran will redesign and rebuild” the Arak reactor to operate on low enriched (≤3.67 percent by mass) uranium in order to “support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes.” Converting the Arak IR-40 to low enriched uranium fuel is intended to reduce its production of weapons-grade plutonium by between 73 percent and 85 percent (the range is a function of the LEU’s enrichment level). A proliferation-resistant enrichment level still results in the production of some plutonium. Its diversion by Iran would be susceptible to IAEA detection and discovery.
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Arak Nuclear Complex IR-40 - Iran's Plutonium Pathway to Nuclear Weapons | Israel Source Hasbara |
From BooMan archive …
Escalation Towards Military Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities | 7 Nov. 2011 |
The Iran meme has crashed and burned inside Israel on two other scores, as well. First, Netanyahu appears to have forced out Meir Dagan, the head of the Israeli spying agency Mossad, whose departure coincided with that of the chief of staff, the head of domestic intelligence, and other key security officials. Dagan, having become a civilian, promptly went public, lambasting Netanyahu for refusing to make peace with the Palestinians while it was still possible.
Dagan went on to accuse Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, of grossly exaggerating the threat from Iran, calling a strike on that country “stupid idea that offers no advantage.” He warned that it would provoke another rocket attack on Israel by Lebanon’s Hizbullah, and perhaps by Syria as well- i.e. it could lead to a regional conflagration.
The back story that has emerged in the Israeli press is that Barak, who is a notorious war-monger and adventurist, had gotten Netanyahu’s ear and pressed for a military strike on Iran. Dagan and all the other major security officials stood against this foolhardy plan, and managed to derail it. But Dagan is said to be concerned that virtually all the level heads have gone out of office together, and that Netanyahu and Barak may now be in a position to revive their crazy plan of attacking Iran.
Nuclear Proliferation Under the Eyes of CIA
Nuclear Spy AQ Khan – CIA/America Refused Arrest in 1975 & 1985 | by Oui @BooMan – 9 Aug. 2005 |
~ Cross-posted @ Daily Kos ~
Pakistani nuclear spy AQ Khan stole essential blue prints in the Netherlands in the seventies. The Dutch secret service BVD was on to the espionage and uncovered the role Khan played to remove documents from nuclear facilities of UCN/URENCO ultracentrifuge process for enriched uranium and NIKHEF research institute.
Ruud Lubbers reveals today that on two occasions to his personal knowledge, the decision to arrest Khan for espionage was thwarted by the CIA and America. The reason was the CIA and US was following Khan in his effort to obtain nuclear materials and sophisticated nuclear test equipment, in order to uncover the countries and persons involved in world-wide nuclear proliferation. Therefore on both occasions, Dutch government and Justice stepped back and let Pakistani nuclear spy travel out of the Netherlands.
More advanced Dutch Urenco nuclear technology leaked to Pakistan, Iran and Libya
Pakistan has acquired more advanced Dutch ultracentrifuge technology in the 1970’s than was publicly known so far. Information compiled by Nuclear Fuel suggests that, besides the previously assumed theft from the Netherlands by the nuclear spy Abdul Qadeer Khan of the technology of three other models (CNOR, SNOR and G-2), know-how from the later 4-M ultracentrifuge programme of UCN made its way to Pakistan. UCN is formerly the Dutch branch of the British-German-Dutch company Urenco, now Enrichment Technology Nederland, or ET NL.
In the 1980s the U.S. (Rumsfeld) and CIA supported Saddam Hussein in the slaughter (and gassing) of a million Iranians.
